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1

"ORDER PERMITTING APPELLEES TO SUPPLEMENT
RECORD ON APPEAL" dated January 3,1996. Allows Appellees
to include the official file and record in the underlying lawsuit in
the Court of Judge Timothy R. Hanson, Civil No. 900907125PI.

2

"MINUTE ENTRY" dated June 22,1995, issued by Judge Frank G.
Noel with respect to the hearing held on May 24, 1995, pertaining
to both parties' Motions for Summary Judgment.

3

"SUMMARY JUDGMENT signed by the Honorable Frank G.
Noel on September 8, 1995.

4

Miller's STANDARD INSURANCE POLICIES ANNOTATED Vol.
I, page 215.

5

HOMEOWNER'S INSURANCE POLICY issued by American Fire
and Casualty Company to the Olsons.

6

"COMPLAINT in the underlying lawsuit COUNTS is on pages
9-12 of the said Complaint (S.R. 9-12).

7

Covering pages dated November 16, 1987, from Frank Grant,
Plaintiffs' Accident Reconstruction Expert pertaining to the accident
in the underlying lawsuit

8

Statement of MICHELLE PAXTON. taken by Frank Grant on
November 3, 1987.

9

Statement of STEPHANIE SMITH, taken by Frank Grant on
November 6, 1987.
"SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT dated November 21, 1987, from
Frank Grant discussing Jennifer Heather Olson's blood alcohol
content of .14 percent

"TOXICOLOGY REPORT' dated October 23, 1987, signed by
Bruce Beck at the Public Safety Toxicology Section, showing a
blood alcohol content for Jennifer Heather Olson of .14 percent.
12

Certain pages from the "CONSOLIDATED RESPONSES OF
RONALD H. OLSON AND CAROL D. OLSON TO THE
PLAINTIFFS' FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES" (S.R. 78,
86, 87, 90, 92, and 96).

13

Certain pages from the Deposition of JENNIFER HEATHER
OLSON including S.R. 454, 470-475, 477-492, 513-516.

14

Certain pages from the Deposition of HEIDI NELSON including
S.R. 388, 393, 395, 398, and 405.

15

Certain pages from the Deposition of KRISTI BRINGHURST
including S.R. 284.

16

Certain pages from the Deposition of JENNIFER PIA including
S.R. 307-313.

17

Certain pagesfromthe Deposition of SCOTT LEVY including S.R.
346, 358-359, 362.

18

Certain pagesfromthe Deposition of MARK MUIR including S.R.
412, 421-422, 425.

19

Certain pages from the Deposition of STEVEN KENT JONES
including S.R. 432, 446-449.

20

Letter dated July 22, 1992, from H. F. Carlson, Claims Supervisor,
for the American Fire and Casualty Company to Michael N
Martinez, Esq., attorney for the Olsons, acknowledging an
obligation on the part of American Fire to represent the Olsons in
the underlying lawsuit if certain facts could be demonstrated. This
letter is found at R. 100.

21

"MINUTE ENTRY" dated September 29, 1992, pertaining to the
final Pretrial Conference held before the Honorable Timothy R.
Hanson establishing policies and procedures to be used at the trial
of the underlying lawsuit Found at S.R. 162-164.

22

"STIPULATION" dated November 19, 1992, and signed by all of
the parties and their counsel in the underlying lawsuit. This
Stipulation sets out the procedures the parties intend to follow at
trial and also pertains to an assignment to Myra L. Taylor of the
Olsons' claims against their Homeowner's insurer in exchange for
-2-

an agreement by the Plaintiffs and USAA not to execute on any of
the Olsons' personal assets. This Stipulation is found at S.R. 177184.
23

COURT REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT of comments made by the
Honorable Timothy R. Hanson at the trial held on November 19,
1992, in the underlying lawsuit and explaining Judge Hanson's
methodology for reviewing Findings of Fact, Exhibits, Depositions,
etc. before arriving at a final decision. This Transcript is found at
S.R. 234-243.

24

COURT REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT of the testimony of the
Olsons in the underlying lawsuit, the proffer of their counsel
Michael N. Martinez and the Court's questioning of each of the
three Olsons separately with regard to their understanding of the
Stipulation and the Plaintiffs' proposed Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Final Judgment This Transcript is found
at S.R. 244-249.

25

Plaintiffs' proposed "FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW showing pencilled changes made by the Honorable
Timothy R. Hanson. This document is found at S.R. 192-206.

26

Plaintiffs'proposed "FINAL JUDGMENT' showing Judge Hanson's
pencilled change in the amount of general damages in paragraph 1
on page 2. This document is found at S.R. 207-209.

27

Letter dated January 25 1993, from Judge Timothy R. Hanson to
James A. Mcintosh, Esq., attorney for Myra Taylor, and Michael N.
Martinez, Esq., attorney for the Olsons in the underlying lawsuit.
This letter pertains to Judge Hanson's review of the evidence, the
depositions, transcripts, exhibits, etc. and the changes he made in
the Plaintiffs' proposed FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW, and FINAL JUDGMENT. This letter directs Plaintiffs'
counsel James A. Mcintosh to prepare new FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, and a new FINAL JUDGMENT. This
document is found at S.R. 190-191.

28

"FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW" signed
by Judge Timothy R. Hanson on January 27, 1993. This document
is found at S.R. 210-224.

29

"FINAL JUDGMENT1 signed by Judge Timothy R. Hanson on
January 27, 1993. This document is found at S.R. 225-227.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 8th day of March 1996 two copies of the above and
foregoing"ADDENDUM OF APPELLEES" were hand-delivered to the following:
Jill M. Aggeler, Esq.
Paul H. Matthews, Esq.
KIRTON & McCONKIE
60 East South Temple, Suite 1800
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

AMES A. McINTOSH
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EXHIBIT "1

JAMES A. McINTOSH, ESQ. -- No. 2194
JAMES A. McINTOSH & ASSOCIATES P.C.
A Utah Professional Law Corporation
Suite 17, Intrade Bldg. South
1399 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84105
Telephone: (801) 487-7834

FILED
JAN

3 1995

CLERK SUPREME COURT,
UTAH

Attorneys for Appellees

I N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
MYRA L. TAYLOR, RONALD H.
OLSON, CAROL D. OLSON, AND
JENNIFER VAN BOERUM aka
JENNIFER HEATHER OLSON

ORDER PERMITTING
APPELLEES TO SUPPLEMENT
RECORD ON APPEAL

Appellees
Appellate Court No. 950448

v.
AMERICAN
FIRE
AND
CASUALTY COMPANY, an Ohio
Corporation
Appellant

Third Judicial District Court
Salt Lake County
Civil No. 930902492 CN
(Judge Frank G. Noel)

Based upon the "Appellees' Motion to Supplement Record on Appeal" dated
January 3, 1996, and the parties' "Stipulation Permitting Appellees to Supplement Record
on Appeal" dated January 3, 1996, and good cause appearing therefor,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

The Appellees are hereby permitted to supplement the record on appeal to

include the official file and record in the lawsuit in Judge Timothy R. Hanson's Court as
Civil No. 900907125PI entitled MYRA L. TAYLOR. Plaintiff v. RONALD H. OLSON.
CAROL D. OLSON, and JENNIFER HEATHER OLSON. Defendants.

2.

The Appeals Clerk in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake

County, State of Utah, is directed to prepare an Index including the supplemented record
and to paginate the said supplemented record as directed by Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure and by the Clerk of this Court.
3.

Both parties may use the suppJemenred record on appeal in any Briefs,

Addenda, or other documents which are filed in this Supreme Court.
DATED this 3rd day of January 1996.

BY THE COURT

JUSTICE

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 3rd day of January 1996 a true and correct copy of the
above and foregoing ORDER PERMITTING APPELLEES TO SUPPLEMENT RECORD
ON APPEAL was hand-delivered to the following:
Jill M. Aggeler, Esq.
KIRTON & McCONKIE
60 East South Temple, Suite 1800
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

sG^A* ft'M*%H&Jt
/ JAMES A. McINTOSH
c:\wpdata\fiIcs\taylor.app\order
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EXHIBIT "2"

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

Myra L. Taylor, Ronald H. Olson,
Carol D. Olson and Jennifer Van Boerum
a/k/a Jennifer Heather Olson,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
American Fire and Casualty Company, an
Ohio Corporation,
Defendants.

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

MINUTE ENTRY

Civil No. 930902492 CN
JUDGE FRANK G. NOEL

The court has reviewed the parties5 motions for summary judgment together with the
memos filed in connection therewith, has heard oral argument and after having taking the matter
under advisement now rules as follows:
The court is of the opinion that the State of Utah recognizes the distinct tort of a parent's
failure to properly supervise and control the conduct of a minor child. The homeowner's
insurance policy in question covers the circumstances in that portion of plaintiffs' complaint
alleging the Olsons' failure to properly supervise and to control the conduct of their minor child.
Accordingly, the defendant had a duty to defend the Olsons in the underlying Taylor/Olson
lawsuit. The defendant was aware of said lawsuit, was repeatedly requested to defend the
Olsons under the terms of the policy but refused to do so. Under these circumstances the
defendant is not entitled to collaterally attack the findings of the trial judge wherein it was

0 012 3 2

TAYLOR V. AMERICAN

PAGE TWO

MINUTE ENTRY

determined, after trial, that the Olsons' failure to supervise and properly control the conduct of
their minor child was the sole proximate cause of the accident.
Accordingly the court grants the plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment.
The parties are asked to consult with one another to determine if they can agree that the
issue of attorney's fees be submitted to the court on an affidavit. If not then the court will
notice the matter for an evidentiary hearing regarding attorney's fees.
The court will certify this as a final judgment pursuant to Rule 54b of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.
Counsel for plaintiffs is to prepare an order consistent with this ruling.
Dated this ^ < ^ d a y of Jiine, 1995.

0 012 33

MINUTE ENTRY
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TAYLOR V. AMERICAN

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Minute Entry,
postage prepaid, to the following on this

cy^-day

of June, 1995.

James A. Mcintosh
JAMES A. MCINTOSH & ASSOCIATES
Attorney for Plaintiff
Suite 17, Intrade Bldg. South
1399 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84105
Donald J. Purser
Jill M. Aggeler
PURSER & EDWARDS
Attorney for Defendants
39 Market Street, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-2104
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EXHIBIT "3"

JAMES A. McINTOSH, ESQ. -- No. 2194
JAMES A. McINTOSH & ASSOCIATES P.C.
A Utah Professional Law Corporation
Suite 17, Intrade Bldg. South
1399 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84105
Telephone: (801) 487-7834

Yulrr .;•-:::

'.strict

SEP 0 8 1995
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs

......

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
MYRA L. TAYLOR, RONALD H.
OLSON, CAROL D. OLSON, AND
JENNIFER VAN BOERUM aka
JENNIFER HEATHER OLSON
Plaintiffs
v.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT
!

Civil No. 930902492CN

[

(Judge Frank G. Noel)

A M E R I C A N F I R E AND
CASUALTY COMPANY, an Ohio
Corporation
Defendant

The above-entitled matter having come on regularly for hearing on Wednesday,
May 24, 1995, between the hours of 8:30 A.M. and 10:00 A.M. before the Honorable
Frank G, Noel pursuant to the Motions for Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiffs and
Defendant; the Plaintiffs being represented by the law firm of James A. Mcintosh &
Associates P.C, appearing through counsel James A. Mcintosh; the Defendant being
represented by the law firm of Purser, Edwards & Shields, L.L.C, appearing through
counsel Jill M. Aggeler; the Court having reviewed the parties' Motions for Summary

Judgment together with the Memoranda filed in connection therewith; the Court having
heard arguments of counsel and having taken the matter under advisement; the Court
having, on June 22, 1995, signed that certain "Minute Entry," a copy of which is attached
to this Summary Judgment as Exhibit "1" and is by reference incorporated herein and made
a part hereof; the Court being fully advised in the premises;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED. ADJUDGED. AND DECREED AS A SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AS FOLLOWS:
1.

The Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.

2.

The Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.

3.

The Homeowners' Insurance Policy ("Policy") issued by the Defendant covers

the circumstances in that portion of Plaintiffs' Complaint alleging the Olsons failed to
properly supervise and control the conduct of their minor child.

The Homeowners'

Insurance Policy is attached as Exhibit "1" to that certain documenl entitled "Plaintiffs'
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Their Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment Regarding Insurance Policy Liability," dated January 23, 1995 ("Plaintiffs'
Memorandum"), which is by reference incorporated herein and made a part hereof.
4.

The Defendant had a duty to defend the Olsons in the underlying

Taylor/Olsons' Lawsuit, Civil No. 900907125PI in this Court, a copy of which underlying
Complaint is attached to the Plaintiffs5 Memorandum as Exhibit "2" and is by reference
incorporated herein and made a part hereof. The Defendant was aware of said lawsuit,
was repeatedly requested to defend the Olsons under the terms of the Policy but refused
to do so.

5.

The Plaintiffs are hereby awarded judgment against the Defendant in the

amount of one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000.00) which is the face amount of the said
Policy.
6.

The Plaintiffs are hereby award judgment against the Defendant for interest

from January 27, 1993, the date the underlying judgment was signed by the Honorable
Timothy R. Hanson at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum on the full amount of
the judgment of $203,794.14 pursuant to the provisions of "SECTION 2 - ADDITIONAL
COVERAGES" on page 13 of the said Policy. Interest will continue at the rate of twelve
percent (12%) per annum on the full amount of Judge Hanson's judgment of $203,794.14
from January 27, 1993, until the Defendant pays or tenders or deposits in Court the said
principal amount of $100,000 together with the amount of eight thousand three hundred
forty-five dollars ($8,345.00) awarded as attorney fees in accordance with paragraph 7 below.
7.

The Plaintiffs are hereby awarded judgment against the Defendant for

attorney fees which the Olsons incurred in the underlying Taylor/Olsons' lawsuit to their
attorney, Michael N. Martinez, Esq., in the amount of five thousand seven hundred seventyone dollars and twenty-five cents ($5,771.25) together with interest on said amount of two
thousand five hundred seventy-three dollars and seventy-seven cents ($2,573.77) for a total
amount of eight thousand three hundred forty-five dollars ($8,345.00). This $8,345.00 will
bear interest at the rate of nine and twenty-two hundredths percent (9.22%) per annum
from the entry of the judgment until paid.
8.

Attorney fees requested by Plaintiffs for services rendered by their attorney

James A. Mcintosh, Esq. in this Court and in the two proceedings in the Courts of Judge
Dee Vc Benson and Judge David Sam in the United States District Court for the District
of Utah will be deferred and decided as part of the Plaintiffs' bad-faith claims in their

Complaint in this Court and no decision is being made as to those fees in this Summary
Judgment.
9.

This judgment and all portions herein are certified as "final" pursuant to the

provisions of Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In this connection, the
Court expressly finds and determines that there is no just reason for delay and expressly
directs the entry of judgment as stated herein.
DONE IN OPEN COURT this

Q

day of A»gW 1995

BY THE CO

FRANK G. NOEfc
District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM

.4.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 25th day of August 1995 a true and correct copy of the
above and foregoing SUMMARY JUDGMENT was hand-delivered to the following:
Jill M. Aggeler, Esq.
KIRTON & McCONKIE
60 East South Temple, Suite 1800
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

( /AMES A. McINTOSH

C:\wpdata\files\tay lor.2^udgmntZsum
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

Myra L. Taylor, Ronald H. Olson,
Carol D. Olson and Jennifer Van Boerum
a/k/a Jennifer Heather Olson,
Plaintiffs,

MINUTE ENTRY

Civil No. 930902492 CN
vs.

JUDGE FRANK G. NOEL
American Fire and Casualty Company, an
Ohio Corporation,
Defendants.
The court has reviewed the parties' motions for summary judgment together with the
memos filed in connection therewith, has heard oral ai'gument and after having taking the matter
under advisement now rules as follows:
The court is of the opinion that the State of Utah recognizes the distinct tort of a parent's
failure to properly supervise and control the conduct of a minor child. The homeowner's
insurance policy in question covers the circumstances in that portion of plaintiffs' compiaint
alleging the Olsons' failure to properly supervise and to control the conduct of their minor child.
Accordingly, the defendant had a duty to defend the Olsons in the underlying Taylor/Clson
lawsuit. The defendant was aware of said lawsuit, was repeatedly requested to defend the
Olsons under the terms of the policy but refused to do so. Under these circumstance:; the
defendant is not entitied to collaterally attack: the findings of the trial judge wherein it was

(IflUOf
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MINUTE ENTRY

determined, after trial, that the Olsons' failure to supervise and properly control the conduct of
their minor child was the sole proximate cause of thfe accident.
Accordingly the court grants the plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment.
The parties are asked to consult with one another to determine if they can agree that the
issue of attorney's fees be submitted to the court on an affidavit. If not then the court will
notice the matter for an evidentiary hearing regarding attorney's fees.
The court will certify this as a fmal judgmejit pursuant to Rule 54b of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.
Counsel for plaintiffs is to prepare an order consistent with this ruling.
Dated this ^

<^4ay of June, 1995.

TAYLOR V. AMERICAN

PAGE THREE

MINUTE ENTRY

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Minute Entry,
postage prepaid, to the following on this

C7~2-day of June, 1995.

James A. Mcintosh
JAMES A. MCINTOSH & ASSOCIATES
Attorney for Plaintiff
Suite 17, Intrade Bldg. South
1399 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84105
Donald J. Purser
Jill M. Aggeler
PURSER & EDWARDS
Attorney for Defendants
39 Market Street, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-2104
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EXHIBIT "4

MILLER'S

STANDARD INSURANCE POLICIES
ANNOTATED
by
Susan J. Miller
and
Philip Lefebvre

VOL I

POLICIES

MILLERS STANDARD INSURANCE POLICIES ANNOTATED

M O

-f o r- m s

HO 00 03 04 91
2.2 lb6-c

Arising out of the rental or holding for rental
of any part of any premises by an "msuied "
This exclusion does not apply to the rental or
holding for rental of an "insured location"
( 1 ) On an occasional basis if used only as a
residence
( 2 ) In part for use only as a residence unless
a single family unit is intended for use by
the occupying family to lodge more than
two roomers or boarders or
(3) In part as an office, school studio or private garage.

2.2 lc - d.

Arising out of the rendering of or failure to
render professional services.

2.2 Id - •

Arising out of a premises

2.2 ldl —
2.2 ld2 —

(1) Owned by an "insured".

2.2 ld3 —

( 3 ) Rented to others by an "insured",

2.2 le — f.

2.2 le2 —

2.2 leA

Arising out of

( 2 ) The entrustment by an "insured' of a motor
vehicle or any other motorized land
conveyance to any person or
Vicarious
liability
whether
or
not
statutorily imposed for the actions of a
child or minor using a conveyance ex
eluded m paragraph (1) or ( 2 ) above

. This exclusion does not apply to

2.2 leAl- ( 1 )

A trailer not towed by or earned on a motorized land conveyance

2.2 leA2 — ( 2 )

A motorized land conveyance designed for
recreational use off public roads not subject to motor vehicle registration and

2.2 leA2a

(a)

2.2 leA2b

( b ) Owned by an 'insured" and on an "insured location"

2.2 leA3- (3)
2.2 leA4
2.2 leA4a
2.2 leA4b
2.2 leA4c

2.2 lf2

( 3 ) Vicarious
liability
whether
or
not
statutorily imposed for the actions of a
child
or minor
using
an
excluded
watercraft described below

2.2 lf3

Excluded watercraft are those that are principally designed to be propelled by engine
power oi electric motor or are sailing vessels,
whether owned by or rented to an "insured "
This exclusion does not apply to watercraft

(b)

inboard or inboard-outdrive engine or
motor power of more than 50 horsepower not owned by or rented to an
"insured"

( c ) One or more outboard engines or motors with 25 total horsepower or less

( 4 ) A vehicle or conveyance not subject to
motor vehicle registration which is
( a ) Used to service an "insureds" residence
Designee for
icapped or

assisting

the

hand-

— 2 . 2 lfAl
_ 2.2 lfA2

__ 2.2 IfA3
2.2 lfA3a

(•)

2.2 lfA4

Outboard engines or motois of more
than 25 total horsepower owned by an
"insured" if
(») You acquire them prior to the policy
period and
(a) You declare them at policy inception or

2.2 lfA4a
_

2.2 lfA4a2

(b) Your intention to insure is re
ported to us in writing withm 45
days after you acquire the outboard engines or motors

2.2 lfA4b

( I I ) You acquire them during the policy
period
This coverage applies for the policy
period
( 2 ) That are sailing vessels
auxiliary power

2.2 lfA4al

2.2 lfA4c

with or without

2.2 lfA5

( a ) L«ss than 26 feet in overall length
( b ) 26 feet or more m overall engih
owned by or rented to an insured

not

2.2 lfA6

— ( c ) In dead storage on an "insured location

HO 00 03 04 91

Coovnght insurance Services Qff'ce inc

Page 13 of 18

1990

Includes copyrighted material of Insurance Services Office, Inc.
with its permission. Copyright, Insurance Services Office, Inc.
92a

— 2 . 2 IfA

( d ) One or more outboard engines or motors with more than 25 total horse
power if the outboard engine or motor
is not owned by an "insured"

Not owned by an 'insured" or

A motorized golf can when used to pl«iy
golf on a golf course

(b)

2.2 lfl

( 2 ) The entrustment by an "insured' of an excluded watercraft described below to any
person or

( a ) Inboard or inboard-outdrive engine or
motor power of 50 horsepower or less
not owned by an "insured"

( 1 ) The ownership, maintenance, use loading
or unloading of motor vehicles or all other
motorized land conveyances
including
trailers owned or operated by or rented or
loaned to an "insured".

2.2 le3 — ( 3 )

2.2 If

( 1 ) The ownership maintenance u'$e loading
or unloading of an excluded watercraft
described below

( 1 ) That are not sailing vessels and are powered by

(2) Rented to an "insured" or
that is not an "insured location".

2.2 lei —

—

g. Arising out of

'Ol-

I .

1990

F> -

2 1 5

EXHIBIT "5"

YOUR NEW

HOMEOWNERS POLICY

American Fire & Casualty ("< >mpany
604 Courtland Street, OHondo. Flonda 32804

'

I

/

HO 84

1 ) 84

YOUR HOMEOWNERS POLICY QUICK REFERENCE
DECLARATIONS PAGE
Your Name
Location of Your Residence
Policy Period
Coverages
Amounts of Insurance
Deductible
Beginning On Page

SECTION I
YOUR
PROPERTY

AGREEMENT

1

DEFINITIONS

1

COVERAGES
Property Coverages
Loss of Use
Additional Coverages
Debris Removal
1
Trees, Shrubs and Plants

2

Credit Card

SECTION II
YOUR
LIABILITY

SECTION 1

and
SECTION II

PERILS INSURED AGAINST

5

EXCLUSIONS

7

CONDITIONS
Insurable Interest
Duties After Loss
Loss Settlement
Mortgage Clause

8

COVERAGES
Personal Liability
Medical Pa/ments to Others

10

EXCLUSIONS

11

ADDITIONAL COVERAGES
Claim Expenses
First Aid Expenses
Damage to Property of Others

13

CONDITIONS
Limit of Liability
Duties After Loss

14

CONDITIONS
Policy Period
Cancellation
Non-Renewal

15

r-i'u ANu

•HICAM
IMfHWNCR

CASUAL(

I-^MPA'JY

POIICY N O

of Insur.irur ( omp.inu's

AT RESIULNCr

PREMISES

TERM

TO

09-27-07

09-27-flo

43 '31 0104

107P159-C

TIMt

FROM

ST TER A G E N T

I1NE YEAR

AGENT

INSUREO

CARSON SMITH C ASSOCIATES INC
2525 SOUTH MAIN ST SUITt- 8
SALT LAKf CITY UT 84115
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HOMEOWNERS
SPECIAL AMENDATORY ENDORSEMENT

Form OC-254
(11-84)

1. S E C T I O N S A D D I T I O N A L COVERAGES
Credit Card. Fund Transfer Card, Forgery and Counterfeit Money
We increase the amount of this coverage from $500 to $1,000 without additional charge.
2. We provide Outboard Motor and Inboard-Outdrive Motor Liability without additional charge.
SECTION II - EXCLUSIONS
Coverage E - Personal Liability and Coverage F - Medical Payments to Others - Section f. Watercraft (1) and (2) are changed to read:
(1) with inboard motor power owned by an insured;
(2) with inboard motor power of more than 50 horsepower rented to an insured;
Item f. Watercraft (4) is deleted.

RENEWAL PLAN

HO 52
( M 4 84)

This policy is changed as follows
1

Policy Period

Policy Period
to

in the Declarations is deleted and replaced as follows

12 01 A M

S t a n d a r d Tune at the residence premises for
and for successive policy periods as stated below

months from

2

If we elect to continue this insurance we will renew this policy if you pay the required renewal premium for
each successive policy period subject to our premiums rules and forms then in effect You must pay us pr lor
to the end of the current policy period or else this policy will expire

3

If a mortgagee is named in this policy we will continue this insurance for the mortgagee s interest for ten days
after written notice of termination to the mortgagee and then this policy will expire

*Entnes may be left blank if shown elsewhere in this policy for this coverage

All other provisions of this policy apply

Copyright Insurance Services Office Inc

1984

HO-52(Ed 4 84)

NO SECTION II —LIABILITY COVERAGES FOR HOME DAY CARL BUSINESS
LIMITED SECTION l — PROPERTY COVERAGES FOR
HO-322
HOME DAY CARE BUSINESS
(Ed 9 85)
If an insured regularly provides home day care services to a person or persons other than insureds and
receives monetary or other compensation for such
services, that enterprise is a business pursuit Mutual
exchange of home day care services however is not
considered compensation The rendering of home
day care services by an insured to a relative of an
insured is not considered a business pursuit
Therefore, with respect to a home day care enterprise
which is considered to be a business pursuit, this
policy0
1

does not provide Section II—Liability Coverages
because business pursuits of an insured are
excluded under exclusion 1 b of Section II —
Exclusions.

does not provide Section I—Coverage B coverage
where other structures are used in whole or in
part for business.
limits coverage for property used on the residence premises for the home day care enterprise
to $2,500 because Coverage C—Special Limits
of Liability—item 9 imposes that limit on business property on the residence premises;
limits coverage for property used off the residence premises for the home day care enterprise
to $250. because Coverage C—Special Limits o(
Liability—item 10 imposes that limit on business
property off the residence premises.

THIS ENDORSEMENT DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A REDUCTION OF COVERAGE

Copyright, Insurance Services Office. Inc . 1985

HO-322 (Ed 9 85)

HO-325
(Ed 12-35)
COMMUNICABLE DISEASE EXCLUSION
S E C T I O N II - EXCLUSIONS
The? following exclusion is added'
Coveiage E • Personal Liability and Cuveiage F - Medical Payments to Others do not apply to b o d i l y i n j u r y
or p r o p e r l y d a m a g e which anses out ol the transmission of a communicable disease by an i n s u r e d .

HO-325 (Ed 12 85)
Copyright Insurance Servir.^ OM'.C

r-

1 9Cf-

00-772(11-85)
FULL V A L U E C O N T E N T S C O V E R A G l : E N D O R S E M E N T

d. articles that are outdated or obsolete and are
stored or not being used.

SECTION I
For an additional premium, covered losses to the
following property are settled at replacement cost at
the time of loss:

e. watercraft, inboard motorboats, outboard
motorboats, outboard motors, inboard/outboard motorboats, inboard/outdrive motorboats, houseboats, sailboats, boat accessories
and equipment, boat trailers and boat carriers.

a. Coverage C —Personal Property;
h. If covered in this policy, awnings, carpeting,
household appliances, outdoor antennas and
outdoor equipment, whether or not attached
to buildings.
Condition 3. Loss Settlement does nol apply to property described in paragraphs a. and b. above.
Personal Property Replacement Cost coverage also applies to articles or classes of property separately
described and specifically insured in this policy.
1. PROPERTY N O T ELIGIBLE
Property listed below is not eligible for replacement cost
settlement. Any loss will be settled at actual cash value
at the time of loss but not more than the amount required to repair or replace.
a. antiques, fine arts, paintings and similar articles
of rarity or antiquity which cannot be replaced.
b. memorabilia, souvenirs, collectors items and
similar articles whose age or history contribute
to their value.
c. articles not maintained in g o o d or workable
condition.

2

R E P L A C E M E N T COST
a. We will pay no more than the least of the
following amounts:
(1) replacement cost at the time of loss
w i t h o u t deduction for depreciation;
(2) the full cost of repair at the time of loss;
(3) the limit of liability that applies to Coverage
C; or
(4) any special limits of liability stated in this
policy.
b. W h e n the replacement cost for the entire loss
under this endorsement is more than $500, we
will pay no more than the actual cash value for
the loss or damage until the actual repair or
replacement is complete.
c. You may make a claim for loss on an actual
cash value basis and then make claim within
180 days after the loss for any additional liability
in accordance w i t h this endorsement.

All other provisions of this policy apply.

HO-300
(Ed. 4-84)
Utah

SPECIAL PROVISIONS

SECTIONS | AND II—CONDITIONS

(i)

5.

(ii) an outstanding demolition order: or

Cancellation. The following is added to paragraphs ti(2),(3) and (4):
However, if any one of the following conditions
exist at any building that is covered in this policy,
we may cancel this policy by letting you know at
least 5 days before the date cancellation takes
effect.
(a) The building has been vacant or unoccupied
60 or more consecutive days. This does not
apply to:
(i)

seasonal unoccupancy; or

(ii) buildings in the course of construction,
renovation or addition.
Buildings with 65% or more of the rental units
or floor area vacant or unoccupied are considered unoccupied under this provision.
(b) After damage by a covered peril, permanent
repairs to the building;
(i)

have not started; and

(ii) have not been contracted for-

an outstanding order to vacate;

(iii) been declared unsafe by governmental
authority.
(d) Fixed and salvageable items have been or are
being removed from the building and are not
being replaced. This does not apply to removal that is necessary or incidental to any
renovation or remodeling.
(e) Failure to:
(i)

furnish necessary heat, water, sewer service or electricity for 30 consecutive days
or more, except dur.ng a period of seasonal unoccupancy; or

(ii) pay property taxes that are owing and
have been outstanding for more than one
year following the date due, except that
this provision will not apply where you are
in a bona fide dispute w i t h the taxing
a u t h o r i t y regarding payment of such
taxes.
All other provisions of this policy apply.

within 30 days of payment of ioss.
(c) Th$ building has:

HO-300 (Ed. 4-84) Utah
Copyright, Insurance Services Office, Inc., 1984

Homeowners 3
Special Form
Ed. 4-84

AGREEMENT
We will provide the insurance described in this policy in return for the premium and compliance with all applicable
provisions of this policy.

DEFINITIONS
In this policy, "you" and " y o u r " refer to the named insured" shown in the Declarations and the spouse if a
resident of the same household. "We." "us** an6 " o u r " refer to the Company providing this insurance. In addition,
certain words and phrases are defined as follows:
(2) which is acquired by you during the policy
period for your use as a residence;

1.

"bodily injury" means bodily harm, sickness or
disease, including required care, loss of services
and death that results.

c.

2.

"business" includes trade, profession or occupation.

any premises used by you in connection with a
premises in 4a or 4b above;

d.

any part of a premises:

3.

" i n s u r e d " means you and residents of your
household who are:

(1) not owned by an Insured; and
(2) where an insured is temporarily residing;

a.

your relatives; or

b.

other persons under the age of 21 and in the
care of any person named above.

Under Section II, "insured" also means:
c.

d.

w i t h respect to animals or w a t e r c r a f t to
which this policy applies, any person or organization legally responsible for these animals
or watercraft which are owned by you or any
person included in 3a or 3b above. A person or
organization using or having custody of these
animals or watercraft in the course of any
business or without consent of the owner is
not an insured;

5.

w i t h respect to any vehicle to w h i c h this
policy applies:

e.

vacant land, other than farm land/owned by
or rented to an insured;

f.

land owned by or rented io an Insured on
which a one or two family dwelling is being
built as a residence for an insured;

g.

individual or family cemetery plots or burial
vaults of an insured; or

h.

any part of a premises occasionally rented to
an insured for other than business use.

"occurrence 1 ' means an accident, including
exposure to conditions, which results, during the
policy period, in:
a.

bodily injury; or

b.

property damage.

(1) persons while engaged in your employ or
that of any person included in 3a or 3b
above: or

6.

"property damage" means physical injury to.
destruction of, or loss of use of tangible property.

(2) other persons using the vehicle on an
insured location with your consent.

7.

"residence employee" means:

4.f "insured location" means:
a.

the residence premises;

b.

the part of other premises, other structures
and grounds used by you as a residence and:

a.

an employee of an insured whose duties are
related to the maintenance or use of the residence premises, including household or
domestic services; or

b.

one who performs similar duties elsewhere
not related to the business of an insured.

(1) which is shown in the Declarations: or

HO-3 Ed. 4-84
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8.

"residence premises" mean
o.

the one family dwelling, other structures, ond
grounds: or

b.

that par t of any other building;

••7c5idc.ee prem
•' also means a two family dwelling where you reSKirrfn at least one of the l.imily units
and which is shown as the "residence premises" in
the Declarations.

where you reside and which is shown as the "residence premises" m the Declarations

SECTION I —PROPERTY COVERAGES
COVERAGE A—Dwelling

We cover:
1.

the dwelling on the residence premises shown in
the Declarations including structures attached to
the dwelling: and

2.

materials and supplies located on or next to the
residence premises used to construct, alter or
repair the dwelling or other structures on the residence premises.

This coverage does not apply to land, including land on
which the dwelling is located.

Our limit of liability for personal property usually
located at on insured's residence, other than the residence premises, is 10% of the limit of liability for Coverage C. or $1000. whichever is greater. Personal
property in a newly acquired principal residence is not
subject to this limitation for the 30 days from the lime
you begin to move the property there.
Special
increase
limit for
limit for

L i m i t s of L i a b i l i t y . These limits 6a not
the Coverage C limit of liability The special
each numbered category below is the tolal
each toss for all property in that category.

1.

$200 on money, bank notes, bullion, gold other
than goldware. silver other than silverware,
platinum, coins and medals.

2.

$1000 on securities, accounts, deeds, evidences
of debt, letters of credit, notes other than bank
notes, m a n u s c r i p t s , passports. • tickets and
stamps.

This coverage does not apply to land, including land on
which the other structures are located.

3.

$1000 on watercraft. including their trailers, furnishings, equipment and outboard motors.

We do not cover other structures:

4.

$1000 on trailers not used with watercraft.

1.

used in whole or in part for business; or

5.

$1000 on grave markers.

2.

r e n t e d . o r held for rental to any person not a
tenant of the dwelling, unless used solely as'a private garage.

6.

$1000 for loss by theft of jewelry, watches, furs,
precious and semi-precious stones.

7.

$2000 for loss by theft of firearms.

8.

$2500 (or loss by theft of silverware, silver-plated
ware, goldware. gold-plated ware and pewterware. This includes flatware, hollowware. tea sets.
trays and trophies made of or including silver,
gold or pewter.

9.

$2500 on property, on the residence premises,
used at any time or in any manner for any business purpose.

COVERAGE B—Other Structures
We cover-other structures on the residence premises
set apart from the dwelling by clear space. This
includes structures connected to the dwelling by only
a fence, utility line, or similar connection.

The limit of liability for this coverage will not be more
than 10% of the limit of liability that applies to Coverage A. Use of this coverage does not reduce the Coverage A limit of liability
COVERAGE C —Personal Property
We cover personal property owned or used by an
insured while it is anywhere in the world At your
request, we will cover personal property owned by:
1.

others while the property is on the part of the
residence premises occupied by dn insured;

2.

a guest or a residence employee, while the property is in any residence occupied by an insured.

Page 2 of 15

10. $ 2 5 0 on p r o p e r t y , away from (he residence
premises, used at any time or in any manner for
any business purpose.

Copyright. Insurance Services Office. Inc.. 1984
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Property Not Covered. We do m

over

1.

articles separately described and specifically
insured in this or other insurance,

2.

animals, birds or fish;

3.

motor vehicles or all other motorized land conveyances This includes
a.

equipment and accessories, or

b

any device or instrument for the transmitting
recording, receiving or reproduction of sound
or pictures which is operated by power from
the electrical system of motor vehicles or all
other motorized land conveyances, including

a

Additiona
,mg Expense, meaning any nee
essary increase in living expenses incurred by
you so that your household can maintain its
normal standard of living, or

b

Fair Rental Value, meaning the fair rental
value of that part of the residence premises
where you reside less any expenses that do
not continue while the premises is not fit to
live in

Payment under a or b will be for the shortest
time required to repair or replace the damage or
if you permanently relocate, the shortest time
required for your household to settle elsewhere
2.

(1) accessories or antennas, or
(2) tapes, wires, records, discs or o t h e r
media for use with any such device or instrument,

If a loss covered under this Section makes that
part of the residence premises rented to others
or held for rental by you not fit to live in, we cover
the
Fair Rental Value, meaning the fair rental
value of that part of the residence premises
rented to others or held for rental by you (ess
any expenses that do not continue while the
premises is not fit to live in

while in or upon the vehicle or conveyance
We do cover vehicles or conveyances not sub/ect
to motor vehicle registration which are
a.

used to service an insured's residence, or

b.

designed for assisting the handicapped.

4.

aircraft and parts Aircraft means any contri
vance used or designed for flight, except model or
hobby aircraft not used or designed to carry people or cargo,

5.

properly of roomers, hoarders and other tenants,
except property of roomers and boarders related
to an insured;

Payment will be for the shortest time required to
repair or replace that part of the premises rented
or held for rental
3

If a civil authority prohibits you from use of the
residence premises as a result of direct damage
to neighboring premises by a Peril Insured Against
in this policy, we cover the Additional Living
Expense or Fair Rental Value loss as provided
under 1 and 2 above for no more than two weeks

The periods of time under 1, 2 and 3 above are not
limited by expiration of this policy

6.

property in an apartment regularly rented or held
for rental to others by an insured;

We do not cover loss or expense due to cancellation of
a lease or agreement

7.

property rented or held for rental to others off the
residence premises;

ADDITIONAL COVERAGES

8.

a.

books of account, drawings or other paper
records; or

1.

b.

e l e c t r o n i c d a t a processing t a p e s , wires
records, discs or other software media,

containing business data But we do cover the
cost of blank or unexposed records and media
9.

credit cards or fund transfer cards except as provided in Additional Coverages 6

COVERAGE D—Loss Of Use
The limit of liability for Coverage D is the total limit for
all the coverages that follow
1.

If a loss covered under this Section makes that
part of the residence premises where you reside
not fit to live in, we cover at your choice, either of
the following However, if the residence premises
is not your principal place of residence we will not
provide the option under paragraph b below

HO-3Ed 4-84

Debris Removal. We will pay your reasonable
expense for the removal of
a

debris of covered property if a Peril Insured
Against causes the loss, or

b

ash, dust or particles from a volcanic eruption
that has caused direct loss to a building or
property contained in a building

This expense is included in the limit of liability that
applies to the damaged property If the amount to
be paid for the actual damage to the property plus
the debris removal expense is more than the limit
of liability for the damaged property, an addi
tional 5% of that limit of liability is available for
debris removal expense

Copyright, Insurance Services Office. Inc

1984
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We will also pay your reasonau«e expense for the
removal of fallen trees from the residence premises if
a.

b.

coverage is not afforded under Additional
Coverages 3 Trees, Shrubs and Other Plonts
for the peril causing the loss, or

3.

lossre^ulti ^<rom theft or unauthorized use
of a fund transfer card used for deposit
withdrawal or transfer of funds issued to or
registered in an insured's name,

c

loss to an insured caused by forgery or alteration of any check or negotiable instrument
and

d

loss to an insured through acceptance in
£;ood faith of counterfeit United States or
Canadian paper currency

the tree is not covered by (his policy

provided the tree damages covered property and
a Peril Insured Against under Coverage C causes
the tree to fall Our limit of liability for this coverage will not be more than $500 in the aggregate
for any one loss
2.

b

We do not cover use of a credit card or fund
transfer card

Reasonable Repairs. We will pay the reasonable
cost incurred by you for necessary repairs made
solely to protect covered property from further
damage if a Peril Insured Against causes the loss
This coverage does not increase the limit of liobil
ity that applies to the proper ty being repaired
Trees, Shrubs and Other Plants. We cover trees,
shrubs, plants or lawns, on the residence premises, for loss caused by the following Perils Insured Against Fire or lightning. Explosion Riot or
civil commotion. Aircraft, Vehicles not owned or
operated by a resident of the residence premises,
Vandalism or malicious mischief or Theft

a

by a resident of your household

b

by a person who has been entrusted with
either type of card or

c

if an insured has not complied with all terms
and conditions under which the cards are
issued

All loss resulting from a series of acts committed
by any one person or in which any one person is
concerned or implicated is considered to be one
loss
We do not cover loss arising out of business use or
dishonesty of an Insured.
This coverage is additional insurance No deductible applies to this coverage

The limit of liability for this coverage will not be
more than 5% of the limit of liability that applies
to the dwelling, or more than $500 for any one
tree, shrub or plant We do not cover property
grown for business purposes

Defense
a

We may investigale and settle any claim or
suit that we decide is appropriate Our duty to
defend a claim or suit ends when the amount
we pay for the loss equals our limit of liability

b

If a suit is brought against an insured for liability under the Credit Card or Fund Transfer
Card coverage, we will provide a defense at
our expense by counsel of our choice

c

We have the option to defend at our expense
an insured or an insured's bank against any
suit for the enforcement of payment under
the Forgery coverage

This coverage is additional insurance
4.

Fire Department Service Charge. We will pay up
to $500 for your liability assumed by contract or
agreement for fire department charges incurred
when the fire department is called to save or protect c o v e r e d p r o p e r t y from a Peril Insured
Against We do not cover fire department service
charges if the property is located within the limits
of the city, municipality or protection district furnishing the fire department response
This coverage is additional insurance No deductible applies to this coverage

5.

Property Removed. We insure covered property
agamsl direct loss horn any cause while being
removed from a premises endangered by a Peril
Insured Against and for no more than 30 days
while removed This coverage does not change
the limit of liability that applies to the property
being removed

6.

Credit Card, Fund Transfer Card, Forgery and
Counterfeit Money.
We will pay up to $500 for
a

the legal obligation of an insured to pay because of the theft or unauthorized use of
credit cards issued to or registered in an
insured's name

Page 4 of 15

7.

Loss Assessment. We will pay up to $ 1000 for your
share of any loss assessment charged during the
policy period against you by a corporation or
association of property owners This only appl es
when the assessment is made as a result of each
direct loss to the property, owned by all members
collectively, caused by a Peril Insured Against
under Coverage A—Dwelling, other than earthquake or land shock waves or tremors before,
dunng or after a volcanic eruption
Thus coverage applies only to loss assessments
charged against you as owner oi tenant of the
residence premises.
We do not cover loss assessments charged against
you or a corporation or association of property
owners by any governmental body

Copyright. Insurance Services Office Inc

1984
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Collapse. We insure for direct physical loss1 to covered property involving collapse of a building or
any part of a building caused only by one or more
of the following:

f.

a.

Perils Insured Against in Coverage C—Personal Property* These perils apply to covered
building and personal property for loss insured by this additional coverage;

b.

hidden decay;

Loss to an awning, fence, patio, pavement, swimming pool, underground pipe, flue, drain, cesspool,
septic tank, foundation, retaining wall, bulkhead,
pier, wharf or dock is not included under items b,
c, d, e, and f unless the loss is a direct result of the
collapse of a building.

c.

hidden insect or vermin damage;

d.

weight of contents, equipment, animals or
people;

e.

weight of rain which collects on a roof; or

use of defective material or methods in construction, remodeling or renovation if the collapse occurs during the course of the cons t r u c t i o n , remodeling or renovation.

Collapse does not include settling, c r a c k i n g ,
shrinking, bulging or expansion.
This coverage does not increase the limit of liability applying to the damaged covered property.

SECTION I—PERILS INSURED AGAINST
COVERAGE A—DWELLING and
COVERAGE B—OTHER STRUCTURES

loss. A dwelling being constructed is not considered vacant;

We insure against risks of direct loss to property
described in Coverages A and B only if that loss is a
physical loss to property; however, we do not insure
loss:
L

involving collapse, other than as provided in Additional Coverage 8;

2.

caused by:
a.

(5) release, discharge or dispersal of contaminants or pollutants;
(6) settling, cracking, shrinking, bulging or
expansion of pavements, patios, foundations, walls, floors, roofs or ceilings: or
(7) birds, vermin, rodents, insects or domestic animals.
If any of these cause water damage not otherwise excluded, from a plumbing, heating, air
conditioning
or automatic
fire
protective
sprinkler system or household appliance, we
cover loss caused by the water including the
cost of tearing out and replacing any part of a
building necessary to repair the system or
appliance. We do not cover loss to the system
or appliance from which this water escaped.

(1) fence, pavement, patio or swimming pool;
(2) foundation,.retaining wall or bulkhead; or
(3) pier, wharf or dock;

d.

vandalism and malicious mischief or breakage of glass and safety glazing materials if the
dwelling has been vacant for more than 30
consecutive days i m m e d i a t e l y before the

HO-3 Ed. 4-84

(1) wear and tear, marring, deterioration;

(4) smoke from agricultural smudging or
industrial operations;

freezing, thawing, pressure or weight of water
or ice, whether driven by wind or not, to a:

theft in or to a dwelling under construction, or
of materials and supplies for use in the cons t r u c t i o n until the dwelling is finished and
occupied;

f.

(3) smog, rust, mold, wet or dry rot;

(2) shut, off the water supply and drain the
system and appliances of water;

c.

constant or repeated seepage or leakage of
water or steam over a period of weeks, months
or years from within a plumbing, heating, air
conditioning or a u t o m a t i c fire p r o t e c t i v e
sprinkler system or from within a household
appliance;

(2) inherent vice, latent defect, mechanical
breakdown;

freezing of a plumbing, heating, air conditioning or automatic fire protective sprinkler system or of a household appliance, or by discharge, leakage or overflow from within the
system or appliance caused by freezing. This
exclusion applies only while the dwelling is
v a c a n t , u n o c c u p i e d or being c o n s t r u c t e d
unless you have used reasonable care to:
(1) maintain heat in the building; or

b.

e.

3.

excluded under Section i—Exclusions.

Under items 1 and 2, any ensuing loss to property
described in Coverages A and B not excluded or
excepted in this policy is covered.

Copyright, Insurance Services Office, Inc.. 1984
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COVERAGE C—PERSONAL P R O P L

.Y

We insure for direct physical loss to the property
described in Coverage C caused by a peril listed below
unless the loss is excluded in Section I—Exclusions
1.

Fire or l i g h t n i n g .

2.

Windstorm or hail.
This peril does not include loss to the property
contained in a building caused by rain snow,
sleet, sand or dust unless the direct force of wind
or hail damages the building causing an opening in
a roof or wall and the rain snow sleet, sand or
dust enters through this opening
This peril includes loss to watercraft and their
trailers, furnishings, equipment, and outboard
motors, only while inside a fully enclosed building

3.

Explosion.

4.

Riot or civil c o m m o t i o n .

5.

A i r c r a f t , including self-propelled missiles and
spacecraft

6.

Vehicles.

7.

Smoke, meaning sudden and accidental damage
from smoke
This peril does not include loss caused by smoke
from agricultural smudging or industrial operations

8.

Vandalism or malicious mischief.

9.

Theft, including attempted theft and loss of property from a known place when it is likely that the
property has been stolen
This peril does not include loss caused by theft
a

c o m m i t t e d by an insured;

b

m or to a
materials
struction
occupied,

c.

dwelling under construction, or of
and supplies for use in the conuntil the dwelling is finished and
or

from that part of a residence premises rented
by an insured to other than an insured.

This peril does not include loss caused by theft
that occurs off the residence premises of

1-3. Failing objects
This peril does not include loss to proper ty con
tamed in a building unless the roof oi an outside
wall of the building is first damaged by a falling
object Damage to the falling object itself is not
included
1 1 . Weight of ice, snow or sleet which causes dam
age to property contained in a building
12. Accidental discharge or overflow of water or
steam from within a plumbing, heating a«r conditioning or automatic fire protective sprinkler sys
tern or from within a household appliance
This peril does not include loss
a

to the system or appliance from which the
water or steam escaped;

b

caused by or resulting from freezing except as
provided in the peril of freezing below or

c

on the residence premises caused by accidental discharge or overflow which occurs off
the residence premises.

13. Sudden and accidental tearing apart, cracking,
burning or bulging of a steam or hot water heating system, an air conditioning or automatic fire
protective sprinkler system, or an appliance for
heating water
We do not cover loss caused by or resulting from
freezing under this peril
14. Freezing of a plumbing, heating, air conditioning
or automatic fire protective sprinkler system or of
a household appliance
This peril does not include loss on the residence
premises while the dwellng is unoccupied unless
you have used reasonable care to
a

maintain heat in the building or

b

shut off the water supply and drain the system and appliances of water

15. Sudden and accidental damage f r o m artificially
generated electrical current.
This peril does not include loss to a tube
sistor or similar electronic component

tran-

property while at any other residence owned
by, rented to, or occupied by an i n s u r e d ,
except while an insured is temporarily living
there Pioperty of a student who is an insured
is covered while at a residence away from
home if the student has been there at any
time during the 45 days immediately before
the loss.

16. Damage by glass or safety g l a z i n g m a t e r i a l
which is part of a building, storm door or storm
window

b

watercraft, including their furnishings, equipment and outboard motors or

17. Volcanic E r u p t i o n other than Joss caused by
earthquake, land shock waves or tremors

c

trailers and campers

a
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This peril does not include loss on the residence
premises if the dwelling has been vacant for more
than 30 consecutive days immediately before the
loss A dwelling being constructed is not considered vacant
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SECTION l — EXCLUSIONS
1.

e.

Neglect, meaning neglect of the insured to
use all reasonable means to save and preserve property at and after the time of a loss.

f.

War, including undeclared war. civil war.
insurrection, rebellion, revolution, warlike act
by a military force or military personnel,
destruction or seizure or use for a military
purpose, and including any consequence of
any of these. Discharge of a nuclear weapon will be deemed a warlike act even if
accidental.

g.

Nuclear Hazard, to the extent set forth in the
Nuclear Hazard Clause of Section I — Conditions.

h.

(1) fire;

Intentional Loss, meaning any loss arising out
of any act committed:

(2) explosion; or

(1) by or at the direction of an insured; and

(3) breakage of glass or safety glazing material which is part of a building, storm door
or storm window;

(2) with the intent to cause a loss.

We do not insure for loss caused directly or
indirectly by any of the following. Such loss is
excluded regardless of any other cause or event
contributing concurrently or in any sequence to
the loss.
a.

Ordinance or Law, meaning enforcement of
any ordinance or law regulating the construe
tion, repair, or demolition of a building or other
structure, unless specifically provided under
this policy.

b.

Earth Movement, meaning earthquake including land shock waves or tremors before, during or after a volcanic eruption; landslide;
mudflow; e a r t h sinking, rising or shifting;
unless direct loss by:

ensues and then we will pay only for the ensuing loss.
This exclusion does not apply to loss l^y theft.
Co Water Damage, meaning:
(1) flood, surface water, waves, tidal water,
overflow of a body of water, or spray from
any o f t h e s e , whether or not driven by
wind;
(2) water which backs up through sewers or
drains; or
(3) water below the surface of the ground, including water which exerts pressure on
or seeps or leaks through a building, sidewalk, driveway, foundation, s w i m m i n g
pool or other structure.
Direct loss by fire, explosion or theft resulting
from water damage is covered.
d.

Power Failure, meaning the failure of power
or other utility service if the failure takes place
off the residence premises. But, if a Peril
Insured Against ensues on the residence
premises, we will pay only for that ensuing
loss.

H 0 3 Ed. 4-84

2.

We do not insure for loss to property described in
Coverages A and B caused by any of the following.
However, any ensuing loss to property described
in Coverages A and B not excluded or excepted in
this policy is covered.
a.

Weather conditions. However, this exclusion
only applies if weather conditions contribute
in any way with a cause or event excluded in
paragraph 1. above to produce the loss;

b.

Acts or decisions, including the failure to act
or decide, of any person, group, organization
or governmental body;

c.

Faulty, inadequate or defective:
(1) planning, : zoning, development, surveying, siting;
(2) design, specifications, workmanship, repair, construction, renovation, remodeling, grading, compaction;
(3) materials used in repair, construction,
renovation or remodeling; or
(4) maintenance;
of part or all of any property whether on or off
the residence premises.

Copyright. Insurance Services Office. Inc.. 1984
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SECTION I—CONDITIONS
1,

2.

(4) changes in title or occupancy of the property during the term of the policy;

Insurable Interest and Limit of Liability. Even if
more than one person has an insurable interest in
the property covered, we will not be liable in any
one loss:
a.

to the insured for more than the amount of
the insured's interest at the time of loss; or

b.

for more than the applicable limit of liability.

(5) specifications of damaged buildings and
detailed repair estimates;
(6) the inventory of damaged personal property described in 2e above;
(7) receipts for additional living expenses incurred and records that support the fair
rental value loss; and

Your Duties After Loss. In case of a loss to covered property, you must see that the following are
done:
a.

give prompt notice to us or our agent;

b.

notify the police in case of loss by theft;

c.

notify the credit card or fund transfer card
company in case of loss under Credit Card or
Fund Transfer Card coverage;

d.

(1) protect the property from further damage;

(8) evidence or affidavit that supports a claim
under the Credit Card, Fund Transfer
Card. Forgery and Counterfeit Money
coverage, stating the amount and cause
of loss.
3.

Loss S e t t l e m e n t . Covered property losses are
settled as follows:
a.

(2) Awnings, c a r p e t i n g , household appliances, outdoor antennas and outdoor
equipment, whether or not attached to
buildings; and

(2) make reasonable and necessary repairs
to protect the property; and
(3) keep an a c c u r a t e record of repair expenses;
e.

f.

prepare an inventory of damaged personal
property showing the quantity, description.
actual cash value and amount of loss. Attach
all bills, receipts and related documents that
justify the figures in the inventory;
as often as we reasonably require:
(1) show the damaged property;
(2) provide us with records and documents
we request and permit us to make copies;
and
(3) submit to questions under oath and sign
and swear to them;

g.

send to us, within 60 days after our request,
your signed, sworn proof of loss which sets
f o r t h , to the best of your knowledge and
belief:
(1) the time and cause of loss;
(2) the interest of the insured and all others
in the property involved and all liens on
the property;
(3) other insurance w h i c h may cover the
loss;
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(1) Personal property;

(3) Structures that are not buildings;
at actual cash value at the time of loss but not
more than the amount required to repair or
replace.
b.

Buildings under Coverage A or B at replacement cost without deduction for depreciation, subject to the following:
(1) If, at the time of loss, the amount of insurance in this policy on the damaged building is 80% or more of the full replacement
cost of the building-immediately before
the loss, we will pay the cost to repair or
replace, after application of deductible
and without deduction for depreciation,
but not more than the least of the following amounts:
(a) the limit of liability under this policy
that applies to the building;
(b) the replacement cost of that part of
the building damaged for like construction and use on the same premises; or
(c) the necessary amount actually spent
to repair or replace the damaged
building.

Copyright. Insurance Services Office. Inc.. 1984
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(2) If. at the time of loss. t h e ^ n o u n l of insurance in this policy on the damaged building is less than 8 0 % of the full replacement cost of the building immediately
before the loss, we will pay the greater of
the following amounts, but not more than
the limit of liability under this policy that
applies to the building:

4.

Each party will:

(5) You may disregard the replacement cost
loss settlement provisions and make claim
under this policy for loss or damage to
buildings on an actual cash value basis.
You may then make claim within 180 days
after loss for any additional liability on a
replacement cost basis.

pay its own appraiser; and

b.

bear the other expenses of the appraisal and
umpire equally.

Other Insurance. If a loss covered by this policy is
also covered by other insurance, we will pay only
the proportion of the loss that the limit of liability
that applies under this policy bears to the total
amount of insurance covering the loss.

8.

Suit Against Us. No action can be brought unless
the policy provisions have been complied with and
the action is started within one year after the date
of loss.

9.

Our Option. If we give you written notice within 30
days after we receive your signed, sworn proof of
loss, we may repair or replace any part of the damaged property with like property.

(b) the cost to repair or replace the damage is both:

(ii) less than $1000.

a.

7.

(4) We will pay no more than the actual cash
value of the damage unless:

less than 5% of the amount of insurance in this policy on the building; and

pay the difference between actual cash value
of the property before and after the loss.

Appraisal. If you and we fail to agree on the
amount of loss, either may demand an appraisal
of the loss. In this event, each party will choose a
competent appraiser within 20 days after receiving a written request from the other. The two
appraisers will choose an umpire. If they cannot
agree upon an umpire within 15 days, you or we
may request that the choice be made by a judge
of a court of record in the state where the residence premises is located. The appraisers will
separately set the amount of loss. If the appraisers submit a written report of an agreement
to us. the amount agreed upon will be the amount
of loss. If they fail to agree, they will submit their
differences to the umpire. A decision agreed to by
any two will set the amount of loss.

(b) those supports in (a) above whi<ch are
below the surface of the ground inside
the foundation walls, if there is no
basement: and

(i)

b.

6.

(a) excavations, foundations, piers or
any supports w h i c h are below the
undersurface of the lowest basement
floor:

(a) actual repair or replacement is complete: or

repair or replace any part to restore the pair
or set to its value before the loss; or

Glass Replacement. Loss for damage to glass
caused by a Peril Insured Against will be set tied on
the basis of r e p l a c e m e n t w i t h safety glazing
materials when required by ordinance or law.

(3) To determine the amount of insurance
required to equal 8 0 % of the full replacement cost of the building immediately
before the loss, do not include the value
of:

(c) underground flues, pipes, wiring and
drains.

a

5.

(a) the actual cash value of that part of
the building damaged: or
(b) that proportion of the cost to repair or
replace, after application of deductible and w i t h o u t deduction for depreciation, that part of the building
damaged, which the total amount of
insurance in this policy on the damaged building bears to 8 0 % of the
replacement cost of the building.

Loss to a Pair or Sexrln case of loss to a pair or set
wc may elect to:

10. Loss Payment. We will adjust ail losses with you.
We will pay you unless some other person is named
in the policy or is legally entitled to receive paym e n t Loss will be payable 60 days after we
receive your proof of loss and:
a.

reach an agreement with you;

b.

there is an entry of a final judgment; or

c.

there is a filing of an appraisal award with us.

1 1 . Abandonment of Property. We need not accept
any property abandoned by an insured.
HO-3 Ed. 4-84
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Subrogation w i l f u l impair (he right of (he mortgagee to recover the lull amount ol the mortgagee's claim.

12. Mortgage Clause.
The word " m o r t g a g e e " includes trustee.
If a mortgagee is named in this policy, any loss
payable under Coverage A or B will be paid to the
mortgagee and you, as interests appear. If more
than one mortgagee is named, the order of payment will be the same as the order of precedence
of the mortgages.

13. No Benefit to Bailee. We will not recognize any
assignment or grant any coverage that benefits a
person or organization holding, storing or moving
property for a fee regardless of any other provision of this policy.
14. Nuclear Hazard Clause.,

If we deny your claim, that denial will not apply to a
valid claim of the mortgagee, if the mortgagee:
a.

notifies us of any change in ownership, occupancy or substantial change In risk of which
the mortgagee is aware;

b.

pays any premium due under this policy on
demand if you have neglected to pay the prem i u m ; and

c.

submits a signed, sworn statement of loss
within 60 days after receiving notice from us
of your failure to do so. Policy conditions
relating to Appraisal, Suit Against Us and Loss
Payment apply to the mortgagee.

If the policy is cancelled or not renewed by us, the
mortgagee will be noMiled at least 10 days before
the date cancellation or nonrenewal takes effect.
If we pay the mortgagee for any loss and deny
payment to you:
a.

we are subrogated to all the rights of the
mortgagee granted under the mortgage on
the property; or

b.

at our option, we may pay to the mortgagee
the whole principal on the mortgage plus any
accrued interest. In this event, we will receive
a full assignment and transfer of the mortgage and all securities held as collateral to the
mortgage debt.

a.

"Nuclear H a z a r d " means any nuclear reaction, radiation, or radioactive contamination,
all whether controlled or uncontrolled or however caused, or any consequence of any of
these.

b.

Loss caused by the nuclear hazard will not be
considered loss caused by fire, explosion, oi
smoke, whether these perils are specifically
named in or otherwise included within the
Perils Insured Against in Section I.

c.

This policy does not apply under Section I to
loss caused directly or indirectly by nuclear
hazard, except that direct loss by fire resulting from the nuclear hazard is covered.

15. Recovered Property. If you or we recover any
property for which we have made payment under
this policy, you or we will notify the other of the
recovery. At your option, the property will be returned to or retained by you or it will become our
property. If the recovered property is returned to
or retained by you, the loss p a y m e n t will be
adjusted based on the amount you received for
the recovered property.
16. Volcanic Eruption Period. One or more volcanic
eruptions that occur within a 72-hour period will
be considered as one volcanic eruption.

SECTION If —

COVERAGES

COVERAGE E — Personal Liability

COVERAGE F — Medical Payments To Others

If a claim is made or a suit is brought against an insured for damages because of bodily injury or property damage caused by an occurrence to which this
coverage applies, we will:

We will pay the necessary medical expenses that are
incurred or medically ascertained-within three years
from the date of an accident causing bodily injury.
Medical expenses means reasonable charges for medical, surgical, x-ray, dental, ambulance, hospital, professional nursing, prosthetic devices and funeral services. This coverage does not apply to you or regular
residents of your household except residence employees. As to others, this coverage applies only:

1.

pay up to our limit of liability for the damages for
which the insured is legally liable; and

2.

provide a defense at our expense by counsel of our
choice, even if the suit is groundless, false or fraudulent. We may investigate and settle any claim or
suit that we decide is appropriate. Our duty to settle or defend ends when the amount we pay for
damages resulting from the occurrence equals
our limit of liability.
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1.

to a person on the insured location with the permission of an insured; or
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2.

to a person off the insured location, if tlie bodily
Injury?
a.

b6

arises out of a condition on the insured location or the ways immediately adjoining;

c.

is caused uy a ^ ^ i d e n c e employee in the
course of the residence employee's employment by an insured; or

d.

is caused by an animal owned by or in the care
of an insured.

is caused by the activities of an insured;

SECTION II —EXCLUSIONS
1.

(3) statutorily imposed vicarious parental liability for the actions of a child or minor
using a conveyance excluded in paragraph (1) or (2) above.

Coverage E — Personal Liability and Coverage F
— Medical Payments to Others do not apply to
bodily injury or property damage:
a.

which is expected or intended by the insured;

b.

arising out of business pursuits of an insured
or the rental or holding for rental of any part
of any premises by an insured.

This exclusion does not apply to:
(1) a trailer not towed by or carried on a
motorized land conveyance.

This exclusion does not apply to:

(2) a motorized land conveyance designed
for recreational use off public roads, not
subject to motor vehicle registration and:

(1) activities which are usual to non-business
pursuits; or

(a) not owned by an insured; or

(2) the rental or holding for r e n t a l of an
insured location:

(b) owned by an i n s u r e d and on an
insured location.

(a) on an occasional basis if used only as
a residence;

(3) a motorized golf cart when used to play
golf on a golf course.

(b) in part for use only as o residence,
unless a single family unit is intended
for use by the occupying family to
lodge more than two r o o m e r s or
boarders; or

(4) a vehicle or conveyance not subject to
motor vehicle registration which is:
(a) used to service an i n s u r e d ' s residence;

(c) in part, as an office, school, studio or
private garage;

(b) designed for assisting the handicapped; or

Co arising out of the rendering of or failure to
render professional services;
d.

(c) in dead storage on an insured location.

arising out of a premises:
f.

arising out of:

(1) owned by an insured;
(2) rented to an insured; or
(3) rented to others by an insured;
that is not an insured location;
e.

arising out of:
(1) the ownership, maintenance, use, loading
or unloading of motor vehicles or all other
motorized land conveyances, including
trailers, owned or operated by or rented
or loaned to an insured;
(2) the entrustment by an insured of a motor
vehicle or any other motorized land conveyance to any person; or

HO-3 Ed. 4-84

(1) the ownership, maintenance, use, loading
or unloading of a watercraft described
below:
(2) the entrustment by an insured of a watercraft described below to any person; or
(3) statutorily imposed vicarious parental liability for the actions of a child or minor
using a watercraft described below.
Watercraft:
(1) with inboard or inboard-outdrive motor
power owned by an insured;
(2) with inboard or inboard-outdrive motor
power of more than 50 horsepower rented to an insured;
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(2) under
contiact or agieement. However, this exclusion does not apply to written contracts:

( 3 ; that is a sailing vcs.
wilh or without
auxiliary power, 26 leet or more in length
owned by or rented to an insured; or

(a) that directly relate to the ownership,
maintenance or use of an insured
location; or

(4) powered by one or more outboard motors
with more than 25 total horsepower if the
ou\board mo\or )s owned by an msured.
But. outboard motors of more than 25
total horsepower are c o v e r e d for the
policy period if:

(b) where the liability of others is assumed by the insured prior to an
occurrence;

(a) you acquire them prior to the policy
period and:

unless excluded in (1) above oi elsewhere
in this policy:

( i ) you declare them at policy inception; or

b.

property damage to property owned by the
Insured;

(ii) your i n t e n t i o n lo insure is reported to us in writing within 45
days after you acquire the outboard motors.

c.

property damage lo property rented to, occupied or used by or in the care of the insured. This exclusion does not apply to property damage caused by fire, smoke or explosion;

d.

bodily injury to any person eligible to receive
any benefits:

(b) you acquire them during the policy
period.
This exclusion does not apply while the watercraft is stored.
g.

(1) voluntarily provided; or

arising out of:

(2) required to be provided;

(1) the ownership, maiateaaace, use, loadiag
or unloading of an aircraft;

by the 'insured under any:
(1) workers* compensation law;

(2) the e n t r u s t m e n t by an i n s u r e d of an
aircraft to any person: or
(3) statutorily imposed vicarious parental liability for the actions of a child or minor
using an aircraft.

(2) non-occupational disability law; or
(3) occupational disease law;
e.

An aircraft means any contrivance used or
designed for flight, except model or hobby
aircraft not used or designed to carry people
or cargo.
h.

2.

Coverage E — Personal Liability, does not apply
to:
a.

(1) is also an insured under a nuclear energy
liability policy or
(2) would be an insured under that policy but
for the exhaustion of its limit of liability.

caused directly or indirectly by wor, including
undeclared war, civil war, insurrection, rebellion, revolution, warlike act by a military force
or military personnel, destruction or seizure
or use for a military purpose, and including
any consequence of any of these. Discharge
of a nuclear weapon will be deemed a warlike
act even if accidental.

Exclusions d., e.e f., and g. do not apply to bodily
Injury to a residence employee arising out of and
in the course of the residence employee's employment by an insured.

bodily injury or property damage for which
an insured under this policy:

A nuclear energy liability policy is one issued
by:
(1) American Nuclear Insurers;
(2) Mutual Atomic Energy Liability Underwriters;
(3) Nuclear Insurance Association of Canada;
or any of their successors; or
f.

bodily injury to you or an insured within the
meaning of part a. or b. of " i n s u r e d " as
defined.

liability:
(1) for your
charged
ciation,
property
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share of any loss assessment
against all members of an assoc o r p o r a t i o n or c o m m u n i t y of
owners:
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3.

Coverage F — Medical Payment
not apply to bodily injury:
a.

(I) non-occuj

Others, does

(3) occupational disease law;

to a residence employee if the bodily i n j u r y :

c.

(1) occurs off the insured location; and

from a n y
(1) nuclear reaction;

(2) does not arise out of or in the course of
the residence employee's employment
by an insured;
b.

;nai oisoonuy IOW oi

(2) nuclear radiation, or
(3) radioactive contamination;

to any person eligible to receive benefits:
(1) voluntarily provided, or

all whether controlled or uncontrolled or however caused; or

(2) required to be provided;

(4) any consequence of any of these
d.

under any
(1) workers' compensation law;

to any person, other than a residence employee of an insured, regularly residing on
any part of the insured location.

SECTION ll—ADDITIONAL COVERAGES
We will not pay for property damage:

We cover the following in addition to the limits of
liability:
1.

a.

to the extent of any amount recoverable
under Section I of this policy;

Claim Expenses. We pay:
a.

expenses we incur and costs taxed against an
insured in any suit we defend;

b.

caused intentionally by an insured who is 13
years of age or older,

b.

p r e m i u m s on bonas required in a suit we
defend, but not for bond amounts mqre than
the limit of liability for Coverage E vVe need
not apply for or furnish any bond;

c.

to property owned by an insured;

d.

to property owned by or rented to a tenant of
an insured or a resident in your household, or

e.

arising out of:

c.

d.

e.

reasonable expenses incurred by an insured
at our request, including actual loss of earnings (but not loss of other income) up to $50
per day, for assisting us in the investigation or
defense of a claim or suit;

(1) business pursuits;
(2) any act or omission in connection with a
premises owned, rented or controlled by
an insured, other than the insured locat i o n ; or

interest on the entire judgment which accrues after entry of the judgment and before
we pay or tender, or deposit in court that part
of the judgment which does not exceed the
limit of liability that applies;

(3) the ownership, maintenance, or use of aircraft, watercraft or motor vehicles or all
other motorized land conveyances

prejudgment interest awarded against the
insured on that pa? t o\ the ludgment we pay.
If we make an offer to pay the applicable limit
of liability, we will not pay any prejudgment
interest based on that period of time after the
offer.

This exclusion does not apply to a motorized land conveyance designed for recreational use off public roads, not subject to
motor vehicle registration and not owned
by an insured.
4.

20

First Aid Expenses. We will pay expenses for first
aid to others incurred by an insured for bodily
i n j u r y covered under this policy We will not pay
for first aid to you or any other insured.

3.

Damage to Property of Others. We will pay, at
replacement cost, up to $500 per occurrence for
property damage to property of others caused by
an insured.

HO-3 Ed 4-84

Loss Assessment. We will pay up to $ 1000 for your
share of any loss assessment charged during the
policy period against you by a corporation or association of property owners, when the assessment is made as a result of:
a

each occurrence to which Section II of this
policy would apply;
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b

liability for each act of a ^,rector, officer or
trustee in the capacity as a director, officer or
trustee, provided

This coverage
>Ues only to loss assessments
charged against you as owner or tenant of the
residence premises.

(1) the director, officer or trustee is elected
by the members of a corporation or association of property owners, and

We do not cover loss assessments charged
agamst you or a corporation or association of
property owners by any governmental body

(2) the director, officer or trustee serves
without deriving any income f r o m the
exercise of duties which are solely on
behalf of a corporation or association of
property owners

Section II — Coverage E — Personal Liability
Exclusion 2 a (1) does not apply to this coverage

SECTION ll—CONDITIONS
1.

Limit of Liability. Our total liability under Covei age E for all damages resulting from any one
occurrence will not be more than the limit of liability for Coverage E as shown in the Declarations
This limit is the same regardless of the number of
Insureds, claims made or persons injured
Our total liability under Coverage F for all medical
expense payable for bodily Injury to one person
as the result of one accident will not be more than
the lirqit of liability for Coverage F as shown in the
Declarations

2.

3o

4.

Severability of Insurance. This insurance applies
separately to each insured This condition will not
increase our limit of liability for any one occurrence.

d

under the coverage — Damage to Property of
Others —- submit to us within 60 days after
the loss, a sworn statement of loss and show
the damaged property, if in the insured's
control,

e

the insured will not except at the insured's
own cost, voluntarily make payment assume
obligation or incur expense other than for first
aid to others at the time of the bodily injury.

Duties of an Injured Person — Coverage F —
Medical Payments to Others.
The injured person or someone acting for the
injured person will
a

Duties After Loss. In case of an accident or occurrence, t h e Insured will p e r f o r m the following
duties that apply You will help us by seeing that
these duties are performed

give us written proof of claim, under oath if
required, as soon as is practical, and

b

authorize us to obtain copies of medical
reports and records

a.

The injured person will submit to a physical exam
by a doctor of our choice when and as often as v\e
reasonably require

give written notice to us or our agent as soon
as is practical, which sets forth
(1) the identity of the policy and insured;

5.

(2) reasonably available information on the
t i m e , place and c i r c u m s t a n c e s of the
accident or occurrence; and

Payment of Claim—Coverage F—Medical Payments to Others. Payment under this coverage <s
not an admission of liability by an insured or us

6.

Suit Against Us. No action can be brought against
us unless there has been compliance with the
policy provisions

(3) names and addresses of any claimants
and witnesses,
b.

promptly forward to us every notice, demand,
summons or other process relating to the
accident or occurrence;

c.

at our request, he'p us

No one will have the right to join us as a party *o
any action against an insured. Also, no action
with respect to Coverage E can be brought against
us until the obligation of the insured has been
d e t e r m i n e d by final j u d g m e n t or agreement
signed by us

(1) to make settlement,
(2) to enforce any right of contribution or
indemnity against any person or organization who may be liable to an insured;
(3) with the conduct of suits and attend hearings and trials
(4) to secure and give evidence and obtain
the attendance of witnesses
Page 14 of 15

7.

Bankruptcy of an Insured. Bankruptcy or insolvency of an insured will not relieve us of our
obligations under this policy

8.

Other Insurance — Coverage E — Personal Liability. This insurance is excess over other valid
and collectible insurance except insurance written specifically to cover as excess over the limits
of liability that apply in this policy

Copyright, Insurance Services Office Inc , 1984
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SECTIONS I AND N—CONDITIONS
1.

Policy Period. This policy applies only to loss irl
Section I or bodily injury or property damage in
Section II, which occurs during the policy period.

This can be done by letting you know at
least 30 days before the date cancellation
takes effect.

2.

Concealment or Fraud. We do not provide coverage for an insured who has:

(4) When this policy is written for a period of
more than one year, we may cancel for
any reason at anniversary by letting you
know at least 30 days before the date
cancellation tjkes effect.

a.

intentionally concealed or misrepresented
any material fact or circumstance, or

bo

made false statements or engaged in fraudulent conduct:

c.

When this policy is cancelled, the premium for
the period from the date of cancellation to
the expiration date will be refunded pro rata.

d.

If the return premium is not refunded with the
notice of cancellation or when this policy is
returned to us, we will refund it within a reasonable time after the date cancellation
takes effect.

relating to this insurance.
3.

Liberalization Clause. If we adopt a revision
which would broaden the coverage under this policy without additional premium within 60 days
prior to or during the policy period, the br oadened
coverage will immediately apply to this policy.

4.

Waiver or Change of Policy Provisions.

6.

Non-Renewal. We may elect not to renew this
policy. We may do so by delivering to you. or mailing to you at your mailing address shown in the
Declarations, written notice at least 30 days before the expiration date of this policy. Proof of
mailing will be sufficient proof of notice.

7.

Assignment. Assignment of this policy will not be
valid unless we give our written consent.

8.

Subrogation. An insured may waive in writing before a loss all rights of recovery against any person. If not waived, we may require an assignment
of rights of recovery for a loss to the extent that
payment is made by us.

A waiver or change of a provision of this policy must
be in writing by us to be valid. Our request for an
appraisal or examination will not waive any of our
rights.
5.

Cancellation.
a.

b.

You may cancel this policy at any time by
returning it to us or by letting us knpw in writing of the date cancellation is to take effect.
We may cancel this policy only for the reasons
stated below by letting you know in writing of
the date cancellation takes effect. This cancellation notice may be delivered to you. or
mailed to you at your mailing address shown
in the Declarations.

If an assignment is sought, an insured must sign
and deliver all related papers and cooperate with
us.

Proof of mailing will be sufficient proof of notice.
(1) When you have not paid the premium, we
may cancel at any time by letting you
know at least 10 days before the date cancellation takes effect.
(2) When this policy has been in effect for less
than 60 days and is not a renewal with us.
we may cancel for any reason by letting
you know at least 10 days before the date
cancellation takes effect.
(3) When this policy has been in effect for 60
days or more, or at any time if it is a renewal with us, we may cancel:
(a) if there has been a material misrepresentation of fact which if known to us
would have caused us not to issue the
policy; or
(b) if the risk has changed substantially
since the policy was issued.
HO-3 Ed. 4-84

Subrogation does not apply under Section II to
Medical Payments to Others or Damage to Property of Others.
9.

Death. If any person named in the Declarations
or the spouse, if a resident of the same household,
dies:
a.

we insure the legal representative of the deceased but only with respect to the premises
and property of the deceased covered under
the policy at the time of death;

b.

insured includes:
(1) any member of your household who is an
insured at the time of your death, but
only while a resident of the residence
premises; and
(2) with respect to your property, the person
having proper temporary custody of the
property until appointment and qualification of a legal representative.
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EXHIBIT "6"

JAMES A. MCINTOSH, ESQ. — NO. 2194
JAMES A. MCINTOSH & ASSOCIATES P.C.

^
>

n

A Utah Professional Law Corporation
Attorney for Plaintiff
Suite 14, Intrade Bldg. South
1399 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84105
Telephone: (801) 487-7834

'J

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
MYRA L. TAYLOR
Plaintiff

COMPLAINT

vs.

Civil No. ^jQOcl

Q 1

RONALD H. OLSON, CAROL D. OLSON,
AND JENNIFER HEATHER OLSON
(Judge

)

Defendants

COUNT 1

1.

On October 17, 1987, ("accident date") the defendant

Ronald H. Olson was the owner of a 1974 Volkswagen, two-door sedan,
green in color ("Volkswagen").

Mr. Olson had purchased the said

Volkswagen from a previous owner Daniel Park Lake.

On the said

October 17, 1987, the Volkswagen was not registered in the state
of Utah and was uninsured.
2.

On the said accident date the said Ronald H. Olson was

married to the defendant Carol D. Olson and was living with his
wife and family at 1930 Logan Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84108.

o oooo i

On the said accident date, the defendant Jennifer Heather Olson was
sixteen years of age, having been born on April 2, 1971.
3.

On the said accident date, the defendant Jennifer Heather

Olson ("Heather") was driving the said Volkswagen at approximately
11:55 P.M. on Yalecrest Avenue (1015 South in Salt Lake City, Utah)
at its intersection with 1900 East ("accident scene") . At the said
time and place the said defendant Heather was intoxicated and was
driving

the

approximately

Volkswagen

with

a

blood

alcohol

content

of

.14 grams in violation of § 41-6-44, Utah Code

Annotated, 1953, as amended.
4.

A few minutes prior to the time and place described in

paragraph 3 above, said defendant Heather was involved in a "hit
and run" accident in an area less than one mile from the said
accident scene.
5.

At approximately 11:55 P.M. on the said accident date and

at the accident scene, the plaintiff Myra L. Taylor was driving her
1984 Subaru 640 station wagon ("Subaru") in a northerly direction
along 1900 East Street and in a careful and prudent manner.
6.

On or about the said 11:55 P.M. on the said accident date

and at the accident scene, the defendant Heather negligently,
carelessly,

recklessly,

improperly,

unlawfully

and

illegally

("negligence") operated her Volkswagen thereby causing a collision
with the Subaru being driven by the plaintiff.
7.

As a direct and proximate cause of the said defendant's

negligence, the plaintiff was then and there
permanently injured both internally and externally.

seriously and
She suffered

bruises, contusions, lacerations, shock, headache, muscle spasms,
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numbness in her joints and members, scarring, strains, fractures,
and other damages and personal injury so as to render the plaintiff
partially and permanently disabled for the balance of her life.
The plaintiff has suffered a loss of the quality of life and
enjoyment of life she experienced prior to October 17, 1987, and
has also suffered mental anguish, emotional pain and suffering and
other mental and emotional trauma.

The plaintiff is entitled to

be awarded general damages in the amount of $500,000 for these
personal injuries.
8.

As a direct and proximate cause of the said defendant's

negligence, the plaintiff sustained a loss and impairment of
earning capacity which will continue for the balance of the
plaintiff's working

life.

The plaintiff

is entitled to be

compensated for the loss of this earning capacity in the amount of
$250,000.
9.

As a direct and proximate cause of the said defendant's

negligence as described above, the plaintiff has been forced to
seek medical and surgical care and attention and has incurred sums
of money for doctors, surgeons, and hospital bills; and will
continue to incur sums for said bills; that the exact amount of the
said bills has not been determined at this time; but will be
determined and known by the time of the trial of this matter; and
the plaintiff requests leave to amend her complaint to plead the
said medical costs and expenses at that time.
10.

As a direct and proximate cause of the said defendant's

negligence as described above, the plaintiff has lost sums of money
which she might otherwise have earned in her employment; that she

"3"

00000 3

has been required to take time off from her employment to receive
medical attention and treatment for the injuries sustained as a
result of the negligence of the defendant Heather as described
above, and also for the time to convalescence from the said injury;
has incurred sums of money to pay for domestic help to assist the
plaintiff in maintaining her household and the raising of ten (10)
children during the time of her convalescence from the said
personal injuries described above; that the exact amount of loss
of money from her employment and the amounts paid for the domestic
assistance is not known at this time, but will become known by the
time of the trial in this matter, and the plaintiff requests leave
to amend her complaint when the said damages become known.
11.

As a direct and proximate cause of the defendant's

negligence as described above, the plaintiff's motor vehicle was
demolished and thereby rendered inoperable. The said motor vehicle
was owned jointly by the plaintiff and her husband Wayne C. Taylor.
The said Wayne C. Taylor has assigned any interest he might have
in damages to the said motor vehicle to the plaintiff Myra L.
Taylor herein.
12.

The Volkswagen Heather was driving at the accident scene

and on the accident date and at the time indicated was in violation
of several safety statutes which have been enacted by the state of
Utah and other local governing bodies; that the operation of the
said

Volkswagen

without

being

registered

or

insured

also

constitutes negligence on the part of the said defendant Heather.
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WHEREFORE,

the

plaintiff

demands

judgment

against

the

defendant Jennifer Heather Olson on this COUNT 1 as follows:
1*

For the sum of $500,000 general damages.

2.

For the sum of $250,000 loss of earning capacity.

3.

For the amount of special damages incurred by the

plaintiff for medical, hospital, doctors, prescriptions and other
expenses and charges described in this complaint*
4.

For the amount of special damages incurred by the

plaintiff for loss of wages, cost of domestic help, and the other
out-of-pocket expenses described above.
5.

Together with interest on all said amounts described

hereinabove at the highest legal rate both before and after
judgment; together with costs of court and such other relief the
court deems appropriate.
COUNT 2
("PUNITIVE DAMAGES FOR HBA0?B£R*S mi&tlt
13.

The

plaintiff

incorporates

AND MALICIOUS MISCONDUCT")
by

reference

all

the

allegations in COUNT 1 into this COUNT 2.
14.

The conduct of the defendant Heather in driving a motor

vehicle without registration and which was uninsured, in being in
an intoxicated condition at the time of the accident, in having
been involved in a "hit and run" collision within a few minutes of
the accident with Myra L. Taylor; and in otherwise disregarding the
rights and safety of the said Myra L. Taylor in the manner in which
the said Heather drove her Volkswagen, was wilful, malicious,
wanton, and intentional ("malicious misconduct").
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15.

As a direct

and proximate cause of the malicious

misconduct of the said defendant Heather as described above, the
plaintiff sustained the personal injuries, property damage, and
other damages more fully described in COUNT 1 above.
16.

Because of the malicious misconduct on the part of the

said defendant Heather, the plaintiff is entitled to punitive
damages against the said defendant.
WHEREFORE,

the

plaintiff

demands

judgment

against

the

defendant Heather on this COUNT 2 as follows:
1.

For all of the damages requested in the prayer in COUNT

2.

For punitive damages in an amount to be determined at the

1.

time of the trial in this matter.
3.

For interest on the said amount of punitive damages at

the highest legal rate allowed by law both before and after
j udgment.
COUNT 3
(M3¥A*0¥0RX LIABILITY Off KONALD H,.OLSOH FOR HEATHER*S MISCOHDUCT")
17.

The

plaintiff

incorporates

by

reference

all

the

allegations in the preceding counts into this COUNT 3.
18.

Section 41-2-115, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended,

provides that any negligence or wilful misconduct of a minor
younger than eighteen (18) years of age when operating a motor
vehicle upon a highway is imputed to the person who has signed the
application of the minor for a permit or license. The said section
further provides the person signing the application for a permit
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or a license is jointly and severally liable with the minor for any
damages caused by the negligent or wilful misconduct.
19.

At the time of the negligence and malicious and wilful

misconduct as described in COUNTS 1 and 2 above, the defendant
Ronald H. Olson had signed the application for a permit or license
of the defendant minor Jennifer Heather Olson.

Pursuant to § 41-

2-115 the said Ronald H. Olson is jointly and severally liable with
Heather for any and all of the damages claimed in COUNTS 1 and 2
above.
20.

Section 41-2-116, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended,

provides that the owner of a motor vehicle causing or knowingly
permitting a minor younger than eighteen (18) years of age to
operate the vehicle upon a highway or a person who gives or
furnishes the motor vehicle to the minor, are each jointly and
severally liable with the minor for any damages caused by the
negligence of the minor in operating the vehicle.
21.

The defendant Ronald H. Olson is jointly and severally

liable with his minor daughter Heather pursuant to § 41-2-116 for
any damages negligently caused by the said minor as set forth more
fully in COUNT 1 above.
WHEREFORE,

the

plaintiff

demands

judgment

against

the

defendants Ronald H. Olson and Jennifer Heather Olson jointly and
severally on this COUNT 3 for all of the damages requested in
COUNTS 1 and 2 above.

~7~

ft

A

aa a

COUNT 4
(w&iaBTItfTT O? RONRW) B< QfcSOff AUD CARO& D, OI.SON FOR
NBGK&KSBHT ENTROSTMBUT OF MOTOR VEHICLE TO THEIR MIKOR DAUGHTER
HEATHER")
22.

The

plaintiff

incorporates

by

reference

all

the

allegations in the preceding counts into this COUNT 4.
23.

The defendants Ronald H. Olson and Carol D. Olson are the

parents of the defendant Jennifer Heather Olson.

On October 17,

1987, the said parents were living in the same household with the
said minor child.

On the said date the said parents improperly

permitted their minor daughter to use the Volkswagen automobile
which was under the control of the said parents. At the said time,
the parents knew or should have known their minor daughter intended
to or was likely to use the motor vehicle and to conduct herself
in an activity and in a manner as to create an unreasonable risk
of harm to others.
24.

The said parents had previously known or should have

known prior to the said accident date about Heather's drinking
intoxicating beverages; however, the said parents failed to take
adequate precautions or to properly instruct their minor child
about the dangers of driving while under the influence of alcohol.
25.

The

parents

further

failed

to

take

the

necessary

precautions to see that their minor child would not take the
Volkswagen automobile on the highways in an unregistered condition
and without the vehicle insurance required by the statutes of the
state of Utah.
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26.

The conduct of the parents in entrusting the motor

vehicle to the minor child under the circumstances set forth above
in this complaint constitute negligence for which the parents are
liable for any damages caused by the said minor child.
27.

The said parents are liable for all the damages claimed

by the plaintiff in the previous counts in this complaint.
WHEREFORE, the plaintiff demands judgment against the three
defendant and each of them jointly and severally in this COUNT 4
for the relief requested in the previous counts in this complaint.
COUNT 5
("LIABILITY OF RONALD H* OLSON AND CAROL T>. OLSON FOR FAILURE
TO FROPERL* SUPERVISE A#$ CONTROL TBS CONDUCT OF THEIR MINOR CHILD
HEATHER**)
28c

The

plaintiff

incorporates

by

reference

all

the

allegations in the preceding counts into this COUNT 5.
29.

As parents

of the said

minor

child

Heather, the

defendants Ronald H. Olson and Carol D. Olson had a duty to
supervise and control the conduct of the said minor child so as to
prevent the minor child from intentionally harming others or from
so conducting herself as to create an unreasonable risk of bodily
harm to them,
30.

The said parents knew or had reason to know that they had

the ability to control Heather and they knew or should have known
of the necessity and opportunity for exercising such control. The
parents

knew

the automobile

did not contain

current

valid

registration as required by Utah statutes nor was the Volkswagen
automobile insured for personal injury or property damage to others
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as required by Utah statutes*
31.

The parents knew the minor child had driven the car

without registration and without insurance on previous occasions;
however, the parents did not exercise the required supervision and
control to

stop Heather

from using

it on the accident date.

Rather, they allowed the minor child to have access to the keys to
the said automobile and to otherwise be able to use and operate the
motor vehicle.
32.

The parents also knew that on prior occasions as well as

on the accident date the minor child Heather had been using license
plates from her older sister Heidi's automobile, the said use being
in violation of the state statutes pertaining to motor vehicles.
Notwithstanding

this

knowledge, the

said

parents

did

not

do

anything to stop this practice and thereby permitted the minor
child to take the Volkswagen on the public streets and highways in
the

state

of Utah with

an

improper

registration

and

without

adequate insurance.
33.

The parents knew or should have known the minor child had

been consuming alcoholic beverages for a period of time prior to
the accident date. The parents also knew the minor child consorted
with

other

friends

and

acquaintances

who

were

accustomed

drinking alcoholic beverages when they were together.

to

The parents

knew or should have known their minor child Heather had driven
previously after having taken alcoholic beverages.
34.
habits,

Notwithstanding
the

Volkswagen

parents

which

had

this knowledge of Heather's

allowed

Heather

to

have

access

invalid

license

plates, lacked

drinking
to

the

adequate
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insurance, and under circumstances where the parents knew or should
have

known

Heather

was

attending

a

party

where

intoxicating

beverages were going to be consumed and knew or should have known
that Heather would be driving the motor vehicle after consuming the
said intoxicating beveragesc
35.

The parents knew that they had the ability to control

their minor daughter's access to and use of the said Volkswagen,
and also knew the necessity

for exercising the said control;

however, they neglected to so control or supervise Heather to
prevent her from using the said Volkswagen under the circumstances
set forth in this count and other counts in this complaint.
36.

The

parents

knew

or

should

have

known

their

minor

daughter Heather had not had sufficient driving experience to be
driving the Volkswagen on October 17, 1987, under the circumstances
described in this complaint without adult supervision and control;
yet the parents neglected to provide this adult supervision and
control, thereby resulting in the accident described more fully in
COUNT 1 above.
37.

The

parents

were

negligent

in

failing

to

retain

sufficient control and discipline over their minor daughter Heather
and in failing to provide adequate supervision for Heather to
insure Heather would not take the Volkswagen automobile under the
circumstances set forth in this count and other counts in this
complaint*
38.

This lack of control and supervision on the part of the

parents constitutes negligence on their part.
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39.

The said parent's negligence contributed as a proximate

and direct cause to the accident on October 17, 1987, as described
more fully in COUNT 1 of this complaint. As a direct and proximate
result of this negligence on the part of the parents, the plaintiff
sustained the damages which she claims in the preceding counts in
this complaint.
WHEREFORE, the plaintiff demands judgment against the three
defendants and each of them jointly and severally on this COUNT 5
for the relief requested in the foregoing counts in this complaint.
DATED this 5th day of December, 1990.

JAMES A. MCINTOSH & ASSOCIATES P.C.

MYR£/L. TAYLOB/

STATE OF UTAH

TAMES A. MCINTOSH
Attorney for Plaintiff

)

:ss
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
On the 5th day of December, 1990, personally appeared before
me MYRA L. TAYLOR, who being first duly sworn, did depose and say
that she has read the above and foregoing Complaint, knows the
contents thereof, that the same are true of her own knowledge,
except as to matters therein alleged upon information and belief
and, as to those matters, she believes them to be true.
•nun r> n ^ ^ a w t w x
JAMES A. MCINTOSH
Notary Public
STATE Of UTAH
My Commtaton Expires
December 11,1993
2038 Royal Cr. SIC. UT 84108
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 5th day of December, 1990, a true
and correct copy of the above and foregoing COMPLAINT was hand
delivered to the following:
Michael N. Martinez, Esq.
349 South 200 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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EXHIBIT "7"

Frank Grant
4821 South 1395 East • Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 • Phone (801) 277-7085

November 16, 1987

Jim Mcintosh
Attorney at Law
1399 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105
Re:
This
Ave.
sign
1900

Myra L. Taylor

accident occurred when a car eastbound on Yalecrest
driven by Jennifer Heather Olson passed a yield
and struck the left front of a car northbound on
East driven by Myra L. Taylor.

In addition to the initial impact on the right front
of the Olson car and the left front of the Taylor car,
additional damage was sustained in a secondary impact
to the right side of the Olson car and to the left side
of the Taylor car. The impact then forced the Taylor
car to the right where it hit head-on into a tree.
Both 1900 East and Yalecrest Ave. are asphalt two-lane
roads. There was a yield sign in place and clearly
visible controlling traffic on Yalecrest Ave. The
sight distance is restricted ny shrubbery on the southwest corner of the intersection. This shrubbery extends
from the sidewalk to the house on the southwest corner.
The speed limit on both streets was posted at 25 MPH.
The accident occurred at about 11:55 P.M. It was dark
with no street lights. The weather was clear and the
road was dry. There were no roadway defects that would
have any bearing on the accident.
Post impact analysis indicates an impact speed of 39 MPH
on the Olson car and an impact speed of 33 MPH on the
Taylor car. There was no indication of application of
brakes on the part of either driver prior to impact.
Due to the shrubbery obstructing the view, both drivers

Accident Analyst

Jim Mcintosh

page two

would have a clear view of the other for about 1.18
seconds prior to impact. The average time required for
perception and reaction is about 1.5 seconds. Under
these circumstances, neither driver would have the time
or the distance to have taken any successful evasive
action. In order for Taylor to have been able to stop
in time she would have to have been traveling at less
than 15 MPH. At the time the Olson car came into view
the Taylor car was about 56 feet away. This would not
allow her time to perceive, react and skid to a stop
at any speed greater than about 15 MPH.
In my opinion, excessive speed of the Taylor car was not
a contributing factor in the cause of this accident.
There was no indication of any vehicle defects on either
car. Witnesses stated that both cars had headlights on
at the time of impact.
Witnesses stated that they detected evidence of the use
of alcohol by Jennifer Olson. Due to the fact that Olson
was a juvenile and there is possible additional charges
pending against her, the City Police Department is reluctant to disclose the results of a blood alcohol test
performed on Olson shortly after the accident.
The license plates on the 1974 Volkswagen driven by
Jennifer Olson (945 ARV) were registered to a 1986
Suzuki owned by Heidi Olson.
The car driven by Jennifer Olson was involved in a traffic
incident on Guardsman Way at Sunnyside Ave. a few minutes
before, L-tihis accident happened with a vehicle driven by
Michelle Paxton. Olson made a left turn in front of
Paxton. The damage was slight but Olson did not stop.
Paxton was following the Olson car at the time of this
accident in an attempt to identify the driver.
Jennifer Olson
of way and hit
Sunnyside Ave.
for failure to

was cited for failure to yield the right
and run as a result of her actions at
and Guardsman Way. She was also cited
yield the right of way, no drivers license,

Jim Mcintosh
no insurance and improper registration.
impounded.

page three
Her car was

Jennifer Heather Olson does have a valid drivers license
which expires on April 2, 1991. She has no traffic violation of record as of November 13, 1987.
In my opinion, the sole cause of this accident was the
actions of Jennifer H. Olson in failing to comply with
the yield sign as required in UCA Section 41-6-74.10 (b),
She was also traveling at an excessive rate of speed of
about 14 MPH over the posted speed limit and failing to
reduce speed when approaching an intersection.

%

Frank Grant
Encl.
Traffic incident report Case # 87-97547
Statements of Michelle Paxton, Gary Knowles, Jason
Boren, Stephanie Smith and Officer Louie Numiz
Photos of accident site
Photos of Taylor vehicle
Scale map

EXHIBIT "8"

Frank Grant
4821 South 1395 East • Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 • Phone (801) 277-7085

10/87
November 3, 1987
James Mcintosh

Re: Myra Taylor

Statement of MICHELLE PAXTON, 1704 Herbert Ave. Salt
Lake City, UtHu
'
Qo
A.

Michelle, I think your mother told you my name is
Frank Grant.
Uh huh.

Q,
A.

I'm a private investigator looking into this accident.
Uh huh.

Q.
A.

I understand you were involved with that same car.
Uh huh.

Qo
Ac

A little bit earlier?
Right.

Q. Where was that?
A. That was on 8th South and I think itfs Guardsman Waye
I think that*s the Street it was. Do you want me to
tell you what happened?
Q. Sure.
A. Well, I just turned right on 9th South and so I was
headed north and the girl was headed south but she
was turning east. Okay so she was turning left and
the light was green so I had the right of way and she
didn't yield for me. She just kept, she just went
right on through. I could tell she wasn't going to
stop so I put on my brakes and she, we both just kind
of hit, you know.
Q.
A.

Not very hard, though?
No, not very hard but I mean I couldn't tell how hard
she hit me and she just took off. She didn't stop
and I turned around and honked and she didn't stop.
I didn't know what she had done to my car, the damage
or anything. All I knew is she had hit me so I
followed her and was honking and she wouldn't stop.
She was pretty well down the street and then she turned
up and then she turned up and was going east up the

Accident Analyst
Complete Accident Investigation & Reconstruction Service

Statement of MICHELLE PAXTON
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the streeto We couldn't have been going more than
35 but I got halfway up the block and she was at the
top of the block and the Subaru was headed north and
she didn't yield.
Q.
A,

I see. Did you ever talk to this young lady, this
Jennifer Olsen?
No, huh uh.

Q.
A.

Never talked to her at all?
No, but I know who she is. I never talked to her that
night because she took off.

Q.
A.

You stopped at the scene I assume?
Right and I ran in and called the police.

Q.
A.

You think she was doing around 35 up through there.
That's what the policeman told me. I had no idea.
I was so frustrated I didn't know what I was doing.
She hit my car, you know. She just was leaving.

Q.
A.

How badly was she hurt?
I really don't know because when they pulled her out
of the car I was talking with the policeman so I don't
know. I know that she has been wearing a neck brace.
I know there was some injuries to her. The first
thing I did after I saw the accident, I ran up to
the Subaru and I could tell she wasn't really in very
good shape. I said, "Are you okay?" She said, "I
don't think so." She was bleeding and everything.

Q.
A.

Did you ever see the Subaru before the--?
Oh! I saw it coming.

Q.
A.

You saw it coming?
I knew there was going to be an accident. I mean I
was far enough behind her, I could see it coming,
yeah.

Q.
A.

Could you see it's headlights, the Subaru?
Yeah, that's how I saw it.

Statement of MICHELLE PAXTON
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Q. Were both of them on or just one?
A. I don't remember. There was another person with me
in the car. He might remember.
Q. Who was that?
A. Jason Boren. But I know that's how I did notice it.
I could see the lights.
Q.
A.

How could I get a hold of Jason?
Hiw number is 532 2683.

Q.
A.

Is that Boren?
Yes and he was with me the entire time.

Q.

Did you ever get close enough to the lady in the VW
to tell whether or not you could smell any alcohol?
I, well, I mean no but I could tell there was something
definitely something wrong with her. This has nothing
to do with it but I had seen her the night before drunk
driving.

A.

Q.
A.

Oh huh.
Because she goes to, I had seen her at the High School
football game and she was drunk and I told my friends
and they said, "Heather, do you want us to drive you
home?11 and she said, "No11. So she got in her car and
drove away drunk.

Q.
A.

Now, this was on a different occasion?
That was two days before. This was Thursday.

Q.
A.

This was on a Thursday you are talking about now?
That she had been drunk driving.

Q. And this accident happened on Saturday?
A. Right and I know that there is a girl who was driving
by who was also at the scene and was Heather's friend
but she didn't see the accident happen. She was there
when they pulled her out of the car and she told me
she did smell alcohol.
Q.
A.

Do you know who that was?
Her name is Stephanie Smith but I'm not sure of her
phone number because it's unlisted but I could get it
for you if you want.

EXHIBIT "9"

Frank Grant

|

4821 South 1395 East • Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 • Phone (801) 277-7085
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11/87
November 6, 1987
Jim Mcintosh

Re: Myra Taylor

Statement of STEPHANIE SMITH, 1212 Princeton Ave. Salt
Lake City, Utlfu rfy£ -////
Q.
A.

Stephanie, my name is Frank Grant.
investgator.
Uh huh,

I'm an accident

Q.
A.

Did you know the girls in this accident?
Uh huh, I knew both of them.

Q. Okay.
A. Just a minute, the one girl I went to Jr. High with.
The one that got in the accident.
Q. Yes.
A. And I thought it was her and I pulled over and it was
her and then I talked to Shelly, the girl she hit
sooner because I go^to school with here She just told
me what had happened.
Q. Who is Shelly?
A. Shelly Paxton, Michelle Paxton.
Q,
A.

Okay, I'm with you,
She was the girl that Heather had hit earlier.

Q. Yes.
A. On Guardsman, I think it was.
Q.
A.

How well do you know Heather?
Well, I was friends with her, like three years ago
but I haven't really been since.

Q.
A.

Did you talk to her at the accident scene?
A little bit, I tried to but she kind of was
hysterical.

Qe
A.

Hysterical from what, do you know?
I guess just the accident. I think she had been
drinking too.

Accident Analyst
Complete Accident Investigation & Reconstruction Service

Statement of STEPHANIE SMITH

page two

Q.
A.

Could you smell it on her?
Yeah, you could kind of smell it in the area.

Q.
A.

Do you know where she had been that night?
I don't know where she had been. I think she had
been at a party or something.

Q.
A.

Do you have any idea where that party might have been?
No, I don't. I'm sorry.

Q.

How long after the accident do you think before you
got there?
Oh, not very long at all because the only other people
there was a guy in the Isuzu Trooper that I guess had
seen Heather back a ways so he followed her to make
sure she got home and then Michelle Paxton and the
person on the front lawn it happened on was the only
persons there.

A.

Q.
A.

So it must have been just a few seconds after it
happened, then?
Just a few seconds, I think.

Q.
A.

Anybody with you?
Yeah, there were.

Q.
A,

Did they know Heather at all?
Yeah, they did. Well, two of them did, I mean one
of them did. One went to Jr. High with me. The
other two I just met but the one, one of the boys
I was with knew her better than I did. He had kept
in touch with her more than I did.

Q.

Had either you or the boys you were with seen her
earlier that evening?
No, I don't think so, huh uh.

A.
Qft
Ae

There were three boys with me.

Does Heather drink quite a bit?
Well, I don't know but I think she might because
when we played their high school, when we played
Highland, at their game, I talked to her after the
game and she had been drinking.

EXHIBIT "10"

Frank Grant
4821 South 1395 East • Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 • Phone (801) 277-7085

November 21, 1987
Jim Mcintosh
Attorney at Law
1399 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105
Re:

Myra Taylor

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT
Results of a blood alcohol test administered at the
direction of the police shortly after the accident
indicated a alcohol level of • 147o in Jennifer Olson.
This indicates that she was under the influence of
alcohol at the time of the accident.
UCA Section 41-6-44 stages that any level .08% or
above a person is presumed to be under the influence.
The high alcoholic content in Olson at the time could
very well account for her failure to observe the Paxton
car on Sunnyside Avenue, her failure to stop at the
scene of the first accident, her obvious attempt to
flee before being identified and her failure to use
due care when approaching the yield sign at the intersection of Yalecrest Avenue and 1900 East where she
was involved in the second accident with Taylor.
It was rumored that Jennifer Olson had attended a
party at a private residence that evening. I would
suggest that the location of this party be investigated
to determine if alcoholic beverages were served to
Jennifer Olson. If so who was responsible for allowing
Jennifer, who is only 16 years of age, to get in such
an intoxicated state. It is inconceivable that she
would not display obvious symptoms of intoxication
with a blood alcohol content of „147o.

Accident Analyst
Complete Accident Investigation & Reconstruction Servirp

Jim Mcintosh
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Information from Salt Lake City Prosecutor Sheryl Luke
indicates that due to the fact that Jennifer Olson has
already been charged with failure to yield the right
of way in this accident would preclude the filing of
the additional charge of driving under the influence
of alcohol.
Jennifer Olsonfs actions on the night of October 17,
1987 indicates gross negligence and a complete disregard
for the safety of others.

Frank Grant
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STATE OF UTAH
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
STATE HEALTH LABORATORY
PUBLIC SAFETY TOXICOLOGY SECTION
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44 Medical Drive. Salt Lake City, Utah 84113
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TOXICOLOGY REPORT
Agency:

SALT LAKE CITY P.O.

Suspect(s):

OLSEN, JENNIFER

Officer:

HUNIEZ, L.

Laboratory N o . — k i Z z I l l i .
Your Agency Case N o . — H z i l l M .

LABORATORY FINDINGS:
Blood Alcohol:

0.14 percent (w/v^
N) ethanol.
ethanol

*

Analyzed by Bruce Beck

Sworn and Subscribed to before me this

Notary Public
Tox Lab LE-2 10/83
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October
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MICHAEL N. MARTINEZ - No. 2109

Attorney for Defendants
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349 South 200 East, Suite 110
Th.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 359-8000

L DISTRICT

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF" SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
1
)
)
)
1

MYRA L. TAYLOR,
Plaintiff,

vs.

DEFENDANTS, CAROL D. OLSON
AND RONALD H. OLSON,
CONSOLIDATED RESPONSES TO
PLAINTIFFS FIRST SET OF
INTERROGATORIES

]1 Civil No. 900907125PI
]I Judge Timothy R. Hanson
]

RONALD H. OLSON, CAROL D.
OLSON AND JENNIFER HEATHER
OLSON,
Defendants.

Comes now defendants, Carol D. Olson and Ronald He Olson,
(hereafter "Olson'8) and respond to the plaintiff's interrogatories
as follows:
INTERROGATORIES
INTERROGATORY
telephone

number,

NO.

1.

State

and

official

the

full

position

name,

address

and

each

person

you

of

consulted in compiling your answers to the INTERROGATORIES, and
indicate why each such person was consulted.
RESPONSE NO 1.
City, Utah

Ronald H. Olson, 1930 Logan Ave., Salt Lake

84108, (801) 581-1808.

Gary Howe, Attorney, initial attorney for defendants.
Dan Flandro, Notary who signed release sheet, Valley Bank,
1300 South 2100 East, Salt Lake City, Utah.
INTERROGATORY
including

NO

2.

Identify

each

and

every

document,

all business records, diaries, correspondence,

EXHIBIT

ledger

2

A

n

upon unsubstantiated legal conclusions and damage claims.
INTERROGATORY NO, 18.

Identify the owner(s) of the 1974

Volkswagen automobile ("Volkswagen") described in paragraph 1 of
the plaintiff's complaint.

In this connection, state the name,

address and telephone nuiaber of the owner on the accident date, and
state the identity of the person from whom the owner was purchasing
the motor vehicles.
RESPONSE NO. 18.
City, Utah

Heather Olson, 1930 Logan Ave., Salt Lake

84108, (801) 581-1808.

She borrowed the money from

Ronald H. Olson who borrowed from Valley Bank.
INTERROGATORY NO. 19.

State whether the defendant Jennifer

Heather Olson ("Jennifer") had any interest in the said Volkswagen
automobile on the accident date

October 17, 1987 ("accident

date") . If so, state the exact interest the said defendant had in
the Volkswagen and how she acquired that interest.
RESPONSE NO. 19.

She was buying the car.

INTERROGATORY NO. 20.

See Response 18.

State why the Volkswagen was not

registered in the state of Utah on the accident date.
RESPONSE NO. 20.

It was an old car that was going to be

restored and was not to be driven.
INTERROGATORY NO. 21. State why the Volkswagen was uninsured
on the accident date.
RESPONSE NO. 21. It was not meant to be driven.
INTERROGATORY NO. 22.

State whether you had ever told

Jennifer not to use the Volkswagen prior to the accident date.
RESPONSE NO. 22. Yes.
INTERROGATORY NO. 23.

If your answer to the next-preceding

e <;..- G < <;

interrogatory is in the affirmative, please answer the following
questions.
(a) The day and time of day of each and every time prior
to the accident date that you told Jennifer

not

to use the

Volkswagen.
(b)

The identity of the other persons who were present

when you told Jennifer this.
(c)

The substance of what you told Jennifer about not

using the Volkswagen.
(d)

The reasons, in detail, why you told Jennifer not

to use the Volkswagen.
RESPONSE NO. 23.
(a)

October 17, 1987 at 5:00 p.m.

(b)

Jennifer.

(c)

Do not use the Volkswagen, use the Buick.

(d)

It wasn't road worthy, registered or insured.

INTERROGATORY NO. 24.

Did you have personal knowledge that

Jennifer had driven the said Volkswagen prior to the accident date.
If so, please answer the following questions.
(a)

How you obtained the said knowledge.

(b)

The exact dates and time of day Jennifer had driven

the Volkswagen.
RESPONSE NO. 24.

No.

INTERROGATORY NO. 25. What measures did you take, if any, to
ensure Jennifer did not use the Volkswagen prior to the accident
date.
RESPONSE NO. 25.

Told her not to use it.

0 0008 7

following questions.
(a)

The identity of the friends.

(b)

The dates when Jennifer was with the said persons.

(c) How you gained your knowledge of the said times when
Jennifer was with the said persons.
RESPONSE NO. 34.

No.

INTERROGATORY NO. 35. Did Jennifer ever tell you that she had
been with persons who were consuming alcoholic beverages?

If so,

identify the said persons, the date and time of day when you had
the conversations and the substance of what Jennifer told you.
RESPONSE NO. 35.

No.

INTERROGATORY NO. 36.

State whether you ever knew of any of

Jenniferfs personal friends who had been involved in any trouble
through

drinking

or

consuming

alcoholic

beverages.

In

this

connection, the words "knowledge of any trouble" are meant to mean
your knowledge of any newspaper accounts, telephone calls, or other
sources as well as personal knowledge which you had of Jennifer's
friends being involved in any disciplinary actions of any kind
either by school officials, by their parents, or by other third
parties.

"Disciplinary

action"

by

school

officials

means

suspensions, reprimands, expulsion or any other sanctions by the
said school officials.

"Disciplinary action" by parents means

grounding, loss of allowances or other privileges, or any other
sanctions, punishments or penalties.
RESPONSE NO. 36.

Only rumor and gossip which we did not

substantiate nor pursue due to its dubious nature.
INTERROGATORY NO. 37.

If your answer to the next-preceding

0 C00C 0

(e)

Grounded her for six months*

(f)

Same as (e)*

INTERROGATORY NO. 39.

State whether Jennifer ever told you

she was under the influence of or affected by alcoholic beverages
at the time of her accident with the plaintiff Myra Taylor.
your

answer

to this

interrogatory

is yes, please

If

answer the

following questions.
(a)

The date when Jennifer made this statement to you.

(b)

The place where the statement was made.

(c)

The identity of the other persons who were present

when the statement wa made.
(d)

The substance of what was said by Jennifer to you

about her being under the influence of or affected by alcoholic
beverages at the time of the said accident.
RESPONSE NO. 39*

No.

Once informed of the circumstances, we

did not need Jennifer to confirm she had been drinking.
INTERROGATORY NO. 40.

Did you become aware of any times

subsequent to the accident with Myra Taylor when a sample of
Jennifer1s blood was taken to determine the alcoholic content of
the said blood?

If your answer to this interrogatory is in the

affirmative, please answer the following questions.
(a) The date and exact time of day when you became aware
of the taking of the blood sample.
(b) The identity of the person who first made you aware
of this matter.
(c)

Did you give your permission for the taking of the

said blood sample?

RESPONSE NO, 46.
INTERROGATORY

We have received no such information.

NO.

47.

State

in

detail

each

and

every

instruction, direction, talk or conversation ("instructions") you
had with your daughter Jennifer to supervise or control her use of
the

Volkswagen

automobile.

In

this

connection,

include

the

following information.
(a)

The date the instructions were given to Jennifer.

(b)

The place where the instructions were given.

(c) The identity of other persons who were present when
the instructions were given.
(d)

The nature of the said instructions.

RESPONSE NO. 47.

See Responses 23 and 42.

INTERROGATORY NO. 48.

State exactly what action you took to

ensure Jennifer would not have access to the keys to the Volkswagen
automobile.
RESPONSE NO. 48.

Only one set of keys existed and they were

in Ronald Olson's room.
INTERROGATORY NO. 49.

State how Jennifer acquired access to

the keys to the Volkswagen automobile on the date of the accident.
RESPONSE NO. 49.

Took them

from Ronald

Olson's dresser

drawer.
INTERROGATORY NO. 50.

After you had instructed Jennifer not

to use the Volkswagen automobile when it was uninsured and not
registered, did Jennifer disregard your instructions and use the
Volkswagen automobile prior to the date of the accident —
17, 1987?

October

If so, please answer the following questions,
(a)

The date(s) when she used the Volkswagen.

0 00
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rt*o
Third Juut«iiwt District

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT
STATE OF UTAH
OUNTY

-0O0-

MYRA L. TAYLOR,
Plaintiff,

Judge Timothy R. Hanson

-vs-

Civil No. 900907125PI
Deposition of:
JENNIFER HEATHER OLSON

RONALD H. OLSON, CAROL D. OLSON,
AND JENNIFER HEATHER OLSON,
Defendants.

:
-0O0-

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 14th day of
October, 1991, the deposition of JENNIFER HEATHER OLSON,
produced as a witness herein at the instance of the
Plaintiff, in the above-entitled action now pending in
the above-named court, was taken before Elaine
FitzGerald, a Certified Shorthand Reporter and Notary
Public in and for the State of Utah, commencing at the
hour of 2s10 PoM. of said day at the Law Offices of James
A. Mcintosh, Esquire, Suite 14, Intrade Building, 1399
South 700 East, Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, State
of Utah.
That said deposition was taken pursuant to
Notice and Subpoena.
-oOo-

ORIGINAL
Elaine FitzGerald
CSR No. 329

INDEPENDENT REPORTING
SERVICE

1200 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Certified Shorthand Reporters

(801) 538-2333

17
Q.

After you had driven it.

A.

Yes.

Q.

And prior to October?

A*

I think so.

Q.

Do you remember how many times you had driven it

prior to October approximately when he found out you were
driving it and told you not to do it again?
A.

No.

I remember one time I moved it and he told

me not to touch it.
Qe

Did you ever take your friends Kristi Bringhurst

or Jenny Pia for a ride in that car prior to the time of
the accident?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And do you remember how many times you did that?

A.

No.

Very few, if more than —

I don't know how

many times.
Q.

Would it have been more than six or less than

A.

Less than six.

Q.

Okay.

six?

Would it have been more than three or

less than three or about three maybe?
A.

Could be about three maybe.

Q.

Do you remember where you went on those three

occasions when you took Kristi and Jenny for a ride prior
to October of '87?

Elaine FitzGerald, Certified Shorthand Reporter

At

<" t)

18
Ac

I gave Jenny a ride home once from my house I

2

remember.

3

Q.

And how far does Jenny live from your house?

4

A,

At the time she lived on 15th East*

5

Q.

And you live on 19th East?

6

A.

Uh-huh.

7

Q.

And does she live north or south of you?

8

A.

North.

9

Q.

And were there other times when you took Kristi

10

or Jenny somewhere else?

11

A.

I drove —

12

Q.

Any other times that you can recall?

13

A.

No.

14

Q.

What did you do about getting license plates to

15

I drove the car to school once.

put on the car during those times you drove it, Heather?

161

A.

I found some.

17

Q.

Where did you find them?

181

A.

In the garage.

19

Q.

Do you remember what the number was on the

20

license plate?

21

A.

No.

22

Q.

Was it the same one that was on there during the

23

day of the accident?

24

A.

They were the same plates.

25

Q.

Where were they located in the garage?
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A.

On shelves.

Q.

Do you know who put them there?

31

A.

NO.

4|

Q.

How did you happen to take those plates off the

shelf in the garage and put them on the Volkswagen during
the times you drove it?
A.

Well, they didn't have plates and I knew it

couldn't be taken without plates and they were there.
Q.

Did you ever talk to your mom or dad about those

plates?
A.

No.

Q.

Never got permission from them to use them?

A.

No.

Q.

Where did you get the keys to the car on the

times you drove it?
A.

My dad kept them in his drawer.

Q.

Where is his drawer?

A.

In his room.

Q.

Which room?

A.

His bedroom.

Q.

Did your dad find out about those times that you

took the car?
A.

He knew once, as I said, when I moved —

that he

was mad that I moved it, and I don't think he knew about
the other times.
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Qc

He didn't find out about those and tell you not

to use it?
A.

I don't know what time he found out about it

exactly, but he —

he did ask me if I had driven it and I

said yes and he did find out that way, but he didn't know
exact times I don't think.
Q.

Did your dad ever move the keys to somewhere

else when he knew you were getting them and driving the
car?
A.

I think he kept them up there.

Q.

They were always in his drawer in his bedroom;

is that right?
Ac

As far as I know.

Q.

I'll represent to you, Heather, that your sister

Heidi said that she thought you had driven that car many
times to school during the period that you're talking
about here, and I'm not saying that she's right in that
because she could have a disagreement with you on that.
I mean, she may not know how much you drove it.

She said

she was down at BYU, then came home a couple months
before she got married, but she said her recollection was
that you drove it several times.

Does that refresh your

memory or would you disagree with her?
A.

I would disagree.

I did not drive it.

Q.

You can only recall driving it to school one
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1

time?

2

A.

Uh-huh.

3j

Q.

Could you have driven it more than once?

4J

A.

The car?

5

Q.

Yes.

6

A.

Yes.

7

MR. MARTINEZ:

More than once to school?

8

MR. MCINTOSH:

Yes.

9

THE WITNESS:

Oh, more than once to school?

10

Q.

(By Mr. Mcintosh)

11

A.

I don't remember any other times.

12

Q.

Heather, why would you take this car when your

13

Yes.

dad told you not to?

14

A.

Because —

15

Q.

Did your mom ever talk to you about not taking

16

the car?

17
18
19
20

I didn't realize how serious it was.

A.

Maybe just in conversation that I wasn't to take

Q.

How did you find out the keys were in your dad's

it.

drawer in his bedroom?

21

A.

Well, he keeps other keys up there.

22

Q.

What would be some of the reasons, Heather, that

23

you would want to take the car?

24

events that you were trying to go to?

25

A.

Were there special

That night?
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II

Q.

No. Prior t© October 1987.

2

A.

Yes. I mean yeah* there —

3

Q.

What war© so®^ ©f the events?

41

A.

Well, the one day we had come home from — for

5

lunch and we didn't have a way back to school and I took

6

it# and to give my friend a ride home.

7

Q.

You had a driver's license during this period of

81 time I think, didn't you?
9

A.

Yes.

10

Q.

So you had had driver's ed and you knew how to

11 drive; is that right?
12

A.

Yes.

13

Q.

Had you ever driven any other cars other than

14 this Volkswagen prior to the accident?
15

A.

Yes.

16

Q.

What cars did you drive?

17

A.

My dad's*

18

Q.

Okayc

19

A.

I think before then I had driven my friend's car

Any others?

20 once or twice•
21

Q.

Which friend was that?

22

A.

Kristi Bringhurste

23

Q.

What kind of a car did she have?

24

A.

She — it w&m her parents' car.

25

Q.

Okay. What kind of a car is your dad's car?
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A.

No.

I don't remember.

2j

Q.

What did she say to you when you took it on

these other occasions, like to take your friend home or
to go to special events or something?
A.

I don't think she knew those specific times.

Q.

Now# you've toLd us that your dad talked to you

a few times about he was aware you had taken it, right?
A.

Yeah, he found —

he knew.

Q.

But you don't think your mother ever knew?

A.

No.

I think she found out, but she didn't find

out those times.

She found out when he found out and she

was there when he talked to me.
Q.

And how did your dad find out about the times

you had taken it?
A.

I don't know.

Q.

But when he asked you about them, you did admit

you had taken it; is that right?
A.

Yes.

Q.

This is prior to the accident that we're talking

about; is that right?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Heather, I want to ask you some questions about

your drinking habits, okay?
A.

(Indicating.)

Q.

This is very important in this lawsuit because
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1

we have a report that your blood alcohol content was

2

taken, tested right after this accident happened.

3

want to ask you some questions about that.

4

MR. MCINTOSH:

So I

And by the way, Mike, I gave Gary

5

Howe copies of all that information, the reports from the

6

Department of Health, and told him what the blood alcohol

7

count was and everything shortly after the accident

8

happened when we had that information.

9

Q.

(By Mr. Mcintosh)

I'm going to ask you about

10

alcoholic beverages, and by that I mean beer, champagne,

11

tequila, vodka, hard liquor, things like that, and I just

12

want to direct your attention to the period of time prior

13

to the accident, okay, that's prior to October the 17th

14

of 1987.

15

done since that time.

16

I don't really care about anything you have
Okay.

That's been four years ago.

Tell me what alcoholic beverages you had

17

consumed at any time prior to the accident.

18

talking about just at the party.

19

within the last four, five years prior to that time.

20

MR. MARTINEZ:

I'm not

It could be any time

Now, you're not asking her if she

21

had consumed it, you are saying to try and tell you about

22

specific times or events or

23
24
25

MR. MCINTOSH:

No.

—
I want to ask her if she had

consumed any alcoholic beverages in that period of time.
THE WITNESS:

Before the accident?
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2

Q.

(By Mr. Mcintosh)

Yes.

Within say four, five

years prior to the accident.

3

A.

And which ones?

4

Q.

I just want you to answer first of all had you

5

consumed any.

61

A.

Yes.

7

Q.

Okay.

Just yes or no0

Let's go back to the earliest time that

8

you started drinking alcoholic beverages and I'm going to

9

give you a frame of reference,

10

On October 17th, when the

accident happened, what grade were you in in school?

11

A.

I was just starting my sophomore —

12

Q.

This would have been in 1987?

13

A.

Uh-huh.

14

Q.

So you graduated in 1989 then?

15

A.

Uh-huh.

16

Q.

Okay.

junior year.

You are starting your junior year.

Had

17

you been drinking alcoholic beverages since the eighth

18

grade, Heather?

19

A.

No, not in eighth grade*

20

Q.

I'll represent to you that one of the witnesses

21

that we took the testimony of last week indicated that

22

you had been taking it since the eighth grade.

23

disagree with that?

24

A.

Not in eighth grade.

25

Q.

The summer following the eighth grade?

Do you

After the eighth grade.
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A.

Uh-huh.

Q.

What alcoholic beverages did you drink then?

A.

Beer.

Q.

Just beer?

A.

And wine coolers.

Q.

Anything else?

A.

No.

Q.

Where did you usually get those drinks?

A.

I believe they were just at places, like at the

houses.
Q.

Where you would have parties you mean?

A.

At friends' houses.

Q.

And starting with that summer after the eighth

grade and going through the ninth grade, how often would
you on an average consume alcoholic beverages?
be once a week, once a month?

Would it

Any period of time that

you can use for a frame of reference?
A.

It was more like I did it and then maybe, you

know, like twice, and then I remember when I was a
freshman I didn't want to do it for a long time and
didn't for a long time.
Q.

A long time to you would mean what?

Would it be

your whole freshman year, all nine months?
A.

No, not my whole freshman yeare

Q.

How many months did you go in your freshman year
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without drinking alcoholic beverages?
A.

Oh, it was months.

Q.

Would you drink them at Christmastime, during

the Christmas break?
A.

No.

Q.

Do you remember any specific times that you

would drink alcoholic beverages in your freshman year?
A.

It was more to the end of the year when I did

drink again.
Q.

And was that at your friends' houses again?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And who were some of the friends that you would

go to where you drank alcoholic beverages?
A.

Jenny Pia's.

Q.

Anybody else?

A.

We'd go to the Levy's.

Q.

Scott Levy?

A.

Uh-huh.

Q.

Okay.

A.

Not that I remember.

Q.

Okay.

Scott Levy's.

Anybody else?

Scott Levy's and Jenny Pia's are the two

that come to your mind today; is that right?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Okay.

And when you went to the homes of those

two people, would the alcoholic beverages be there or
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would you bring some?
A.

I never took any.

Q.

What about the summer after the ninth grade,

before you went in the tenth grade?

Did you drink

alcoholic beverages then?
A.

I may have because I didn't just drink once or

twice, but it was -- was a lot of period between them
because I'd decide I wasn't gonna do it and try and then
I just —
Q.

I don't remember.
Okay.

Would you say you did it three or four

times during the summer between the ninth and tenth grade
year, or would it be more than that or less than that?
Ac

I remember one specific time that I can think

of, but I —
Q.

it was probably more than that.

Do you have an independent recollection, just

your best estimate today, as to maybe how many times
during the summer those three months between your
freshman and sophomore year?
A.

That I drank?

Q.

Yes.

A.

I remember I hadn't drank for a long time before

that night.

I couldn't give —

Q.

Would it be more than six or less than six?

A.

Less than six because I —

Q.

More than three or less than three or about
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three?
A.

In the three months prior?

Q.

Three months between your freshman and your

sophomore year, the summer months, June, July and
August.
A.

Oh, between the —

Q.

Oh, no.

not before the accident?

We're talking about

MR. MCINTOSH:

—

Let's just take about a

five-minute break here.
THE WITNESS:

Okay.

(Recess taken.)
Q.

(By Mr. Mcintosh)

Okay.

Heather, let's go back

to your drinking experiences between your freshman and
sophomore years then, June, July and August, and ask you
again during that period of time how often you would have
drank alcoholic beverages.
A.

I don't know an exact number.

Q.

I understand you don't know an exact number, and

this is a long ways back here.

I'm not trying to, you

know, have you come up with the exact number.
A.

Okay.

Q.

And I understand that you have done a lot to

stop drinking alcoholic beverages since this accident.
think that's commendable.

It's just an unfortunate

situation that's happened here and we have to go into
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this.

I don't particularly like going into it, but it's

very important in our lawsuit because it relates to
punitive damage issues and other issues that we are going
to be getting into in the trial.
A.

I understand.

Q.

So I have to ask you about this and I just want

your best recollection.
drank these things.
anything, Heather.

You know, you're the one that

And nobody is here to accuse you of
I'm not sitting here as a judge and I

don't mean to be judgmental of your drinking habits.

And

people drink and they don't drink and it really doesn't
make any difference to me one way or another, but I do
have a duty to find out as much as I can about those
drinking habits because it's important to this lawsuit.
A.

Okay.

Q.

So just with that background, maybe you could

just tell me, just recollection, if you have a
recollection of doing this periodically, maybe how many
times you can recall.
A.

Maybe a couple drinks.

Q.

All right.

school.

Let's take your sophomore year at

What would be some of the occasions during the

sophomore year that you would maybe be drinking?

This

would have been about a year prior to the accident,
right?
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A.

Uh-huh.

Q.

Okay.

Do you remember some of the times when

you would be drinking during that school year?

Was your

driinking usually done on the weekends as opposed to
during the week?

A.

Yes.

Q.

So it would usually be, what, Friday or Saturday

nights?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Do you recall drinking any other nights of the

week?
A.

No.

Q.

Do you recall drinking in connection with events

like football games or basketball games or things like
that?
A.

No.

Q.

Do you recall ever going to any football games

when you had been drinking?
A.

No.

Q.

Okay.

I'll represent to you that one of the

witnesses last week said that they thought you had been
drinking at a football game on the Thursday prior to the
accident.

Do you recall ever doing that?

A.

No.

Q.

Okay.

During your sophomore year then, what
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would be the frequency?

Would you do this one weekend a

month or less than that or more than that?
A.

I may have drank like two weeks in a row and

then not for a long
Q.

—

What would you say for an average during the

months of the school year?

Would it have averaged at

least once a month?
A.

If you'd spread them out, no, not that much.

Q.

Were there some months when you didn't drink

once?
A.

Yeah*

Qe

And were there some months when you drank more

than once?
A.

Yeah.

Q.

And the alcoholic beverages that you drank

during your sophomore year, would they have been the beer
and the wine that you talked about before?
A.

Uh-huh.

Q.

Did you ever use anything other than the beer

and wine?
A*

I can't remember what it was, but there is

something —

I think it was a hard —

well, I know it was

a hard alcohol, but I don't know what it was.
Q.

Was it tequila?

A.

No, it wasn't tequila.
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Q.

Do you remember where it was that you had drank

that?
A.

It was at Jenny Pia's.

Q.

Did Jenny have it there already?

A.

Uh-huh.

Q.

Did you ever have any of these drinking sessions

Yes.

at your house?
A.

No.

Q.

Now, let's take the period of time between your

sophomore and junior year.

Okay.

This would be the

months of June, July and August of 1987.

Did you drink

alcoholic beverages during that summer?
A.

I think I probably did after school ended in

June, so yes, I did that summer.
Q.

Okay.

And could you give us your best estimate

as to what the frequency would have been?

Would it have

been one weekend a month or more than that or less than
that for June, July and August?
A.

When I drank that night, I hadn't drank for a

long time, and so just —
a long time.

It wasn't —

because I remember I hadn't for
I mean, if I did during the

summer, it was just after school ended and probably a
couple of —

I mean, I don't know an exact number.

Q.

Maybe a couple of times

A.

Yeah.

—
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Q.

—

during the summer?

And were you drinking beer and wine on those
occasions, too?
A.

Yeah,

I'm sure that's what

—

Q.

When you would drink, Heather —

let's take a

period of time, maybe a year before the accident.
A.

Uh-huh.

Q.

This would have been during your sophomore year

and the first part of your junior year, maybe a month or
two before the accident.

How many beers would you have

when you would do this drinking?
A.

I guess it would vary, but --

Q.

Give me the minimum amount that you would ever

drink.

Just one bottle or one can?

A.

Yeah.

I didn't like —

like the beer.

Q.

How many cans of beer have you had at one time

or bottles of beer at one time?
A.

At one time?

Q.

Maximum amount.

A.

I think I drank like four or —

a whole thing of

I've never drank

—

Q.

Six-pack?

A.

Yeah, the six-pack.

Q.

You might have had four or five though?

A.

Four or five, yeah.
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Q.

And during the time that you might have drank

four or five cans of beer, did you also have some wine?
A.
coolers.

No.

I didn't drink —

if —

I drank wine

I drank wine coolers.

Q.

What do you mean by wine coolers?

A.

They're just the like White Mountain wine

coolers.

They're in a bottle and they're -- they were

really strong so like I would drink maybe two of those.
Q.

What size were the wine coolers; do you know?

Are they pints or
A.

—

They're in bottles and I don't know that —

much fluid is

how

—

Q.

How many ounces is in it or anything?

A.

No.

Q.

Now, let's take the period of time say six

months prior to the accident, okay?
A.

(Indicating.)

Q.

Let's take that summer prior to your junior year

and September and October your junior year.

Do you

remember a group of friends that you had consisting of
Steve Jones, Steve Ebert, Jenny Pia, Kristi Bringhurst,
Scott Levy and Jeff Gertino, a Muir fellow?

Do you

remember that group?
A.

Uh-huh.

Q.

Do you remember getting together for parties
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with that group during that six-month period?

Some of

the parties would be at Scott Levy's house?
A.

We'd go up to Levy's.

Q.

I didn't mean to say house.

apartment.

I think it was an

I think he lived in Foothill Place

Apartments?
A.

Uh-huh.

Q.

And did you go to some other people's houses or

apartments also?
A.

Well, I know a few of their families and we'd go

to their houses.
Q.

And when you had these gatherings, would it be

true, Heather, that there was beer and intoxicating
beverages that were served and usually all the kids that
came would pitch in and pay a little bit for it?
MR. MARTINEZ:

Well, that assumes a lot of

facts, like every time they got together there was a
party and they were drinking.
THE WITNESS:
Q.

Yeah.

(By Mr. Mcintosh)

Well, let's take the times

when you did get together and when you did drink when
there was alcoholic beverages.

On those occasions, I

think you had some of those parties where there was beer,
didn't you?
A.

Yeah.
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Q.

In fact, most of the time that you got together,

there was beer?

When you got together, there was beer,

wasn't there, for that group?
A.

Well, it really depends, because that group,

there were the kids that came from families who didn't
approve and we wouldn't -Q.

I understand, but I'll represent to you,

Heather, that nearly every one of the eight witnesses
said last time that nearly every time they got together,
they had beer.
A.

Now, would you dispute that?

Well, I can remember a number of times going to

Ebert's and not drinking or going to Kristi"s house and
not drinking, but we did have

—

Q.

You are aware that Kristi drank beer; are you

A.

Yeah, but we never drank at her house.

Q.

Okay.

not?

Right.

Ebert and Kristi Bringhurst.

Any

others?
A.

That we didn't drink at their houses?

Q.

Yes.

A.

We never drank at Jeff Gertino's house.

It was

when -- you know, the specific times were in usually the
same places.
Q.

Okay.

You had these parties with them.

They'd

usually start about 7s00 in the evening and go until
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ll 12:00 or 12:15 because you had curfew at 12:30; is that a
2

fair statement?

3

A.

Yes.

4

Q.

And usually the group would just get together

5

and decide whose place they were going to go to on a

6| particular day; is that right?
A.

Uh-huh.

Q.

And at those times when alcoholic beverages were

served, you'd usually just have the beer or something
like that and there wouldn't be food served in connection
with it; is that right?
A.

You mean they wouldn't give us food or --

Q.

That's right.

When you would go to their

places, you'd be there and the beer would be there, but
they didn't have food to go along with that normally that
was out with the beer?

And by food I mean fried chicken,

rolls or any cold cuts or anything like that.
A.

No.

Maybe eat some chips or something like

that.
Q.

Might have had some chips or something like

that?
A.

Yeah.

Q.

Okay.

All right.

Let's go to the period of

time that we're talking about, this accident date, okay,
Friday, October 16th, and Saturday, early morning hours,
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your arm or anything, taking some blood from you?
A,

I don't know,

I know I got a tetanus shot and I

don't know what else they did.

That's one thing they

told me, that I was getting a tetanus shot.
Q.

Do you remember anything else about the

accident?

Do you remember anything else that happened in

the hospital?
A.

I remember just my dad and my neighbor were

there.
Q.

Which neighbor was that?

A.

Mike Margetts.

Q.

Do you remember anything that happened in the

hospital as far as anybody that came there to see you?
A.

No.

Q.

Heather, going back to this Volkswagen that you

had at the time, you said you got the license plates off
a shelf in the garage.

How did you know the license

plates were there?
A.

I had seen them before.

Q.

When your dad used to take the Volkswagen down

to Jim's garage, did he get those license plates and put
them on there when he drove it down to the garage?
Ac

I never saw him, no.

Q.

Did you actually put the license plates on the

Volkswagen yourself?

By that I mean, did you use the
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screwdriver, put the screws in and affix it there?
A*

Yes.

Q.

You did that every time that you used it; is

that right?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And did you do that this night?

A.

Uh-huh.

Q.

Did you ask your parents if you could take the

Yes.

Volkswagen that night?
A.

No.

Q.

Were your parents home that night?

A.

No.

Q.

Was your dad home?

A.

NOc

Q.

Do you know where he was?

A.

No.

Q.

Where was the Volkswagen that night?

My mom was out of town.

Was it

inside the garage or was it outside of the garage?
A.

It was in the driveway.

Q.

Was it behind another car?

A.

No.

Q*

So it was outside the garage, on the driveway,

but not behind the other car; is that right?
A«

No.

Q.

Okay.

Were there any cars in the garage?

I
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Q.

When did your mom or your dad find out about

your having drank beer before?
A.

I think when I was a sophomore.

Q.

How did they find that out?

A,

No.

They -- they —

Did you tell them?

one night they asked me if

I had been drinking that night.
Q.

You told them you had?

A.

Yeah.

Q.

Did they just smell alcohol on your breath?

A.

Well, I think it was on my clothes, and I don't

even remember if I had been drinking that night, but I
said that I had.
Q.

What did they tell you when they found out you

had been drinking?
A.

We just talked about it and

—

Q.

This was during your sophomore year about a year

before the accident?
A.

Yeah.

Q.

Did they find out after that time that you had

been drinking again?
A,

No, not that I can remember.

Q.

Did you ever tell them?

A,

No.

Q.

Did they ever talk to you about any of the

friends that you were going out with?

This group that I

Elaine FitzGerald, Certified Shorthand Reporter
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EXHIBIT "14"

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT L^E^Ol|j^
Third Judicial Di
STATE OF UTAH
-0O0-

MOV 1 9 «
: COUNTY

MYRA L . TAYLOR,
Civil No. 900907125PI

Plaintiff,

vs.
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RONALD H. OLSON, CAROL D.
OLSON, AND JENNIFER HEATHER
OLSON,

)
)

HEIDI NELSON

ORIGINAL

Defendant.

-0O0-

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 8th day of October,
1991, the deposition of HEIDI NELSON, produced as a witness
herein at the instance of the plaintiff, in the aboveentitled action now pending in the above-named court, was
taken before Melinda J. Andersen, a Certified Shorthand
Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State of Utah,
commencing at the hour of 3:50 p.m. of said day, at the
offices of James A. Mcintosh, Salt Lake City, State of
Utah.
That said deposition was taken pursuant to Subpoena.
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MELINDA J ANDERSEN
CSR No. 281

INDEPENDENT REPORTING
SERVICE
Certified Shorthand Reporters

1200 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801)538-2333

1

Q

What was that?

2

A

It was a Suzuki Samurai .

3

Q

A Suzuki?

4

A

Yes.

5

0

When did you get your Rabbit automobile?

6

A

June of 19S7 -- no, I'm sorry.

7

Q

What year was it?

8

A

No .

9

Q

You're not sure what year it was?

10

A

It was an '84 or '85.

11

0

Rabbit?

12

A

Yes.

13

Q

Do you still have that automobile?

14

A

No.

15

Q

When did you get the Suzuki?

16

A

I believe August of '86. . It was around then.

17

Q

And what year was that car?

18

A

It was new that year.

19

Q

So it probably would have been an '86?

20

A

'86.

21

Q

Who did you buy it from?

22

A

I believe Steven Wade.

23

Q

Were you the registered owner?

24

A

Yes.

25

Q

And your name at that time would have been what?

It was March.

Was it a new one that year?

I'm not sure.

6
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Q

Do you have any papers pertaining to the Si;le of

that car?

6

A

No.

Q

Where would the papers be?

A

I believe he took over the payments

and I

believe, it was done through the bank, through Valley 3an L

7

0

But you don't remember his name?

8

A

I don't.

9

Q

Can you find that out for us?

10

A

I

11

Q

Would you call me with his name and address and

12

can.

telephone number?

13

A

Yes.

14

0

If I'm not in Just leave

15

A

Okay.

16

Q

What did you do with the license plates from the

17

that with my secretary.

Suzuki when you sold it?

18

A

I don't know.

19

Q

Did you put them on the Volkswagen?

20

A

No.

21

Q

How do you know that if you don't remember what

22
23 I
24
25

I don't remember.

you did with them?
A

I would imagine that I left them in the

garage

at home »
Q

Did you get new plates for the Rabbit?
3

I never

looked.

*
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if she was driving on the street...
Q

Did you ever

not to d r i v e

hear your mom or dad ever

that Volkswagen because

A

No.

Q

Did you ever

it wasn't

tell

nor

registered?

hear your mom and dad tell

her

not

to tell the Volkswagen because there wasn't insurance on
it?
A

No.

Q

Did you ever hear your mom and dad tell Heather

for any reason not to drive the Volkswagen?
A

My morn and dad have told all of us on numerous

occasions not to drive cars.
Q

What do they tell that?

A

If they don't want us going out, or if we have

other things they don't always let us drive to places.
Q

Specifically with respect to the Volkswagen, do

you ever remember your folks telling Heather not to drive

i

that car ?

A

No .

Q

Did you ever see Heather drive the car during

the six months?

J

A

Yes.

Q

Was she driving it on a regular basis?

.A

No, I think maybe to school.

MELINDA J. ANDERSEN, CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER
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You don't know
A

No

Q

Did Heather ever tell you that your fathei told

her not to use the Volkswagen because it wasn't in a
condition to drive it?
6

A

I wasn't living at home.

7

Q

Prior to June of 1987, had you been to S.YU that

9

A

I was there from August until February.

10

Q

August of '86 and February of '87?

11

A

Right.

12

Q

Then from February of '87 to June when you got

8

13

No, I don't know.

year?

married, you had been living at home?

14

A

Right.

15

Q

During that period of time, four months, from

16

February to June when you were living at home, again, your

17

recollection is that you saw Heather driving the

18

Volkswagen?

19

other occasions; is that right?

She would take it to school and use it on

20

A

Yes.

21

Q

I'm going to read to you from interrogatory No.

22

24 that your parents answered a question that I asked them:

23

Did you have personal knowledge that Jennifer had driven

24

the said Volkswagen prior to the accident date, and they

25

said no.
18
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT 'IKRRZ&P/
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STATE OF UTAH

NOV 1 9
-0O0-
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)

Civil No. 900907125PI
Deposition of:

vs.
RONALD H. OLSON, CAROL D.
OLSON, AND JENNIFER HEATHER
OLSON,
Defendant.

)
)

)

KRISTI BRINGHURST

ORIGINAL

-0O0-

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 8th day of October,
1991,

the deposition of KRISTI BRINGHURST, produced as a

witness herein at the instance of the plaintiff, in the
above-entitled action now pending in the above-named court,
was taken before Melinda J. Andersen, a Certified Shorthand
Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State of Utah,
commencing at the hour of 1:00 p.m. of said day, at the
offices of James A. Mcintosh, Salt Lake City, State of
Utah.
That said deposition was taken pursuant to Subpoena.
-oOo-

MELINDA J, ANDERSEN
CSR No. 281

INDEPENDENT REPORTING
SERVICE
Certified Shorthand Reporters

1200 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801)538-2333

1
2
3

or on a table.
Q

During the night did you notice that other

people would be bringing beer in as they came to the party?

4

A

No, I didn't notice.

5

Q

Do you know who brought the beer that was there

6

when you got there?

7

A

I don't know who did.

8

Q

Did you notice Heather Olson drinking any beer

9
10

while she was there?
A

I don't remember.

I know —

I think she may

11

have had a beer because I —

12

remember exactly, but I think she had had a beer.

13
14
15
16
17

Q

I'm not positive.

I can't

The other parties that you had where beer was

served over there, did Heather drink beer then?
A

I don't know if Heather was at parties other

than that time with me.
Q

The other three parties that you mentioned that

18

this group of friends had, Heather wasn't there at those

19

parties?

20
21
22
23

A

She could have been at one other one, but I

don't remember Heather being there.
Q

Did you ever see Heather drinking alcoholic

beverages before?

24

A

Yes-

25

Q

Where was that?
12
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OLSON,
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ORIGINAL

Defendant.

-oOoBE IT REMEMBERED that on the 8th day of October,
1991, the deposition of JENNIFER PIA, produced as a witness
herein at the instance of the plaintiff, in the aboveentitled action now pending in the above-named court, was
taken before Melinda J. Andersen, a Certified Shorthand
Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State of Utah,
commencing at the hour of 1:25 p.m. of said day, at the
offices of James A. Mcintosh, Salt Lake City, State of
Utah.
That said deposition was taken pursuant to Subpoena.
-oOo-

MELINDA J.ANDERSEN
CSR No. 281

INDEPENDENT REPORTING
SERVICE
Certified Shorthand Reporters

1200 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801)538-2333

A

No.

2 I

Q

No hard liquor?

3 I

A

Not that I can remember, no.

Q

So just beer?

A

Yes.

Q

Did you notice that some of the fellows were

6 I
7

bringing beer in during the night as they came to the

8

party?

9

A

Probably.

10

Q

Where was the beer kept?

11

A

I think just in his refrigerator.

12

Q

At the parties that you had over there

They usually did.

13

previously, on most of those occasions was it the same kind

14

of party it was this night?

15

A

Yes.

16

Q

You had the same type of alcoholic beverages

17

normally?

18

A

Yes.

19

Q

Was there anybody in your group that did not

20

drink alcoholic beverages?

21

A

I don't think so.

22

Q

Did you know that Heather consumed alcoholic

23

beverages?

24

A

Yes.

25

0

How did you know that?
11
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A

Because I had seen her.

Q

Had you see her drink at these prior parties

that you had also?

5
6

A

Yes.

Q

Did you see her drink some alcoholic beverages

the night of this party that we're talking about?

7

A

Yes.

8

Q

Did you actually serve her some of those

9

alcoholic beverages?

10

A

No.

11

Q

So was it just a matter of most of the kids that

12

wanted to have them would go to the refrigerator or the

13

table, wherever they were,, and take whatever they wanted?

14

A

Yes.

15

Q

You didn't have a bartender or anybody actually

16

serving those to anyone?

17

A

No.

18

Q

Did you have a chance to observe Heather taking

19

alcoholic beverages that night?

20

A

Yes.

21

Q

Do you know how many she had?

22

A

No.

23

Q

Did you have a chance to see her when she left

24
25

the party that night?
A

Yes, I did.
12
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1

Q

Do you know about when she left?

2

A

Probably —

I think that night she left earlier

3

and she went to another party alone.

4

her.

5

think.

6

Q

Do you remember that for sure?

7

A

Well, I can't be positive, but I'm pretty sure

8
9

Ule didn't go with

So she probably left around 9:00 or so, I would

that she left and went somewhere else.
Q

I think the sequence of the facts we have,

10

Jennifer, probably would be that she stayed at that party

11

most of the evening and some of the boys had taken her ca)

12

and gone out joyriding and she got kind of mad at them and

13

when they brought it back she left about midnight.

14

that refresh your memory?

15

A

I think so.

16

remember she had —

17

been it.

18
19

Q

That could be because I —

it was so long ago.

Does

I

That could have

Do you remember an incident like that where some

of the boys had taken her car?

20

A

Yes.

21

Q

I think she had a Volkswagen?

22

A

Yes, a bug.

23

Q

She got mad at them for taking it and then when

24
25

they brought it back she left by herself?
A

Right.

That sounds right.
13
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Q

Was that about midnight?

A

Probably, because I remember when I was driving

3 | home from the party I saw her car.

I called -- because my

4 | house is on the way home from Scott's —

I past the

accident and I called Kristi as soon as I got home and
said, Did Heather get in an accident.
7 |

Q

Did you stop at the accident scene?

8 I

A

No, I drove around the block probably two or

9 j three times because I wasn't sure it was her.
10

her.

11

stop.

I never saw

There was a crowd around it and I didn't want to

12

Q

Did you recognize her car there?

13

A

Yes.

14

Q

Do you know what condition she was in when she

15

left that night as far as being under the influence of

16

alcohol or not?

17

A

Yes, she was.

18

Q

She was under the influence?

19

A

Yes.

20

Q

What makes you say that?

21

A

Because she had been drinking.

22
23

It's just not

—

I mean, I'm sure she was.
Q

Can you tell us what you base that on, just

24

facts that led you to believe that?

Sometimes people kind

25

of stumble around, sometimes their speech is slurred,
14
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sometimes they do other things.

What made you believe that

she was under the influence?
A

Well, I can't remember that, but she had been

drinking and I'm sure —

I just knew.

I guess especially

after the accident we realized how drunk she was.
Q

How did you find out after the accident how

drunk she was?
A

She told us what happened.

I mean, just the way

she had hit the lady and ended up on someone's front lawn.
Q

What did Heather tell you about the accident?

A

The whole thing from then on —

I mean I guess

our relationship was just really never the same.

It was

kind of like I guess she bumped into somebody and didn't
realize that she hit them or something and then they —

I

don't know if they chased her or turned around and followed
her —

I don't remember.

And she was trying to get —

like

thinking that they wouldn't catch up to her or something.
I can't remember.
Q

You're right.

There was a hit-and-run just a

few minutes before this up by Guardsman Way and 9th South,
and she was leaving that scene when she hit my client, Myra
Taylor, right around Nelson Crest.

You have the right

sequence there.
A

Then she just blacked out or something I guess

and ended up in that yard.
15
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Q

What did she tell you about her state of being

intoxicated?
3
4

A

She just —

I guess she just probably said she

had been drinking too much.

5

Q

Okay.

6

A

And she was mad at those guys for taking her car

7

and stuff .

8

Q

Did she tell you how much she had consumed at

9

the party?

10

A

No.

11

Q

You have a definite opinion that she was under

12

the influence of alcohol when she left?

13

A

Yes.

14

Q

Did you ever tell her not to drive her car in

15
16

that condition?
A

I *m sure we had told her before, but I don •t

17

thin k that night we realized how —

18

I didn't realize how dnjnk she was.

19

Q

Until when?

20

A

Until the accident.

21
22
23

I mean, I was shocked .

I guess she was drunker

than we all thought she was.
Q

Had she been drunk on other occasions when you

had been over there for parties?

24

A

Yes.

25

Q

And did anybody ever talk to her and tell her
16

she shouldn't go out and drive in that condition at other
parties?
A

I'm sure they had.

4 I

Q

Do you remember anybody saying that?

5

A

Yes, I think so.

6

Q

Who do you remember telling her that?

7

A

I don't remember who, but I'm sure —

I can

8

remember people talking about it and saying you shouldn't

9

drive —

10

Q

I mean to everybody we would say that.
Were her drinking habits at these parties that

11

you went to such that she did like to drink would you say,

12

or was it hard to get her to drink?

13

A

No, she liked to.

14

Q

Nobody had to force her to take anything?

15

A

No.

16

Q

In addition to beer that night, was there any

17

food to eat?

18

A

I can't remember.

19

Q

Most of the parties it was just the beer without

20

food, wasn't it?

21

A

Yeah.

22

Q

Did you know of any occasions where any of these

23

people that were there with you, the names we mentioned

24

including Heather, ever been disciplined by any school

25

authority for drinking alcoholic beverages?
1 7
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)
)
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SCOTT LEVY

ORIGINAL

-0O0-

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 8th day of October,
1991, the deposition of SCOTT LEVY, produced as a witness
herein at the instance of the plaintiff, in the aboveentitled action now pending in the above-named court, was
taken before Melinda J. Andersen, a Certified Shorthand
Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State of Utah,
commencing at the hour of 2:30 p.m. of said day, at the
offices of James A. Mcintosh, Salt Lake City, State of
Utah.
That said deposition was taken pursuant to Subpoena.
-oOo-

ELINDA J . ANDERSEN
CSR No. 281

INDEPENDENT REPORTING
SERVICE
Certified Shorthand Reporters

1200 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 538-2333

food there
2

A

Well, we did.

3

Q

Do you remember what you had out for them to eat

4

that night ?

5

A

Well, they would go to my cupboard anytime and

6

grab anyth ing they wanted.

7

like. . .

8
9

Q

That's why sometimes I didn't

Was a matter of you having something out like

sandwiches or fried chicken or something?

10

A

No, I didn't cater them.

11

Q

What was available for them to have was the

12

alcoholic 1leverages; is that right?

13

A

Yes.

14

Q

Let rne ask you about Heather Olson.

15

Did you see

her at the party this night?

16

A

Yes.

17

Q

Did you see her drinking alcoholic beverages?

18

A

I think she did.

19

Q

Did you notice her condition?

20

A

Yes.

21

0

Did you notice how many alcoholic beverages she

22

might have had?

23

A

No, I don't have no idea how many.

24

G

Did you see her condition when she left that

25

night?
13
MCI

TMnA

T

AMf\rnrrki

/^ r-r> ••• «•»»- -

l|

A

I saw her, but I don't know.

2 |

Q

Has Heather consumed alcoholic beverages at tl.e

3 | prior parties that you've had?
A

She may have .

Q

Do you know of your own personal knowledge that

she had?
A

She probably did-

I can't recall which.

Q

You've seen her drink alcoholic beverages at

these parties?
A

Yes.

Q

Do you recall when Heather was there that Steve

Ebert and Steve Jones borrowed her Volkswagen to go get
something to eat?
A

Yes.

Q

Do you remember thern coming back?

A

Yes.

Q

Do you remember about what time that was?

A

Later .

Q

Between 11:00 and 12=00?

A

Probably.

0

Do you recall that Heather was upset that they

had been gone so long with her car?
A

Yes.

Q

Do you remember her leaving shortly after that?

A

I knew she had left, but I don't recall her
14
uAMr\
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A

No —

well, I —

I think —

I never went there,

but I think the other guys may have.
Q

Where did you usually get the alcoholic

beverages that you brought to the parties?
A

Different gas stations.

Q

Did you ever have any problems getting them even

though you're a minor?
A

Yes.

Q

How did you handle that?

A

Send somebody that looked older .

Q

Who did you usually send?

A

Anybody.

Q

Did your father have alcoholic beverages in the

Somebody else would try.

refrigerator during the times when you weren't having these
parties?
A

Sometimes.

Q

On this particular night of this party, did you

drink any of the alcoholic beverages that he supplied?
A

No.

Q

Do you remember that for sure?

A

Yes.

Q

Was there alcoholic beverages in the house or in

the apartment that night that he brought in?
A

No.

Q

Was there any charge for the party?
17
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE CO
STATE OF UTAH
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)
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MARK MUIR
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ORIGINAL
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BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 8th day of October,
1991, the deposition of MARK MUIR, produced as a witness
herein at the instance of the plaintiff, in the aboveentitled action now pending in the above-named court, was
taken before Melinda J, Andersen, a Certified Shorthand
Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State of Utah,
commencing at the hour of 3:15 p.nu of said day, at the
offices of James A. Mcintosh, Salt Lake City, State of
Utah*
That said deposition was taken pursuant to Subpoena.
-0O0-
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INDEPENDENT REPORTING
SERVICE
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1200 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
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(801)538-2333

Q

What have you talked about?

A

I was served mine.

I didn't thirk L'iat if..: .'.

about it and they asked me if I was served with one ar.d I
said, yes, when, this and that, where, wondering what it
was all aboutQ

Did you have a chance to review with them so.r.c

of the things that happened at the party?
A

Yes, I did.

Heather being there.

Obviously I didn't recall Jeff a; >.

When I was served with the SU'OPODre-

tried to think about the night.
of them being there.
Q

I couldn't recall eithe-

Jeff told me he got served wit^ o ie

Did you observe Heather drinking intoxicating

beverages at this party?
A

To be honest with you I can't picture it in

mind, but I believe she was.
Q

Did you observe her condition at the part>?

A

I can't remember, I honestly can't.

Q

Do you know Heather Olson?

A

Yes , I do .

Q

Have you ever been to a party where she was

there with this group before this night?
A

Yes.

Q

Have you ever seen her drink intoxicating

beverages at those other parties?
A

Yes.

Q

Would you say thai people might have to 4orco

her to drink intoxicating beverages?
A

No.

Q

She seemed to enjoy them, didn't she?

A

I don't know.

I guess you would have to .-lok

her . What do you mean by force?
Q

Did she ever have to be forced in the sense that

she said no she didn't want any and people kept trying to
make her take it?
A

No.

Q

Most of

the people that y^ere

in

this group at

this party this night were people that you had seen
drinking at least beer previously; would that be a fair
statement?
A

Yes.

Q

Do you recall where they got the beer from,

Mr . Muir?
A

No, I don't.

Q

Where would you get it when you would bring it?

A

There was quite a few gas stations four >ears

ago that sometimes would not iod.
0

Did you get it from the gas station just east of

the Cowboy Grub?
A

I never got it there, no.

markets in the avenues.

Usually some of the

Q

Did she say she was kind of lunning away >Cvo.n

the other one when she hit Mrs. Taylot?
A

I can't remember.

That sounds familiar, but

that was four years ago so it's a conversation I ca 't
recall .
Q

I understand.

A

I don't know if she said she was running, but 1

do remember her saying she struck another car .
Q

Did you have in your mind that this was a

hit-and-run situation?
A

I can't recall.

I would assume so.

Q

Do you know if Heather brought any alcoholic

beverages to the party?
A

I can't recall that.

Q

Was it usually the fellows that would get the

beer and things like that?
A

Most of the time, but not always.

Q

Did girls bring some sometimes?

A

Yes.

C

Did you ever have any occasion at any of the

parties that you went to where Heather was present, to tell
her you thought she drank too much?
A

No-

Q

Were you ever present when anybody else told her

she drank too much?
14
MPI

TNP1A

T

ANJnPDQPW

rCDTTFTCn

CUno^uAMh

oco^o-*-£-<-»

EXHIBIT "19"

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COU
STATE OF UTAH
-0O0-

MYRA L . TAYLOl,

)

Plaintiff,

)

vs.

C i v i l No.

90090712

Deposition of:

RONALD H. OLSON, CAROL D.
OLSON, AND JENNIFER HEATHER
OLSON,
Defendant.

)
)

STEVEN KENT JONES
?:LC3C;27n!3TCGUR7
District

)

ORfGlfW

NOV 1 9 1992
-oOo-

XGCDUNTY

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 8th day of October,
1991, the deposition of STEVEN KENT JONES, produced as a
witness herein at the instance of the plaintiff, in the
above-entitled action now pending in the above-named court,
was taken before Melinda J. Andersen, a Certified Shorthand
Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State of Utah,
commencing at the hour of 2:15 p.m. of said day, at the
offices of Jamas A. Mcintosh, Salt Lake City, State of
Utah.
That said deposition was taken pursuant to Subpoena.
-oOo-

MELINDA Jc AUDI
CSR No. 281

INDEPENDENT REPORTING
SERVICE
Certified Shorthand Reporters

1200 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

(801)538-2333

1
2

should be driving when she left?
A

Of course.

Q

What did she say to you?

A

Well, we gave her the keys and she ran out and a

few of her girlfriends ran out after her.
Q

That would have been Jenny and Kristi?

7

A

Yes.

8

Q

Were they trying to tell her not to drive?

9

A

As far as I know.

10

Q

Did you tell her she shouldn't be driving?

11

A

Uh-huh.

12

Q

Did Steve Ebert tell her that, too?

13

A

I hope he would.

14

Q

You definitely remember telling her that?

15

A

Well, whether I did not, it would seem logical.

We didn't go outside.

16

I knew that she shouldn't be driving.

17

would say something, but whether I did or not I cannot

18

remember.

19
20

Q

I would hope that I

At these prior parties that Heather had been to,

did she dr ink alcoholic beverages at those?

21

A

She did, not all of them though..

22

Q

Did you ever have to force her to take alcoholic

23

beverages?

24

A

No, of course not.

25

Q

She seemed to enjoy them just like the rest of
1 '•-

you; is that right?

3 1

A

Yes.

Q

Did your group have any limitations on the

4 J number of drinks that somebody could have at these parties?
A

If it came to the point that we knew someone was

6 j over drinking, I think we would mention it to them just for
7

the fact we didn't want them to get caught by their

8

parents, number one, and we didn't want them to get hurt.

9

As far as limiting people, no.

I think one of things that

10

we tried to do when the guys would get together -- those

11

guys I mentioned previously -- when we would go out and

12

drink and stuff by ourselves, we would always have a

13

designated driver, so that someone was always chosen that

14

was not going to drink that night so we wouldn't be

15

involved in something.

16
17

Q

Do you know how long Heather had been there

before you got there for the first 20 minutes?

18

A

I don't know that.

19

Q

Was there anybody there to check the condition

20

of people as they left?

21

A

No.

22

Q

Anybody present to monitor how much a person

23

drank?

24

A

No, not a designated person.

25

Q

Any police or security personnel present?
16
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A

No.

Q

Did you ever talk to Heather about this accident

after it happened?

4

A

No, I didn't.

5

Q

Did you ever hear anything about what she told

6
7

other people about how intoxicated she was that night?
A

No, but by word of mouth you hear —

apparently

8

she was involved in an accident prior to being involved

9

with these people.

I know the girl that she got in an

10

accident —

11

mistaken.

12

the grapevine I found out about it.

13

that with Heather, no, I didn't speak with her about that.

14

Q

I think it was Shelly Paxton, if I'm not
Just through word of mouth and kind of through
As far as addressing

Anything else you would like to tell us about

15

the party other than what you talked about?

16

particularly interested in Heather's condition.

17

in addition to what you've already said about her condition

18

as you got back and gave her the keys?

19

A

I'm
Anything

I don't know how to specifically describe her

20

exact condition.

It's been a long time, obviously.

I did

21

know that she had been drinking and her friends making an

22

effort to run out and get the keys back from her, obviously

23

gave me an indication that they had a better judgment from

24

being there and actually witnessing how much she had

25

consumed as to whether she would be eligible to drive under
1 7

MELINDA J. ANDERSEN, CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER

1
2
3

that condition.
Q

The things you told us that you observed led you

to believe that she was under the influence of intoxicating

4 I beverages; is that correct?
A

That's correct.
MR. McINTOSH:

That's all I have, Mr. Jones.

(The deposition concluded at 2-"30 p.m.)-

IS
MELINDA J. ANDERSEN, CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER

EXHIBIT "20"

T h e O h i O C a S U a l t y G r O U p of Insurance Companies
CLAIM DEPARTMENT:

706O Union PtrV Avo.. SuH« 360, Mldvtls. Utth 84047
Uallino AMrmmn- P.O Go* 420. Midvtl*. Ulih S4047-0429 • T*tot)hone: 8CW256-S576 {Ftx - 801-20&-S4721

GEORGE R. KESt. Omlma Minspir
H«roW F. C«f*«on, Cairns Supervisor

July 22. 1992

Michael N. Martinez & Associates
Attornoyo at Law
K i c h « l M. Martin**. Eoq .
447Q Gordon Lano, Suito 100
Murray, Utah
84107

Re:

Your Client:
Our Claim No.

our injured:
Date of Loss;

Taylor, Myra L,
UT 2 GFL 88 H R.I 1<5 A
Olson, Ronald 6e Carol
10/17/67

Dear Mr. Martinez:
W« have reviewed the deposition of Jennifer (Heather) Olson which W Q «
forwarded to u« with your July Cf 1992 correspondence.
We do not believe the deposition demonstrate* a lack of parental
supervision by Ronald Olson and Carol Olson as alleged. Wc believe that
such an allocation of necessity would have to be supported by direct
statements made by Ronald Olson and Carol Olson pertaining to their
knowledge of Jennifer's use of the vehicle and knowledge of her habita
of consumption of alcohol. Should you wish to make available to ua
copies of the deposition of Ronald Olson and Carol Olson, we shall
further consider the C«sc At this point we must respectfully reiterate
our position of a denial of Liability coverage afforded by th« Olson'»
Homeowners policy issued by this Company.
Vsry truly yourse
THE AMERICAN FIRE AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY

H. F. Carlson
Claims Supervisor
HFC:kk

EXHIBIT
(i»010 0
The Ohio CaKualtv lnuira*v* r / i m n m . . VA/—» A~~.*.<

EXHIBIT "21"

County of Salt Lake - State of Utah
FILE NO.
( • PARTIES PRESENT)
TLE:
YRA L. TAYLOR.

COUNSEL:
(^ COUNSEL PRESENT)
James A. Mcintosh

:

:

Plaintiff.

Attorney for

:

vs.

900907125

Plaintiff

Michael N. Martinez

ONALD H. OLSON, et al..

Attorney for Defendant

Defendants,

CLERK

HON.

TIMOTHY R. HANSON
JUDGE

REPORTER

DATE:

BAILIFF

The

above-referenced

S e p t e m b e r 2 9 , 1992,
a.nd t h e

at

matter

t h e hour o f 2 : 0 0

d e f e n d a n t s were

before the Court for pretrial on
P« m.

Counsel

met w i t h

p r e s e n t . and

in the t r i a l

i s s u e s involved

came

for

the plaint iff

t h e Court to d i s c u s s t h e

p r e s e n t l y s c h e d u l e d f o r No-"member 1 9 ,

which i s

1992.
for__ the

Counsel

p r e s e n t ,ed

parties

their

r e s p e c t i v e po s i t i o n s o f

liability and potential defenses thereto informally to the

Court, and the

Court discussed with counsel the nature of the claims and the defenses.
Counsel for

the parties

summarized the anticipated facts leading up

to and including the accident which
Complaint, and

it appeared

is

that there

the facts, including the conduct of

the

subject

of

the plaintiffs

was little dispute with regard to

the defendant

Jennifer Heather Olson

prior to and at the time of the accident in question.
Counsel

for

the

plaintiff,

court as to the nature of
advised

the

Court

as

as

£Ji£ claimed
to

the

well as the defendant, advised the

in.iwrigg—Q£—t^e—pontiffi en4

anticipated evidence relating to special

damages and general damages.
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County of Salt Lake - State of Utah
FILE NO. 900907125
TITLE:
( • PARTIES PRESENT)
MYRA L . TAYLOR.

(y COUNSEL PRESENT)

COUNSEL:

Plaintiff.
VS.
RONALD H. OLSONr * t

a1_,

Defendants.

CLERK

HON

TIMOTHY R. HANSON
JUDGE

REPORTER

DATE:

BAILIFF

Counsel presented their respective
of

punitive,

damages.

The

positions relating

to the claims

plaintiff may choose not to pursue punitive

damages under the circumstances of this case, and will advise the Court as
the trial date approaches whether or not that remains an issue, or whether
or not the claim for punitive damages will be abandoned.
ThA parties a.erf>*d and the
presentation of

partial

presentation of
impairment

parties will likely be able
documentatinn

as

to

those

through their proffers and
anH proffer

is

willing

to

acquiesce

in the

evidence in this matter through proffer and/or affidavit,

as opposed to the
permanent

Court

;

will form

live testimony.

are

to

not

agree

amounts
the expert

a hasis

in

upon

Special

damages and

substantial dispute, and the
presentation

of appropriate

and those percentagestestimony offered

for* imposition

The parties

through reports

of general damages and/or

punitive damages should punitive damages continue to be an issue.
Th«» PAi-ties ftgrpgd that. »11 depositions that have
puhlished for

the Court's

been tftk?P,—may be

consideration in this matter.

The original of

l»J

t.ho d e p o s i t i o n s MBJ r r - p p o t i v g c o u n s e l ' s f i l e s w i l l be p r e s e n t e d t o t h e — _

000163
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THIRD JUDICIAL DI5THICT

County of Salt Lake - State of Utah
FILE NO.
ITLE

COUNSEL:

(* PARTIES PRESENT)

900907125

( • COUNSEL PRESENT)

YRA L. TAYLOR.
Plaintiff,
vs.
HNAin H. 0LS0Nf et

aLr

.Defendants *

CLERK

HON. TIMOTHY R. HANSON
JUDGE

REPORTER

DATE:

BAILIFF

Court at the time of trial for formal filing.
the

parties

to

publish

depositions,

Based upon the agreement of

the Court ordered the depositions

pnhl-jghAH.

There being no further business befg/e the Court

on this

cause, the

pretrial conclude* at 3:05 p.m.

n

IMOTHY R. HANSON
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
Copies

to:

James A. Mcintosh. Esq.
Michael N. Martinez, Esq.
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EXHIBIT "22"

JAMES A. MCINTOSH, ESQ, — No. 2194
JAMES A. MCINTOSH & ASSOCIATES P.C.
A Utah Professional Law Corporation
Attorney for Plaintiff
Suite 17, Intrade Bldg„ South
1399 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84105
Telephone: (801) 487-7834

ThirdJuuiuJU:-""'**
MOV 1 9 ^Ji)2

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
MYRA L. TAYLOR
Plaintiff

'•
;

v.

;

RONALD H. OLSON, CAROL . D.
OLSON, and JENNIFER HEATHER
OLSON

:
:
:
:
:

Defendants

1.

STIPULATION

Civil No. 900907125PI
(Judge Timothy R. Hanson)

The parties individually and through their respective

counsel of record, hereby stipulate and agree as hereinafter set
forth,
2c

The parties acknowledge the above-entitled matter came

on regularly for final pretrial on September 29, 1992, at the hour
of 2:00 p.m. and lasted for more than one hour.

At this pretrial,

the parties and the court agreed to certain procedures to be used
at the time of trial for submitting" testimony through proffers of
proof, affidavits, medical reports, and other documentation.

On

ft (' n •» \ :
\J \f \J

JL

i *

October 1, 1992, the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson entered an order
pertaining to the said pretrial and setting out the said trial
procedures.

The parties agree to follow Judge Hanson's procedures

at the trial, which

is scheduled

to begin

at

10:00

a.m.

on

Thursday, November 19, 1992.
3.

The parties agree to be present in court on the said

trial date to acknowledge and stipulate to any proffers of proof
that are made through their respective counsel.
4.

Counsel will bring to the trial all original depositions

which are in their files and the parties agree all such original
depositions may be published by the court and used by Judge Hanson
to determine the outstanding issues in this case and the general
damages to be awarded to the plaintiff.
5.
plaintiff

Using the said procedures established at pretrial, the
will

submit documentary

special damages.

evidence

in support

of her

Based on these special damages and also the

medical and dental reports to be submitted by the plaintiff, the
parties agree to submit to the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson the
issue of what general damages the plaintiff would be entitled to.
Judge Hanson will have the sole discretion to determine the said
general damages based on the evidence presented at trial and the
stipulation of the parties with respect to the reasonableness of
the said general damages.

Judge Hanson will not be bound by any

stipulation or agreement of the parties with respect to the general
damages, but will be free to determine them according to his own
personal review of the evidence submitted by the plaintiff.

-2-

6.

It is recognized plaintiff's counsel represents not only

the plaintiff, Myra L. Taylor, but also United Services Automobile
Association ("USAA") which was the insurance carrier insuring the
Taylor vehicle at the time of the accident described

in the

plaintiff's complaint, which complaint is by reference incorporated
herein and made a part hereof.

USAA's involvement in this case is

to protect their subrogation

rights with respect to both the

uninsured motorist payment of some $20,000.00 and also the no-fault
payment for medical expenses, loss of wages, and domestic help or
essential services of some $22,200.10.
7.

The plaintiff agrees to withdraw her claim for punitive

damages against any of the defendants.
8.

Judge Hanson will be asked to determine the amount of

special and general damages to which the plaintiff is entitled with
respect to each separate Count of the five (5) Counts described in
her complaint and with respect to each claim made in each of the
said five (5) Counts.

Again, Judge Hanson will be invested with

the sole discretion to make the said findings of fact, conclusions
of law, and judgment based on his review of the evidence submitted
at trial.
9.

The defendants agree to waive their right to the normal

thirty-day (30) appeal period allowed by the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure and the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Accordingly,

when the final judgment is entered, this matter will become final
with respect to all issues set forth in the said judgment and the
defendants will have no right to appeal said judgment.

10c

After the court determines the amount of the judgment,

including both special and general damages, the defendants agree
to

assign

any

homeowners1

and

all

claims

they

might

have

against

their

insurance company, or any other insurance companies

where there might be coverage pertaining to the facts set forth in
the five (5) Counts of the plaintiff f s complaint . The parties only
know of the Olsons1 homeowners1 insurance coverage at the present
time, however, this stipulation is broad enough to include any
other insurance if such becomes identified in the future.
11.

With respect to the assignment of their claims against

their homeowners1 insurance company as described in paragraph 10
above, the parties agree Myra L. Taylor will be entitled to pursue
any and all claims against the defendants1 homeowners1 insurance
carrier to the same extent the defendants would be entitled to
pursue those claims under the terms of their policy or under the
general common law or statutory law in the state of Utah.

In this

connection, the defendants agree Myra L. Taylor may appear as the
sole

party

plaintiff

in

any

subsequent

lawsuit

against

the

homeowners1 insurance company, or may appear jointly with the said
Olsons as parties plaintiffs, or she may designate the Olsons to
appear as the party plaintiff in the said lawsuit.

The election

of who the party plaintiffs would be in the said lawsuit will be
left up to the sole discretion of Myra L. Taylor to decide at the
time the lawsuit is commenced.
12.

With respect to the said "assignment" of the defendants1

rights against their homeowners1 insurance carrier as described in
paragraphs 10 and 11 above, the said defendants agree to assign,

to the extent permitted by law, any and all claims they have
against the said carrier to include, but not necessarily be limited
to,

the

carrier

$100,000.00
for

any

liability

"excess"

coverage, the

judgment

over

liability

and

above

of the

the

said

$100,000.00 which the court may enter at the time of the trial, and
any "additional" damages to which the Olsons might be entitled to
such as personal tort actions for mental anguish, economic loss,
damage to reputation, etc..

These claims also involve any and all

claims which the defendants have for attorney

fees they have

incurred in the present action and any and all damages they have
sustained as a result of the refusal of their homeowners1 insurance
carrier to defend them in the instant action and/or for the said
carrier's breach of the duty of good faith dealing with the said
defendants.
13.

With

respect

to the said

"assignment" as

stated

in

paragraphs 10, 11, and 12 above, the defendants and each of them
agree that they will cooperate with the plaintiff in any lawsuit
which might later be filed against the defendants1 homeowners1
insurance company.

The defendants direct their counsel, agents,

and assigns to cooperate with the plaintiff in the said subsequent
lawsuit, and counsel, agents, and assigns agree to do so.

This

cooperation is to be made without any remuneration of any kind
being paid by the plaintiff to the defendants or their counsel.
With respect to this "cooperation," the plaintiff acknowledges the
defendants will not have any responsibility to pay for any costs
or attorney fees in connection with any subsequent lawsuit which
the plaintiff files against the defendants1 homeowners1 insurance

-5-

carrier.

Plaintiff shall indemnify each co-plaintiff against any

loss, costs, or damages which may or do accrue as a result of any
action of co-plaintiff in the subsequent lawsuit.
14.

With respect to the "Assignment11 described above and in

the event the defendants are not permitted by lav/ to assign some
portion of their claims against their homeowners' carrier to the
plaintiff because the claims are personal in nature or for whatever
other reasons, the defendants agree to appear as parties plaintiffs
in any subsequent lawsuit commenced by Myra L. Taylor against the
homeowners1 carrier. Any monies collected by any of the defendants
by virtue of these personal claims which cannot be assigned will
be the sole property of the said Myra L. Taylor and the defendants
agree to pay all of such monies to the said Taylor.
15.

In

exchange

for

the

said

"assignment"

as

described

hereinabove, the plaintiff and USAA agree they will not execute on
any of the personal assets of any of the three defendants, rather,
the plaintiff will look solely for recovery from the defendants1
homeowners1 insurance carrier for payments on the said judgment.
16.

The defendants agree to identify for the plaintiff at the

time of trial the exact identity, including name, address, and
telephone number, of their homeowners1 insurance carrier.

In this

connection, the parties acknowledge the said carrier has been
identified in letters written by their counsel as Ohio Casualty
Insurance Company and also has been identified in letters from the
insurance company as the "American Fire and Casualty Insurance
Company."

In this connection, the defendants agree to provide the

plaintiff, at or before the time of trial, with a full and complete

-6-

copy

of

the

homeowners1

insurance

policy,

together

with

all

endorsements which were in effect on October 17, 1987, the date of
the accident described in the plaintifffs complaint.
17 c

The defendants represent and agree none of them have made

any agreements and/or promises to their homeowners1

insurance

carrier that would release the carrier from any liability to the
defendants for any of the acts, issues, claims, or assets stated
in the plaintiff's complaint or that would impair in any way, the
right of the defendants to pursue any claims they have under the
terms of the homeowners1 policy for failure of the carrier to
defend the defendants in the instant lawsuit, for breach of the
carriers1 duty to deal in good faith with the defendants and/or for
any other claims the defendants have against the carrier for any
liability

connected

with

the

plaintiff's

complaint

and

the

carriers' duties with respect thereto. If there have been any such
agreements, promises, or other documents signed or agreed to by the
defendants then this Stipulation will be automatically null and
void and any final judgment entered in this case will be without
the benefit or protection of this Stipulation.
18.

The parties and their respective counsel are signing this

Stipulation to be used in connection with any final Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and/or Final Judgment which the court
enters

in this

Stipulation may

matter.

The parties

be presented

agree

and

consent

to the above-entitled

court

this
for

approval, and if it is approved by the trial judge assigned to hear
this case —

the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson ~

this Stipulation

may be incorporated into any of the court's final documents by

reference to the same extent as though each and every separate
provision

in this

Stipulation

had

been

included

in the

said

documents.
19.

This Stipulation is binding on the parties hereto, their

heirs, personal representatives, assignees, or successors. In this
connection

the

parties

state

their

intention

to

have

this

Stipulation survive the death of any of the parties.
DATED this 19th day of November 1992.

-UJ

MYRA//L. TAYLOR, Plaintiff

JAMES A. MCINTOSH & ASSOCIATES P.C.

AMES A. MCINTOSH
Attorney for Plaintiff and for United
Services Automobile Association

^V V L :
RONALD D. OLSON, Defendant

d, flbn

CAROL'D. OLSON, Defendant

JENNIFER4HEATHER OLSON, Defendant

MICHAEL N. MARTINEZ
Attorney for Defendants
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

2

SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

3
4

MYRA L.. TAYLOR,
Case No.

5

Judge Timothy R. Hanson

6

vs.

7

RONALD H. OLSON, CAROL D.
OLSON, and JENNIFER HEATHER
OLSON,

8

900907125

Plaintiff,

)
)

Th..d Jutiiu.v.; District

ORG i J t*0

Defendant.

9

If:.:.

Ki.t i.AK-7. COUNTY

10
11

BE IT REMEMBERED that the above-entitled case

12
13

came on regularly for trial before the Honorable Timothy

14

R« Hanson, a Judge of the Third Judicial District Court

15

of the State of Utah, at Salt Lake City, Salt Lake

16

County, State of Utah on the 19th day of November, 1992,

17

at 10:00 a.m., and that the following proceedings were

18

had..

19
20
21
22
23
24
25

ORIGINAL
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2
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FOR THE PLAINTIFF:

James A. Mcintosh
Attorney at Law
Suite 14 intrade Bldg South
1399 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105

FOR THE DEFENDANTS:

Michael N. Martinez
Attorney at Law
4479 South Gordon Ln.
Murray, Utah 84107

4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
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17
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1

P R O C E E D I N G S

2

November 19, 1992

3

Partial Transcript

4

THE COURT:

What I intend to do, ladies and

5

gentlemen, and counsel in this matter, is to review the

6

exhibits that have been received.

7

believe it's necessary to relate these Findings of Fact

8 I

to particular witnesses, I want to review some of the ..

9 '

depositions.

To the extent that I

Inasmuch as the facts as to how the

10 :

accident occurred are not substantially in dispute, if at

11

all, I don't need to .spend a lot of time on bow this

12

accident occurred, except that I will read the factual

13

recitations to make a determination, because I'm willing

14

to make a finding of percentage of responsibility here to

15

determine the percentage of responsibility for the

16

accident between Ms. Taylor and Ms. Olson.

17

attempt to —

18

evidence that I have, make a determination as to that

19

percentage.

20

I will

I won't attempt, 1 will, based on the

The other major issue that I'm primarily concerned

21

with in this matter is reading all the medical

22

information, reading the information that's been provided

23

in relation to the damages claimed in this matter by Ms.

24 I

Taylor, and attempting to put , a figure to that. And in

25

reaching that type of figure, so you'll all understand
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1

how that's done, meiny times these types of cases are

2

tried to a jury, and I tell a jury they are charged with

3

responsibility of putting a dollar figure on an injury.

4

And obviously that's not something you can calculate with

5

precision; it's somewhat subjective.

6

weigh and evaluate the —

7

evidence may show.

8

this case shows permanent impairment, that's a factor

9

that I must take into consideration in determining

10

damages, what the lawyers and judges call pain and

11

suffering. And that's kind of a general catchall for

12

change of lifestyle, limitations on what people can do,

13

and what they can't do, actual pain that has occurred,

14

inconvenience, emotional upset that's related to that,

15

and the mental impact that runs with physical injuries.

16

I will attempt to evaluate all those things, and attach a

17

figure to it.

18

I will attempt to

a number of things that the

To the extent that the evidence in

But like I say, there's no mathematical formula that

19

I tell jurys about, or that I could apply myself.

20

There's really no way with any degree of precision,

21

because as Mr. Taylor pointed out, I'm sure if everybody

22

sitting in this courtroom could have had the power to

23

make this whole thing disappear, we'd all be a lot

24

happier.

25

There have been injuries as a result of the accident, and

But the accident happened.

It did happen.

Page
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1

the only way that the legal system that we have in this

2

country can compensate a person for injuries is

3

monitarily.

4

woefully inadequate, but it's the only way we have to do

5

it. And so T will try and determine what I believe to be

6

a reasonable, and a fair figure for the damages that I

7

determine to exist.

8
9

There's no other way.

Sometimes that's

And so what I think I will do, counsel, is this:

I

may choose to issue a brief written memoranda about some

10

of my observations in relation to the evidence.

11

also revi ew the Findings of Fact, and Cone J .usions of Law,

12

and the final judgment that's been proposed, and

13

determine whether or not what changes or additions or

14

deletions need to be made from those Findings of Fact,

15

and I'll pen and ink those in, and send you a copy of

16

those changes, and I'll ask Mr. Mcintosh to prepare it in

17

fina 1 for m.

18

a final judgment. And that will resolve this Court's

19

involvement in this matter, at least resolves this case

20

between Ms. Taylor, and the Olsons. ..

21

I will

Once I have that document, then I will sign

Also, I think the record ought to reflect at this

22

point in time that the Court has had some input into this

23

matter, and I am satisfied that both sides have carefully

24

evaluated their positions.

25

is —

Proceeding by way of proffer

it's not unheard of, but it's not unusual in this
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case.

But if there is no disputed issues of fact with

regard to the manner in which this accident occurred, and
if there's no need to bring in witnesses to testify
because what they are going to say is not in substantial
dispute by the other side, then it seems foolish to spend
a number of days trying a case like this.

So's that's

the reason that I agreed that we could proceed by way of
proffer in this case as opposed to calling in doctors,
and having them testify, and having everyone testify
directly.

Some cases are pretty straight forward.

appears to be one.

This

And so there's no reason to spend a

lot of time determining what's going to be inevitable in
any event, certainly with regard to the issue of
liability.

So when I say the issue of liability, I'm

talking about how the accident occurred.

So I believe

proceeding by way of proffer in this case was and is
appropriate, and that's the reason that I have agreed to
do that, and I assume counsel were equally as comfortable
with that, otherwise you wouldn't have agreed to proceed
in that fashion.
It also appears to the Court that the stipulation
has been carefully drafted, that it has been reviewed at
some length by both sides, and that both sides have had
input, and up until this morning, and including this
morning, there were ongoing discussions with regard to

Page
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1

the proper contents of the stipulation, for example, and

2

the Findings of Fact that have been offered in this

3

matter.

4

review not only for the plaintiff, but also for the

5

defendants as to their position, and that this

6

stipulation, and the facts that have been agreed to as

7

far as this accident occurred, as far as how this

8

accident occurred lidve been done at arms-length.

9

just don't want to leave the impression to anyone,

So it appears that there has been a careful

And I

10

because it's not my impression that the defendant are

11

just here to do whatever t :he pla intiffs choose t ;o ha /e

12

them do to get this matter over with, I do not believe

13

that has been the case*

14

observation.

15

That has not been my

And so I'm satisfied this is an arms-length

16

transaction, if I can use that term.

Certainly arms-

17

leng th negot i atIons as to how to resolve this matter, and

18

a careful analysis of what the facts are, and the facts

19

are basically as I've already said, not in substantial

20

dispute.

21

gentlemen, that's what I intend to do.

22

tell you how soon I was going to have it done

23

certainly within the week.

24

crisis, I would hope to have thd s done before the

25

holidays next Thursday, and in the mail back to your

So with those explanations, ladies and
I wish I <:oiiId
~

And barring some unforeseen
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attorneys so we can finalize this matter.

Anything else,

counsel?
MR. McINTOSH:
Court three copies —

Your Honor, may I give the

copies of three cases that just

have some general verdicts and amounts that have been
found in other states?
THE COURT:
MR. McINTOSH:
injuries.

Certainly
With respect to similar type

One of the cases is for $450,000, one of the

cases is for $150,000, and one of them is for $75,000. I
wanted you to have both ends of the spectrum.

Those are

probably the three best samplings I could find of this
type of injury, and what other courts have done.
THE COURT:

I'll be glad to consider those.

All right. And, of course, so that everyone understands,
perhaps with a little more clarity how one reaches the
subjective figures, not only do I rely upon my own
evaluation of what the evidence shows, and the
significance of the injuries, and how that might be
translated into a dollar figure, I want this record to
reflect, because I don't know who might be reading it in
the future, but I want this record to reflect that over
the last ten years there have been a number of personal
injury cases tried to this Court, so I'm familiar with
what jurys have done, what I have done on cases that may

Page
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bear some resemblance, to this in the way of damages, and
also some significant experiences as a trial lawyer
before taking the bench, because I specialized in this
type of area.

So there's something to draw on besides

just kind of plucking a figure out of the sky.

So I will

attempt to make it reasonable, but appropriate. So,
that's what we'll do.
Thank you for your efforts, counsel.

I think you've

handled this in an appropriate fashion in view of the
circumstances, and

commend you on your willingness to

agree where you could to save your clients expense and
trauma going through a protracted piece of litigation.
All right. We'll be in recess. Again, thank you for
your good efforts.
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STATE OF UTAH

)

3
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)
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

SS.
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5
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7
8
9

I, BUNNY CAROL NEUENSCHWANDER, do hereby
certify:
That I am a Certified Shorthand Reporter,
License No. 152, and one of the official court reporters

10

of the State of Utah; that on the 19th day of November,

11

1992, I attended the within matter and reported in

12

shorthand the proceedings had thereat; that later I

13

caused ray said shorthand notes to be transcribed into

14 I

typewriting, and the foregoing pages, numbered from 3 to

15

9, inclusive, constitute a partial transcript, true and

16 I

correct account of the same to the best of my ability.

17
18 I
19

Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 14th day of
December, 1992

20
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/
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COl^RT^
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MYRA L. TAYLOR,

Case No.

,A^ _ b <A<3

900907125

Plaintiff,
Judge Timothy Re Hanson
vs.
RONALD H. OLSON, CAROL D.
OLSON, and JENNIFER HEATHER
OLSON,
Defendant.

BE IT REMEMBERED that the above-entitled case
came on regularly for trial before the Honorable Timothy
Re Hanson, a Judge of the Third Judicial District Court
of the State of Utah, at Salt Lake City, Salt Lake
County, State of Utah on the 19th day of November, 1992,
at 10:00 a.m., and that the following proceedings were
had •
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4479 South Gordon Ln.
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P R O C E E D

IN GS
November 19, 1992
Partial Transcript

THE COURJ:

Mr. Martinez?

MR. MARTINEZ:

We really have nothing to add,

Your Honor, other than I would proffer to the Court that
if asked, each of the defendants would agree wi th the
factual statement as stated in the Findings of Fact, And
for the record, Your Honor, on the stipulation,
stipulation paragraph number sixteen states that : >n th i; s
day, on the date of trial, defendants would provide the
homeowner's policy, carrier's issued policy, which we
have provided, so the record will note that.

-. -

just for clarification, which I've discussed with Mr.
Mcintosh, for paragraph seventeen, it states that the
defendants nor any of them have made any agreement or
released the insurance carrier, the homeowner's insurance
carrier from any liability.

And that applies strictly to

any agreement ^ L - de of the policy.

Other than that,

Your Honor, we have nothing to add or state.
THE COURT:

All right.

Let me ~

so that we

have a response under oath on many of these issues, Mr.
and Mrs. Olson, and Ms. Olson, would you raise your
right-hand, and be sworn, please. And I'll ask you some
questions about: these facts.
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(Mr. and Mrs. Olson and Ms. Olson were sworn.)
THE COURT:

Please be seated.

Have all three

of you had an opportunity to read this stipulation, your
signatures on it.
MR. OLSON.MRS. OLSON:

Yes.
Yes.

MS. OLSON:

Yes.

THE COURT:

And have you also had an

opportunity to review the document called Findings of
Fact.
MR. OLSON:

Yes, we did, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

All three of you have read that?

MS. OLSON:

Yes.

MS. OLSON:

Yes.

THE COURT:

In both the stipulation, and

Findings of Fact, there are certain recitations as to the
manner in which this accident occurred, and the
participation of Ms. Olson, and Ms. Taylor, and how this
accident occurred.

Now, I recognize all three of you

weren't there, but to the extent that you have personal
knowledge, or to the extent that you have been advised as
to what occurred on that occasion, do these Findings of
Fact represent the facts as they occurred as you
understand them to be, and as you recollect them to be to
the extent you have personal knowledge?

Page 4
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1

MR. OLSON:

2

MRS. OLSON:

3

MS. OLSON:

Yes.

4

THE COURT:

All three of you agree?

5

MR. OLSON:

Yes.

6

MRS. OLSON:

7

MS. OLSON:

Yes.

8

THE COURT:

The reason I ask these questions,

9

Yes.
Yes.

Yes.

so the record is clear on this, I am satisfied that the

10

factual recitation of both the stipulation, and the

11

findings are basically the agreement of both parties, and

12

I've heard from the Taylors, and now I've heard from the

13

three of you, and it appears that there's agreement

14

between the parties as to what the facts basically are

15

with regard to how this accident occurred.

16

the reason I've asked those questions.

17

make sure that you felt that they were a satisfactory

18

recitation of the facts.

19
20

All right.

Very good.

And so that's

I just wanted to

Anything further from the

defendant, then?

21

MR. MARTINEZ:

None, Your Honor. We'd rest.

22

MR. MclNTOSH:

Nothing further, Your Honor.

23

Thank you.

24
25
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License No. 152, and one of the official court reporters
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of the State of Utah; that on the 19th day of November,

11

1992, I attended the within matter and reported in

12

shorthand the proceedings had thereat; that later I

13

caused my said shorthand notes to be transcribed into

14

typewriting, and the foregoing pages, numbered from 3 to

15

5, inclusive, constitute a partial transcript, true and

16 J
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EXHIBIT "25"

J A M E S A. MCINTOSH, ESQ. ~

No.

HtEBMSTBiC???^?
Third Judicial District

2194

JAMES A. MCINTOSH & ASSOCIATES P.C.
A Utah Professional Law Corporation
Attorney for Plaintiff
Suite 17, Intrade Bldg. South
1399 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84105
Telephone: (801) 487-7834

JAHJLfte
JCfcfcOUNTY
7

Deputy Ctotfk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
MYRA L . TAYLOR

:

Plaintiff

RONALD H. OLSON, CAROL D.
OLSON, and JENNIFER HEATHER
OLSON
Defendants

,;

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

:
i:

civil No. 90090n2SPI

:
:

(Judge Timothy R. Hanson)

The above-entitled matter, having come on regularly for trial
on Thursday, November ] 9 , 3 992 , before the He :>i i,orab] e Timothy R.
H a nson,

Juc ig< • of the above-entitled

court, hearing this case

without a jury; the plaintiff, Myra L. Taylor, being present in
court and represented by the law firm
Associ--! --

James A. M--! rv „,•-. &

a Utah professional law corporation, appearing

through counsel, James Ac Mcintosh; the defendants, Ronald H.
Olson, Carol D. Olson, and Jennifer Heather Olson being present in
court and bei i tg represented by counsel, Michae] N

Martinez; the .

court having heretofore entered a Pretrial Order establishing the
procedures for presenting evidence at the time of the trial; said
Pretrial Ordei * being incorporated herein by reference and being.
made a part hereof; the court having received the various proffers
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of proof, affidavits, medical reports, and other evidence submitted
by the plaintiff in support of the allegations raised in each of
the five (5) Counts of her complaint; the court having taken the
proffer of testimony from the defendants, Ronald H. Olson and Carol
D. Olson, said proffers being made by their counsel, Michael N.
Martinez, and approved by the said Olsons; the court having
published the deposition of all persons heretofore deposed in this
action; the court having reviewed the said proffers of proof,
affidavits, medical reports, and other evidence and being fully
advised in the premises; hereby enters its findings of fact and
conclusions of law as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On October 17, 1987, ("accident date11) the defendant

Ronald H. Olson was the owner of a 1974 Volkswagen, two-door sedan,
green in color ("Volkswagen") • Mr, Olson had purchased the said
Volkswagen from a previous owner Daniel Park Lake.

On the said

October 17, 1987, the Volkswagen was not registered in the state
of Utah and was uninsured.
2.

On the said accident date the said Ronald H. Olson was

married to the defendant Carol D. Olson and was living with his
wife and family at 1930 Logan Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84108.
On the said accident date, the defendant Jennifer Heather Olson was
sixteen years of age, having been born on April 2, 1971.
3.

On the said accident date, the defendant Jennifer Heather

Olson ("Heather") was driving the said Volkswagen at approximately
11:55 P.M. on Yalecrest Avenue (1015 South in Salt Lake City, Utah)

-2-
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at its intersection with 1900 East ("accident scene"),

There was

a

I'hc

"yield"

traffic

siqn

tdcjnq

Ya]eere4"

A^ITIUP

tt

.Hi

intersection, which sign required drivers on Ifalecrest Avenue to
yield the right-of-way to persons on 1900 East.
4*

Ac the sa i ci time and p] ace described i i i paragraph 3

above, the ^aid defendant Heather was driving under the influence
of intoxicating beverages and was driving the Volkswagen with a
blood-alcohc
4,
5.

ontent of approximately .14 qr.ims in violation of
• : . ^ode Annotated, 19 53, as amended.

A : ^w minutes prior t-.; tue time and place described in

paragraph ^

- -v*-*
-*;

a nd

said defendant Heather was involved i n a "hi t
i n an area, ip«« than one mi le from, the said

accident scene. This hit and run involved another motorist by the
name of Michelle Paxton.

Heather was being pursued by Ms. Paxton

through a r esidential neighborhood at the time she reached the
accident scene.
6
* <: r
her

At approximate!v
the accident seem

; i * So P.M. on the said accident date
• - . laintiff M- : 1

1984 Subaru 640 station wagon

- raylor was driving

("Subaru"

m

a northerly

direction along 1900 East Street and in a careful and prudent
mam *er.
7.

On or about the said 11:55 P«M

on the said accident date

and at the accident scene, the defendant Heather negligently,
("negligence") operated I ler X ' * x ' ' fen thei: eby causi ng a col lisi on
with the Subaru being driven L\ the plaintiff.

The specific

grounds of negligence include, b^t are not necessarily limited to,
the followings

-3-
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(a)

A failure to keep a proper lookout.

(b)

Failure to yield the right-of-way to Myra Taylor

who was driving her car on 1900 East.
(c)

Driving too fast for existing conditions,

(d)

Driving

under

the

influence

of

intoxicating

beverages with a blood-alcohol content of approximately twice the
limit established by the Utah statutes for a presumption of driving
under the influence of intoxicating beverages.
(e)

Failure

to

take

evasive

action

to

avoid

the

(f)

Failure to keep her motor vehicle under control.

accident.

jt

fcv.-v

(x^—Driving- a-motor vehicle that—was—not- -insured and

-also -not- registered;
g nx.X

(h-)—Driving" a motor vehrcrte-w-rfeh license plates which

-had - not been.-issued- forthe- automobile-Heather^-was-driving-f
8.

As a sole, direct

negligence, Myra
permanently

and

proximate

L. Taylor was then and

injured.

She

suffered

cause of Heather's
there

seriously

bruises,

and

contusions,

lacerations, shock, headache, muscle spasms, numbness in her joints
and members, scarring, strains, fractures, and other damages and
personal

injury

so

as to

render

the plaintiff partially

and

permanently disabled for the balance of her life.
9.

The plaintiff has suffered a loss of the quality of life

and enjoyment of life she experienced prior to October 17, 1987,
and has also suffered mental anguish, emotional pain and suffering
and other mental and emotional trauma as more fully described in
the evidence plaintiff provided at trial, some of which is dis-

-4-
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cussed hereafter.
10.

Prior to the time of the sal ci acci dent oi :i October 17,

1987, the plaintiff was 'fehe pictuiiii--o£ health and vigor.

She was

a healthy mother who had given birth to and raised twelve (12)
children. She was a<_,^ustonied *••• f^kinq
coast-to-coast in the family car

lung trips as ,-i family from

She would drive the family car,

pack the luggage and the food, work tirelessly and enthusiastically
completing these tasks as a wife and mother.
plaint .ft

By comparison, the

is unable to ride in the family car at the time of trial

without hunching her back and walking bent over because of back
spasms and pain.
11. • Prior to the time of the accident, the plai ntiff enjoyed
sports.

She had played tennis, golf, bowling, horseback riding,

motorcycling, hiking, waterskiing, camping, badminton, jumping on
the trampoline with her children, and dancing. Since the accident,
the plaintiff has been unable to participate in any of these
activities and is by comparison an "invalid" with respect to her
lifesty 3 e pi: i < :>i: to the accident.
12.

The plaintifffs treating physician, King S. Udall, M.D.,

gave his written opinion in a letter dated approximately
IllOnth

n r i n r

percem

\at*

I •••

IJhp

fj

i

I HJ|

p 1 .i I Fl 1 i f l

I I. I S

SUStti.

r- fl)
*-

permanent impairment and disability of net

person as a result of the accident.

total

Dr. Udall stated that, as a

result of the accident, Myr.ii h. Taylor h.id to ,liter her 1 i f P an<j
career significantly. Because of the accident Dr. Udall states Ms.
Taylor was unable to work on a full-time basis either lifting or
providing the usual services of a registered i i/t irse

-5-

As a result,

0 0 0 1 9 I]

she did not receive commensurate wages for the amount of time she
missed as working half-time as she did as a full-time employee.
Dr. Udall further states as a result of the accident the plaintiff
has difficulty with her housework and cannot do routine housework
as before or do anything which involves heavy work using the upper
extremities.

After listening to the proffers of proof and the

other evidence submitted at trial, the court concurs in the
findings by Dr. Udall as more fully stated in his October 20, 1992
letter to plaintiff's counsel, James A. Mcintosh, Esq..
13.

As a sole, direct and proximate cause of the accident,

the plaintiff has incurred a loss of wages for th€* period of time
October 18, 1987, through October 5, 1991, in the amount of
$65,861.84.

This finding is based on the affidavit of Margie Q.

Richins, dated November 9, 1992.

Ms. Richins is the Civilian

Payroll Supervisor for the Veteran's Administration Medical Center
where the plaintiff, Myra L. Taylor, worked for many years as a
Registered Nurse.
14.

The court finds it was reasonable and necessary for the

plaintiff to take the depositions of certain persons, to wit,
Kristi Bringhurst, Jenny Pia, Steve Ebert, Steve Jones, Scott Levy,
James Levy, Mark Muir, Jeff Gertino, and Heidi Olson.

The court

further finds it was reasonable and necessary for the plaintiff to
pay the said persons $17.00 each to attend their depositions and
to pay the amount of $232.00 for the service of subpoenas on the
said persons together with the further amount of $374.80 to the
court reporter for taking and transcribing the said depositions.
The court finds this total of $759.80 is a reasonable and necessary
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expense incur ret I Iby the

plaintiff in this action and is to be taxed

as part of the costs to be awarded to the plaintiff.
15."

In addition to the said ^t>b,*61.84 lost wages described

in paragraph 1 3 , the court finds the plaintiff has also incurred
the following^special damages from the time of the accident through
the time of the tri aJ
(a)

Essential Services —

$6,2GG„Q0c

(b)

Medical Expenses -- $5,178.75

(c)

Expert Witness Fees to Frank Grant for Accident,

Investigation and Reconstruction Services —
16.

In

impairment
at

addition

$718.75.

to the ten percent

(10%) total

person

^ disability noted by Dr. King Sc Udall as described

i

- . . • • ! : :M* sustained injuries to her nose and teeth,

as more

fully

Allred, M.D .t

described

in medical

reports

from

Dr. Bryce D.

and from her dentists, V e e Boyd Hair, D.M.D., and

Scott B. Hai i: , D.D.S. .
17.

The plaintiff was able to resume full-time employment at

the Veteran's Administration Hospital on or about October 5, 1991.
The sani full 1.1 nif Hin[iloyiiHMil IK-M i^sitaied

: change s- * ri»- tvpe and

nature oi the work plaintiff had been performing prior
accident arv: required a career change as ru*>e
Udali*
18.

v- ;

-. report ami in tin-11 p 1 a i irit; i I *

the

^ l y - ^ - - J m Dr.
*fc*-^'t-v ; , .

The court finds Myra L. Taylor's physical, mental, and

emotional disabilities will continue for the rest of her natural
life and w i1 ] i n te rfere w i th he r e I i j o y me f11 o f ] I fe as a wi£ e and
a mother, and wi 13 deprive her of the benefits and enjoyment of
life which she had prior to the time of the accident as more fully

-7-
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set forth hereinabove in these findings. For all of these reasons,
4

tyf, tec

the court finds the plaintiff is entitled to $25O,000vOfr as
reasonable and full compensation for the general damages she has
sustained from the time of the accident to the time of trial and
from the trial through the remainder of her natural life. In this
connection, the court finds the plaintiff was born on January 28,
194 3, and at the time of the accident, on October 17, 1987, was
forty-four (44) years of age. The plaintiff had a life expectancy
at the time of the accident of approximately thirty-six (3 6) years.
The court takes judicial notice of the plaintiff's life expectancy
which can also be verified in the legal encyclopedias such as the
DESK BOOK in American Jurisprudence "Second Edition" Cumulative
Supplement issued in April of 1991. The mortality tables are found
in the said publication as Items numbers 159, 160, and 161.
19 c The parties have submitted to the court a proposed
"Stipulation" dated November 19, 1992, which provides for an
assignment after judgment has been entered of the defendant's claim
against their homeowners' insurance company for failure and refusal
to defend the defendants in this instant lawsuit, for failure to
pay the policy limits of $100,000.00, for any excess judgment which
might be entered in this action, and for any additional claims
which the defendants might have against their homeowners' insurance
carrier.

As consideration for the said assignment, the plaintiff

agrees not to execute on the defendants' personal property.

The

court finds the Stipulation is reasonable and adopts the terms of
the said Stipulation as though they were fully set forth in these
findings.
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20.

The court finds there has been no collusion between the

plaintiff and the defendants with respect to the said Stipulation
or wit.n respect t© assigning the defendants * r ight.s t:« :> t)l ,e
plaintiff with respect t© t h e defendants 1 h o m e o w n e r s 1

insurance

carrier. The p a r t i e s have submitted correspondence between counsel
for the plaintiff
correspondence
homeowners 1

and counsel

between

insurance

for 1:1 le de fendants

counsel
claims

homeowners :| .insurance company.

as u •,

for t h e defendants

office

and t h e attorney

s

and t h e
for t h e

The con ir t: f:i i ids t h e sa i d doc \ lments

have kept the h o m e o w n e r s 1 insurance company apprised of this legal
action and have given t h e said company every chance to appear in
this ease and t o represent the defei idai its her ei i i

T h e coi ir t fi nds

the said insurance company has not appeared in this action in a n /
capacity whatsoever through t h e date of t h e t r i a l .
21.

The plaintiff withdrew 1 ieii claim :':::

onitive damages at

the trial.
22.

The court

finds

the plaintiff

has proved

all the

allegations with respect to each of tl le c] a :i its :i n Coi, mts 1 2

3,

4, and 5 of the plaintifffs complaint except for the claim for
punitive damages against the defendant, Heather Olson, as set forth
in Count 2 which claim the plaintiff withdrew at trial.
With respect to the allegations in Count 5 of the
plaintiff's complaint, the court specifically finds the defendants,
Ronald He Olson, and his wife, Carol D«, 01 son,

were negligent in

failing to supervise and control the activities m
child Jennifer Heather Olson.

liieii minor

The court finds the said parents

knew the said minor child was taking the Volkswagen car from the
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parents' residence and had used it on several occasions prior to
the time of the accident.

The court also finds the parents knew

that their daughter had consumed alcoholic beverages on occasions
prior to the time of the accident and was in the habit of attending
parties with friends who the parents knew drank intoxicating
beverages.

The court further finds the parents had the duty and

responsibility

to

prevent

the

minor

child

from

taking

the

Volkswagen automobile which was uninsured and which was not
registered, but the parents did not take the necessary steps and
precautions to prevent the minor child from using the automobile,
either on prior occasions or at the time of the accident on October
17, 1987. The court further finds the parents' lack of supervision
and control over the minor child was the sole, direct, and
proximate cause of the accident for the reasons stated in this
paragraph and for the other reasons more fully described in Count
5 of the complaint, all of which the court finds are fully
established by the evidence in this case.
24.

Section 41-2-115, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended,

provides that any negligence of a minor younger than eighteen (18)
years of age when operating a motor vehicle upon a highway is
imputed to the person who has signed the application of the minor
for a permit or license.

The said section further provides the

person signing the application for a permit or a license is jointly
and severally liable with the minor for any damages caused by the
negligent misconduct.
25.

At the time of the accident as described above in these

findings, the defendant Ronald H. Olson had signed the application
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for a permit or license of the defendant minor Jennifer Heather
Olson.

Pursuant to § 41-2-115 the said Ronald H. Olson is jointly

and severally liable with Heather for any and a] 1 of the damages
sustained by Myra L. Taylor as more fully described above in these
findings.
Section 4i-2-116, Utah Code Ax n lotated, 1 9 ^ , a* amended,

•' ' 26 c

provides that the owner of a motor vehicle causing or knowingly
permitting a mi nor younger than eighteen
operate

the v eh i cle 1 lpon a highway

or

(18) years rf ac- - 3
a p«€ rson

A • - ••

*ho

-r

furnishes the motor vehicle to the minor, are each jointly and
severally liable with the minor for any damages caused fay the
-..r: n -> s * >•>- 'eM. . «=?.

negligence
27«

The defendant Ronald H

Olson is jointly and severally

liable with his minor daughter Heather pursuant to § 41-2-116 for
any and all damages negligently caused by the
person

of Myra

L,

Taylor

as

set

forth

said minor to the

hereinabove

in

these

findings.
28.

The defendants Ronald H

Olson .ti I 1 nrol I»

the parents of the defendant Jennifer Heather Olson,,

0") .MM u e
On October

1 7 , 1987, the said parents were living :

-r.e ;ame household with

the

,,;.

said

1111 noj

rhilhl

mi

Mm

siii..

JO

\<\\\\

parents

negligently permitted their minor daughter to use the Volkswagen
automobile which was under the control of the said parents. At the
said tiirv

-

*

daughter intended \

•

• shoi ild havv

•-•,,.«

-IV-M:

minor

or was likely to use the motor vehicle and to

conduct herself ,r a- activity and in a manner as to create an
unreasonar

,

thers.
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29.

The said parents had previously known prior to the said

accident date about Heather's drinking intoxicciting beverages;
however, the said parents failed to take adequate precautions or
to properly instruct their minor child about the dangers of driving
while under the influence of alcohol.
30.

The

parents

further

failed

to

take

the

necessary

precautions to see their minor child would not take the Volkswagen
automobile on the highways in an unregistered condition and without
the vehicle insurance required by the statutes of the state of
Utah.
31.

As

parents

of

the

said

minor

child

Heather,

the

defendants Ronald H. Olson and Carol D. Olson had a duty to
supervise and control the conduct of the said minor child so as to
prevent the minor child from negligently harming others or from so
conducting herself as to create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm
to others such as Myra L. Taylor.
32.

The said parents knew or had reason to know they had the

ability to control Heather and they knew or should have known of
the necessity and opportunity for exercising such control.
parents

knew

the

automobile

did

not

contain

current

The
valid

registration as required by Utah statutes nor was the Volkswagen
automobile insured for personal injury or property damage to others
as required by Utah statutes.
33.

The parents knew the minor child had driven the car

without registration and without insurance on previous occasions;
however, the parents did not exercise the required supervision and
control to stop Heather from using it on the accident date.
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Rather, they allowed the minor child to have access to the keys to
the said automobile, to install improper license plates on the said
automobile, ..mud to otherwise be able to use an J operate the said
automobile.
34.

The parents also knew that on prior occasions as well as

on the accident date the minor child Heather had been using license
plates from her older sister Heidi8 s automobile, the said use being
in violation.of the state statutes pertaining to motor vehicles.
Notwithstanding this knowledge, the said parents did not; ensure
Heather would discontinue this practice and the parents thereby
permitted the minor child to take the Volkswagen on the public
streets

ai id h :i ghways

in

the

state

of Utah

. •

nproper

registration and without adequate insurance.
35.

The parents knew the minor child had consumed alcoholic

beverages prior to the accident datec

The parents also knew the

minor child consorted with other friends and acquaintances who were
accustomed to drinking alcoholic beverages when they were together.
36. -Notwithstanding
habits,

the

Volkswagen

parents

which

had

this knowledge

<

Heather's

allowed

Heather

to

have

invalid

license

plates,

access
lacked

drinking
to

the

adequate

insurance, and under circumstances where the parents knew or should
have

known

Heather was

attending

a party

where

intoxicating

beverages were going to be consumed and knew or should have known
that Heather may be driving the motor vehicle after consuming the
said intoxicating beverages0
37.

The parents had the ability to control Heather's access

to and use of the said Volkswagen^ and also knew the necessity for
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exercising the said control; however, they neglected to so control
or supervise Heather to prevent her from using the said Volkswagen
under the circumstances set forth in Count 5 of the plaintiff's
complaint*
38.

The

parents

were

negligent

in

failing

to

retain

sufficient control and discipline over their minor daughter Heather
and in failing to provide cidequate supervision for Heather to
insure Heather would not take the Volkswagen automobile under the
circumstances set forth in the complaint.
39.

This lack of control and supervision on the part of the

parents constitutes negligence on their part.
40•

The said parent's negligence contributed as a proximate

and direct cause to the accident on October 17, 1987, as described
more fully hereinabove in these findings.

As a direct and

proximate result of this negligence on the part of the parents, the
plaintiff sustained the damages which she claims in the preceding
Counts in this complaint.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The plaintiff

is entitled

to

judgment

against the

defendants and each of them jointly and severally on Counts 1, 3,
4, and 5 of the plaintiff's complaint for the amount of $77,959.34
special damages and the amount of $250, OQQ-.flO- general damages,
together with the amount of $834.80 as costs.
2.

The Stipulation of the parties dated November 19, 1992,

should be approved by the court and is by reference incorporated

00 02

into these conclusions as though it were fully set out herein.
DONE IN OPEN COURT THIS 19TH DAY OF NOVEMBER 1992.
BY THE COURT

TIMOTHY R. HANSON
District Court Judge
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 19th day of November, 1992, a
true and correct copy of the above and foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was hand delivered to the following:
Michael N. Martinez, Esq.
4479 Gordon Lane, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, UT 84107

Jdtflm&s
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EXHIBIT "26"

FllEDOWTBICTtr.T.T
Third Judicial District
JAMES A. MCINTOSH, ESQ. — No. 2194
J A M E S A. MCINTOSH & ASSOCIATES P.C.

A Utah Professional Law Corporation
Attorney for Plaintiff
Suite 17, Intrade Bldg. South
1399 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84105
Telephone: (801) 487-7834

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
MYRA L. TAYLOR
Plaintiff

i

t

:

V •

<

RONALD H. OLSON, CAROL D.
OLSON, and JENNIFER HEATHER
OLSON

:
::
!
:
!

Defendants

FINAL JUDGMENT

Civil No. 900907125PI
(Judge Timothy R. Hanson)

The above-entitled matter, having come on regularly for trial
on Thursday, November 19, 1992, before the Honorable Timothy R.
Hanson, Judge of the above-entitled court, hearing this case
without a jury; the plaintiff, Myra L. Taylor, being present in
court and represented by the law firm of James A. Mcintosh &
Associates P.C, a Utah professional law corporation, appearing
through counsel, James A. Mcintosh; the defendants, Ronald H.
Olson, Carol D. Olson, and Jennifer Heather Olson being present in
court and being represented by counsel, Michael N. Martinez; the
court having heretofore entered a Pretrial Order establishing the
procedures for presenting evidence at the time of the trial; said
Pretrial Order being incorporated herein by reference and being
made a part hereof; the court having received the various proffers
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of proof, affidavits, medical reports, and other evidence submitted
by the plaintiff in support of the allegations raised in each of
the five (5) Counts of her complaint; the court having taken the
proffer of testimony from the defendants, Ronald H. Olson and Carol
D. Olson, said proffers being made by their counsel, Michael N.
Martinez, and

approved

by the

said

Olsons; the court

having

published the deposition of all persons heretofore deposed in this
action; the court having reviewed the said proffers of proof,
affidavits, medical reports, and other evidence and being fully
advised in the premises; the court heretofore entered its findings
of fact and conclusions of law, which are by reference incorporated
herein and made a part hereof;
IT

IS HEREBY

ORDERED, ADJUDGED,

AND

DECREED

AS

A

FINAL

JUDGMENT IN THIS MATTER AS FOLLOWS:
1.

The plaintiff, Myra L. Taylor, is hereby awarded judgment

against the defendants, Ronald H. Olson, Carol D. Olson, and
Jennifer Heather Olson, and each of them jointly and severally, on
Counts 1, 3, 4, and 5 of the plaintiff's complaint for the amount
of $77,959.34 special damages, and $250,Q0Ovt>fr general damages
together with the plaintiff's costs incurred herein in the amount
of $834.80.
2o

The court approves and adopts the Stipulation signed by

the parties on November 19, 1992.
DONE IN OPEN COURT THIS 19TH DAY OF NOVEMBER 1992.
BY THE COURT

TIMOTHY R. HANSON
District Court Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 19th day of November, 1992, a
true and correct copy of the above and foregoing FINAL JUDGMENT
was hand delivered to the following:
Michael N. Martinez, Esqe
4479 Gordon Lane, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, UT 84107

^Mtrowft-iff^M

u

/ JAMES
J£MFQ A.
A MCINTOSH
MPTMTAQM
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EXHIBIT "27"

© t f t r i 3«Mrial Pfgtrtct (Eauvi
Courts Building
240 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 535-5677

r i M O T H Y R. H A N S O N
DISTRICT JUDGE

^fofstnct

JAH2il3£3
January 25, 1993

LAKE COUNTY

James A. Mcintosh, Esq*
1399 South 700 Est, Suite 17
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105
Michael N. Martinez, Esq.
4479 Gordon Lane, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Re:

Myra L. Taylor v. Ronald H< Olson, et al
Civil No. 900907125

Gentlemen:
I have had an opportunity t© review in detail the exhibits
that were offered during the trial in the above-referenced
matter. I have also reviewed those exhibits in connection with
the proposed Findings ©f Fact and Conclusions of Law, and the
Final Judgment submitted by Mr« Mcintosh.
Having due
consideration for the medical information submitted, I am
satisfied that the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law are appropriate in relation to the issue of special
damages, such as lost wages, essential services and medical
expenses, and am willing to adopt those provisions of the
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as the Court's. As to
general damages, I believe the evidence supports a general
damage verdict in the amount of $125,000.00, and have made the
appropriate pencil changes on the original Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Final Judgment. On page 5, I was of
the opinion that there should be a change in wording to include
in paragraph 10 on the second line the statement that the
plaintiff was in excellent health and vigor, as opposed to "the
picture of" health and vigor• I have made that pencil change
as well.
In reviewing the specific findings of negligence in
paragraph 7 on page 4 of the proposed Findings, I note that
subpart (g) suggests that driving a motor vehicle that was not
insured and also not registered constitutes negligence, and in
item (h) that driving a motor vehicle with license plates which

000190

James A. Mcintosh, Esq.
Michael N. Martinez, Esq.
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had not been issued for the automobile Heather was driving also
constitutes negligence. While such conduct may be in violation
of state statute, I do not believe that that would be an
appropriate finding for negligence as to the conduct of
defendant Heather Olson at the time and place of the accident
in question. I cannot see how the vehicle being uninsured, nor
having inappropriate plates in any way contributed to the
negligent conduct of Ms. Olson's driving pattern up to the
point of the accident.
Accordingly, unless there is something that I have
overlooked, it would appear that paragraph 7(g) and (h) should
be removed from the Findings of Fact.
I include the original Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, and the original Final Judgment in Mr. Mcintosh's copy of
this letter to counsel. Please make the appropriate changes in
accordance with the pencil changes noted above and found on the
original documents themselves, and resubmit them, at which time
the Court would be in a position to sign the Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and the Final Judgment immediately.
All other Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and the
Final Judgment appear to be appropriate in form, and are
adopted as presented as the Court's Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Final Judgment.
Please feel free to contact me if there are any further
questions regarding this matter.
Very truly yours,

Timothy R. Hanson
District Court Judge
TRH:jsh
Enclosure
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EXHIBIT "28"

Third JoUicU Dishict
JAMES A. MCINTOSH, ESQ. — No. 2194
J A M E S A. MCINTOSH & ASSOCIATES P.C.

JAN 2 7 1S93

A Utah Professional Law Corporation
Attorney for Plaintiff
Suite 17, Intrade Bldg. South
1399 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84105
Telephone: (801) 487-7834

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
MYRA L . TAYLOR

!

:
Plaintiff

:•

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

J
;

Civil No. 900907125PI

V

RONALD H. OLSON, CAROL D.
OLSON, and JENNIFER HEATHER
OLSON
Defendants

:

(Judge Timothy R. Hanson)

The above-entitled matter, having come on regularly for trial
on Thursday, November 19, 1992, before the Honorable Timothy R.
Hanson, Judge of the above-entitled court, hearing this case
without a jury; the plaintiff, Myra L. Taylor, being present in
court and represented by the law firm of James A. Mcintosh &
Associates P.C., a Utah professional law corporation, appearing
through counsel, James A. Mcintosh; the defendants, Ronald H.
Olson, Carol D. Olson, and Jennifer Heather Olson being present in
court and being represented by counsel, Michael N. Martinez; the
court having heretofore entered a Pretrial Order establishing the
procedures for presenting evidence at the time of the trial; said
Pretrial Order being incorporated herein by reference and being
made a part hereof; the court having received the various proffers

of proof, affidavits, medical reports, and other evidence submitted
by the plaintiff in support of the allegations raised in each of
the five (5) Counts of her complaint; the court having taken the
proffer of testimony from tl\e defendants, Ronald H. Olson and Carol
D. Olson, said proffers being made by their counsel, Michael N.
Martinez,

and approved

by the said

Olsons; the court

having

published the deposition of all persons heretofore deposed in this
action; the court having reviewed the said proffers of proof,
affidavits, medical reports, and other evidence and being fully
advised in the premises; hereby enters its findings of fact and
conclusions of law as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On October 17, 1987, ("accident date") the defendant

Ronald H. Olson was the owner of a 1974 Volkswagen, two-door sedan,
green in color ("Volkswagen").

Mr. Olson had purchased the said

Volkswagen from a previous owner Daniel Park Lake.

On the said

October 17, 1987, the Volkswagen was not registered in the state
of Utah and was uninsured.
2.

On the said accident date the said Ronald H. Olson was

married to the defendant Carol D. Olson and was living with his
wife and family at 1930 Logan Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84108.
On the said accident date, the defendant Jennifer Heather Olson was
sixteen years of age, having been born on April 28 1971.
3.

On the said accident date, the defendant Jennifer Heather

Olson ("Heather") was driving the said Volkswagen at approximately
11:55 P.M. on Yalecrest Avenue (1015 South in Salt Lake City, Utah)
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at its intersection with 1900 East ("accident scene").
a

"yield" traffic sign

There was

facing Yalecrest Avenue at the said

intersection, which sign required drivers on Yalecrest Avenue to
yield the right-of-way to persons on 1900 East.
4•

At the said time and place described in paragraph 3

above, the said defendant Heather was driving under the influence
of intoxicating beverages and was driving the Volkswagen with a
blood-alcohol content of approximately .14 grams in violation of
§ 41-6-44, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.
5.

A few minutes prior to the time and place described in

paragraph 3 above, said defendant Heather was involved in a "hit
and run" accident in an area less than one mile from the said
accident scene. This hit and run involved another motorist by the
name of Michelle Paxton.

Heather was being pursued by Ms. Paxton

through a residential neighborhood at the time she reached the
accident scene.
6.

At approximately 11:55 P.Me on the said accident date

and at the accident scene, the plaintiff Myra L. Taylor was driving
her 1984 Subaru 640 station wagon

("Subaru") in a northerly

direction along 1900 East Street and in a careful and prudent
manner.
7.

On or about the said 11:55 P.M. on the said accident date

and at the accident scene, the defendant Heather negligently,
("negligence") operated her Volkswagen thereby causing a collision
with the Subaru being driven by the plaintiff.

The specific

grounds of negligence include, but are not necessarily limited to,
the following:
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(a)

A failure to keep a proper lookout•

(b)

Failure to yield the right-of-way to Myra Taylor

who was driving her car on 1900 East.
(c)

Driving too fast for existing conditions.

(d)

Driving

under

the

influence

of

intoxicating

beverages with a blood-alcohol content of approximately twice the
limit established by the Utah statutes for a presumption of driving
under the influence of intoxicating beverages.
(e)

Failure

to

take

evasive

action

to

avoid

the

(f)

Failure to keep her motor vehicle under control.

accident.

8.

As a sole, direct and proximate

negligence, Myra
permanently

L. Taylor was then

injured.

She

and

suffered

cause
there

of Heather's
seriously

bruises,

and

contusions,

lacerations, shock, headache, muscle spasms, numbness in her joints
and members, scarring, strains, fractures, and other damages and
personal

injury

so as to

render the plaintiff

partially

and

permanently disabled for the balance of her life.
9.

The plaintiff has suffered a loss of the quality of life

and enjoyment of life she experienced prior to October 17, 1987,
and has also suffered mental anguish, emotional pain and suffering
and other mental and emotional trauma as more fully described in
the evidence plaintiff provided at trial, some of which is discussed hereafter.
10.

Prior to the time of the said accident on October 17,

1987, the plaintiff was in excellent health and vigor.

She was a

healthy mother who had given birth to and raised twelve
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children. She was accustomed to taking long trips as a family from
coast-to-coast in the family car. She would drive the family car,
pack the luggage and the food, work tirelessly and enthusiastically
completing these tasks as a wife and mother.

By comparison, the

plaintiff is unable to ride in the family car at the time of trial
without hunching her back and walking bent over because of back
spasms and pain.
11.
sports.

Prior to the time of the accident, the plaintiff enjoyed
She had played tennis, golf, bowling, horseback riding,

motorcycling, hiking, waterskiing, camping, badminton, jumping on
the trampoline with her children, and dancing. Since the accident,
the plaintiff has been unable to participate in any of these
activities and is by comparison an "invalid" with respect to her
lifestyle prior to the accident.
12.

The plaintiff's treating physician, King S. Udall, M.De,

gave his written opinion in a letter dated approximately one (1)
month prior to the trial that the plaintiff has sustained a ten
percent (10%) permanent impairment and disability of her total
person as a result of the accident.

Dr. Udall stated that, as a

result of the accident, Myra L. Taylor had to alter her life and
career significantly. Because of the accident Dr. Udall states Ms.
Taylor was unable to work on a full-time basis either lifting or
providing the usual services of a registered nurse. As a result,
she did not receive commensurate wages for the amount of time she
missed as working half-time as she did as a full-time employee.
Dr. Udall further states as a result of the accident the plaintiff
has difficulty with her housework and cannot do routine housework
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as before or do anything which involves heavy work using the upper
extremities.
other

After listening to the proffers of proof and the

evidence

submitted

at trial, the court

concurs

in the

findings by Dr. Udall as more fully stated in his October 20, 1992
letter to plaintiff's counsel, James A. Mcintosh, Esq..
13.

As a sole, direct and proximate cause of the accident,

the plaintiff has incurred a loss of wages for the period of time
October

18, 1987, through October

$65,861.84.

5,

1991, in the amount of

This finding is based on the affidavit of Margie Q.

Richins, dated November 9, 1992.

Ms. Richins is the Civilian

Payroll Supervisor for the Vcrteran's Administration Medical Center
where the plaintiff, Myra L. Taylor, worked for many years as a
Registered Nurse.
14.

The court finds it was reasonable and necessary for the

plaintiff to take the depositions of certain persons, to wit,
Kristi Bringhurst, Jenny Pia, Steve Ebert, Steve Jones, Scott Levy,
James Levy, Mark Muir, Jeff Gertino, and Heidi Olson.

The court

further finds it was reasonable and necessary for the plaintiff to
pay the said persons $17.00 each to attend their depositions and
to pay the amount of $232.00 for the service of subpoenas on the
said persons together with the further amount of $374.80 to the
court reporter for taking and transcribing the said depositions.
The court finds this total of $759.80 is a reasonable and necessary
expense incurred by the plaintiff in this action and is to be taxed
as part of the costs to be awarded to the plaintiff.
15.

In addition to the said $65,861.84 lost wages described

in paragraph 13, the court finds the plaintiff has also incurred
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the following reasonable and necessary special damages from the
time of the accident through the time of the trial,
(a)

Essential Services -- $6,200000.

(b)

Medical Expenses ~

(c)

Expert Witness Fees to Frank Grant for Accident,

$5,178.75

Investigation and Reconstruction Services —
16.

In

addition

to

the

ten

percent

$718.75.
(10%) total

person

impairment and disability noted by Dr. King S. Udall as described
above, the plaintiff also sustained injuries to her nose and teeth,
as more fully described

in medical reports from Dr. Bryce D.

Allredf M.D., and from her dentists, Vee Boyd Hair, D.M.D., and
Scott B. Hair, D.D.S..
17.

The plaintiff was able to resume full-time employment at

the Veteran's Administration Hospital on or about October 5, 1991.
The said full-time employment necessitated a change in the type and
nature of the work plaintiff had been performing prior to the
accident and required a career change as more fully noted in Dr.
Udall1s medical report and in the plaintiff's own testimony.
18.

The court finds Myra L. Taylor's physical, mental, and

emotional disabilities will continue for the rest of her natural
life and will interfere with her enjoyment of life as a wife and
a mother, and will deprive her of the benefits and enjoyment of
life which she had prior to the time of the accident as more fully
set forth hereinabove in these findings. For all of these reasons,
the court

finds the plaintiff

is entitled

to

$125,000.00

as

reasonable and full compensation for the general damages she has
sustained from the time of the accident to the time of trial and

from the trial through the remainder of her natural life. In this
connection, the court finds the plaintiff was born on January 28,
1943, and at the time of the accident, on October 17, 1987, was
forty-four (44) years of age. The plaintiff had a life expectancy
at the time of the accident of approximately thirty-six (36) years.
The court takes judicial notice of the plaintiff's life expectancy
which can also be verified in the legal encyclopedias such as the
DESK BOOK in' American Jurisprudence "Second Edition" Cumulative
Supplement issued in April of 1991. The mortality tables are found
in the said publication as Items numbers 159, 160, and 161.
19.

The parties have submitted to the court a proposed

"Stipulation" dated November 19, 1992, which provides for an
assignment after judgment has been entered of the defendant's claim
against their homeowners' insxirance company for failure and refusal
to defend the defendants in this instant lawsuit, for failure to
pay the policy limits of $100,000.00, for any excess judgment which
might be entered in this action, and for any additional claims
which the defendants might have against their homeowners' insurance
carrier. As consideration for the said assignment, the plaintiff
agrees not to execute on the defendants' personal property.

The

court finds the Stipulation is reasonable and adopts the terms of
the said Stipulation as though they were fully set forth in these
findings.
20.

The court finds there has been no collusion between the

plaintiff and the defendants with respect to the said Stipulation
or with respect to assigning the defendants' rights to the
plaintiff with respect to the defendants' homeowners' insurance
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carrier. The parties have submitted correspondence between counsel
for the plaintiff and counsel for the defendants as well as
correspondence

between

counsel

for

the

defendants

and

the

homeowners' insurance claims office and the attorney for the
homeowners' insurance company. The court finds the said documents
have kept the homeowners1 insurance company apprised of this legal
action and have given the said company every chance to appear in
this case and to represent the defendants herein. The court finds
the said insurance company has not appeared in this action in any
capacity whatsoever through the date of the trial.
21.

The plaintiff withdrew her claim for punitive damages at

the trial.
22.

The court

finds the plaintiff

has proved

all the

allegations with respect to each of the claims in Counts 1, 2, 3,
4, and 5 of the plaintiff's complaint except for the claim for
punitive damages against the defendant, Heather Olson, as set forth
in Count 2 which claim the plaintiff withdrew at trial.
23.

With respect to the allegations in Count 5 of the

plaintiff's complaint, the court specifically finds the defendants,
Ronald H. Olson, and his wife, Carol D. Olson, were negligent in
failing to supervise and control the activities of their minor
child Jennifer Heather Olson.

The court finds the said parents

knew the said minor child was taking the Volkswagen car from the
parents' residence and had used it on several occasions prior to
the time of the accident.

The court also finds the parents knew

that their daughter had consumed alcoholic beverages on occasions
prior to the time of the accident and was in the habit of attending
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parties with
beverages •

friends who the parents

knew

drank

intoxicating

The court furttuir finds the parents had the duty and

responsibility
Volkswagen

to

prevent

automobile

the

which

minor

was

child

uninsured

from

and

taking

which

the

was

not

registered, but the parents did not take the necessary steps and
precautions to prevent the minor child from using the automobile,
either on prior occasions or at the time of the accident on October
17, 1987. The court further finds the parents1 lack of supervision
and

control

over

the minor

child

was

the

sole,

direct,

and

proximate cause of the accident for the reasons stated in this
paragraph and for the other reasons more fully described in Count
5

of the

complaint,

all

of which

the

court

finds

are

fully

established by the evidence in this case.
24.

Section 41-2-115, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended,

provides that any negligence of a minor younger than eighteen (18)
years of age when operating a motor vehicle upon a highway is
imputed to the person who has signed the application of the minor
for a permit or license.

The said section further provides the

person signing the application for a permit or a license is jointly
and severally liable with the minor for any damages caused by the
negligent misconduct.
25.

At the time of the accident as described above in these

findings, the defendant Ronald H. Olson had signed the application
for a permit or license of the defendant minor Jennifer Heather
Olson.

Pursuant to § 41-2-115 the said Ronald H. Olson is jointly

and severally liable with Heather for any and all of the damages
sustained by Myra L. Taylor as more fully described above in these
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findings.

26.

Section 41-2-116, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended,

provides that the owner of a motor vehicle causing or knowingly
permitting a minor younger than eighteen (18) years of age to
operate the vehicle upon a highway or a person who gives or
furnishes the motor vehicle to the minor, are each jointly and
severally liable with the minor for any damages caused by the
negligence of the minor in operating the vehicle.
27.

The defendant Ronald H. Olson is jointly and severally

liable with his minor daughter Heather pursuant to § 41-2-116 for
any and all damages negligently caused by the said minor to the
person of Myra L. Taylor as set forth hereinabove in these
findings.
28.

The defendants Ronald H. Olson and Carol D. Olson are

the parents of the defendant Jennifer Heather Olson.

On October

17, 1987, the said parents were living in the same household with
the said minor child.

On the said date the said parents

negligently permitted their minor daughter to use the Volkswagen
automobile which was under the control of the said parents. At the
said time, the parents knew or should have known their minor
daughter intended to or was likely to use the motor vehicle and to
conduct herself in an activity and in a manner as to create an
unreasonable risk of harm to others.
29.

The said parents had previously known prior to the said

accident date about Heather's drinking intoxicating beverages;
however, the said parents failed to take adequate precautions or
to properly instruct their minor child about the dangers of driving

-lift o i\ <•* i> t\

while under the influence of alcohol.
30.

The

parents

further

failed

to

take

the

necessary

precautions to see their minor child would not take the Volkswagen
automobile on the highways in an unregistered condition and without
the vehicle insurance required by the statutes of the state of
Utah.
31.

As

parents

of

the

said

minor

defendants Ronald H. Olson and Carol

child

Heather,

D. Olson had

the

a duty to

supervise and control the conduct of the said minor child so as to
prevent the minor child from negligently harming others or from so
conducting herself as to create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm
to others such as Myra L. Taylor.
32.

The said parents knew or had reason to know they had the

ability to control Heather and they knew or should have known of
the necessity and opportunity for exercising such control.
parents

knew

the

automobile

did

not

contain

current

The
valid

registration as required by Utah statutes nor was the Volkswagen
automobile insured for personal injury or property damage to others
as required by Utah statutes.
33.

The parents knew the minor child had driven the car

without registration and without insurance on previous occasions;
however, the parents did not exercise the required supervision and
control

to

stop Heather

from using

it on the accident

date.

Rather, they allowed the minor child to have access to the keys to
the said automobile, to install improper license plates on the said
automobile, and to otherwise be able to use and operate the said
automobile.
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34.

The parents also knew that on prior occasions as well as

on the accident date the minor child Heather had been using license
plates from her older sister Heidi's automobile, the said use being
in violation of the state statutes pertaining to motor vehicles.
Notwithstanding this knowledge, the said parents did not ensure
Heather would discontinue this practice and the parents thereby
permitted the minor child to take the Volkswagen on the public
streets and highways in the state of Utah with an improper
registration and without adequate insurance.
35.

The parents knew the minor child had consumed alcoholic

beverages prior to the accident date.

The parents also knew the

minor child consorted with other friends and acquaintances who were
accustomed to drinking alcoholic beverages when they were together.
36o

Notwithstanding this knowledge of Heather's drinking

habits, the parents allowed

Heather to have

access to the

Volkswagen which had invalid license plates, lacked adequate
insurance, and under circumstances where the parents knew or should
have known Heather was attending a party where

intoxicating

beverages were going to be consumed and knew or should have known
that Heather may be driving the motor vehicle after consuming the
said intoxicating beverages.
37.

The parents had the ability to control Heather's access

to and use of the said Volkswagen, and also knew the necessity for
exercising the said control; however, they neglected to so control
or supervise Heather to prevent her from using the said Volkswagen
under the circumstances set forth in Count 5 of the plaintiff's
complaint.

-13-

0G0

38.

The

parents

were

negligent

in

failing

to

retain

sufficient control and discipline over their minor daughter Heather
and in failing to provide adequate supervision for Heather to
insure Heather would not take the Volkswagen automobile under the
circumstances set forth in the complaint.
39.

This lack of control and supervision on the part of the

parents constitutes negligence on their part.
40.

The said parent's negligence contributed as a proximate

and direct cause to the accident on October 17, 1987, as described
more fully hereinabove in these findings.

As a direct and

proximate result of this negligence on the part of the parents, the
plaintiff sustained the damages which she claims in the preceding
Counts in this complaint.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The plaintiff

is entitled

to

judgment against the

defendants and each of them jointly and severally on Counts 1, 3,
4, and 5 of the plaintiff's complaint for the amount of $77,959.34
special damages and the amount of $125,000.00 general damages,
together with the amount of $834.80 as costs.
2.

The Stipulation of the parties dated November 19, 1992,

should be approved by the court and is by reference incorporated
into these conclusions as though it wererfully set out herein.
DONE IN OPEN COURT THIS 27TH DAJT OF JANUARY 1993.
BY/THE. CPURT

*0^.
TIMOTHY R. HANSON

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 27th day of January 1993 a true
and correct copy of the above and foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was hand delivered to the following:
Michael N. Martinez, Esq.
4479 Gordon Lane, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
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EXHIBIT "29"

JAMES A. MCINTOSH, ESQ. ~ NO. 2194 ' —
JAMES A. MCINTOSH & ASSOCIATES P.C.

A Utah Professional Law Corporation
Attorney for Plaintiff
Suite 17, Intrade Bldg. South
1399 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84105
Telephone: (801) 487-7834

. Third Judical District

JAN 2 7 1993

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
MYRA L. TAYLOR
Plaintiff
XT

:

i

:

FINAL JUDGMENT

<

V •

J

RONALD H. OLSON, CAROL D.
OLSON, and JENNIFER HEATHER
OLSON

j
:
;

|

VQR^a-^Cflan^.
Civil No. 900907125PI
(Judge Timothy R. Hanson)

Defendants

:

The above-entitled matter, having come on regularly for trial
on Thursday, November 19, 1992, before the Honorable Timothy R.
Hanson, Judge of the above-entitled court, hearing this case
without a jury; the plaintiff, Myra L. Taylor, being present in
court and represented by the law firm of James A. Mcintosh &
Associates P.C, a Utah professional law corporation, appearing
through counsel, James A. Mcintosh; the defendants, Ronald H.
Olson, Carol D. Olson, and Jennifer Heather Olson being present in
court and being represented by counsel, Michael N. Martinez; the
court having heretofore entered a Pretrial Order establishing the
procedures for presenting evidence at the time of the trial; said
Pretrial Order being incorporated herein by reference and being
made a part hereof; the court having received the various proffers

of proof, affidavits, medical reports, and other evidence submitted
by the plaintiff in support of the allegations raised in each of
the five (5) Counts of her complaint; the court having taken the
proffer of testimony from the defendants, Ronald H. Olson and Carol
D« Olson, said proffers being made by their counsel, Michael N.
Martinet, and approved by the said Olsons? the court having
published the deposition of all persons heretofore deposed in this
action; the court having reviewed the said proffers of proof,
affidavits, medical reports, and other evidence and being fully
advised in the premises? the court heretofore entered its findings
of fact and conclusions of law, which are by reference incorporated
herein and made a part hereof;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED AS A FINAL
JUDGMENT IN THIS MATTER AS FOLLOWS:
1.

The plaintiff, Myra L. Taylor, is hereby awarded judgment

against the defendants, Ronald H. Olson, Carol D. Olson, and
Jennifer Heather Olson, and each of them jointly and severally, on
Counts 1, 3, 4, and 5 of the plaintiff's complaint for the amount
of $77,959c34 special damages, and $125,000.00 general damages
together with the plaintiff's costs incurred herein in the amount
of $834c80o
2c

The court approves and adopts ytie Stipulation signed by

the parties on November 19, 1992.
DONE IN OPEN COURT THIS 27TH DXY OF JANUARY 1993.

TIMOTHY R. HANSON
District Court

~2'

atfac*-

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 27th day of January, 1993, a true
and correct copy of the above and foregoing FINAL JUDGMENT was
hand delivered to the following?
Michael N« Martinez, Esq.
4479 Gordon Lane, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
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